Closer unity in the Queensland trade union movement 1900-1922 by Armstrong, John Brian
ABSTRACT 
Closer Unity in the Queensland Trades Union Movement 1900-1922 
is a descriptive and analytic account of the evolution and develop-
ment of the structural forms of Queensland trades union organisations 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century. While the thesis 
concentrates mainly on the formation of a stable, widely acceptable 
form of central organisation for the whole state, it also analyses 
and delineates the re-organisation of newly formed and already es-
tablished unions on a more closely-knit and more centralised basis. 
The central theme of the thesis explores the phenomenal growth in 
union membership and the number of unions, the major social, indust-
rial, economic and political crises in Queensland (but in some in-
stances such as World War 1 on a broader scale) and their relation-
ship to the amount of and type of experimentation in form and structure 
in the Queensland trades union movement. 
The first chapter is concerned with the fundamental doctrine of 
closer unity that '^ unity is strength*', the origins and trends of this 
phenomenon in Great Britain and the United States of America and the 
development of these trends in the Queensland context. Particular 
emphasis is given to the influence of crises during times of union 
expansion on the amount of experimentation with new union structures. 
This "crisis growth" theory is applied to the circumstances of the 
Queensland movement during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. The close relationship between the advocates of closer 
unity and the Queensland Parliamentary Labor Party is discussed 
as a unique factor influencing the trends within the Queensland 
closer unity movement. The criteria for designating unions as 
being militant or non-militant are re-defined in terms of the 
perceptions of the contemporary trades union movement. In the 
first decade and a half of the twentieth century, particularly, 
trades unionists perceived militancy in different terms to those used 
by some later historians of the Australian trades union movement. 
Chapters two, three and four trace the revival of tmionism which 
occurred in Queensland and the parallel attempt to achieve a max-
imization of the strength of the expanding linion movement by uni-
fying trades unions under the unbrella of the Atistra,lian Labour Fed-
eration, The culmination of these attonpts was the staging in 1910 
and 1911 of the first trades and labour congresses to be held in 
Queensland, There is a re-interpretation of the causes of the union 
revival and the rapid re-growth of trade unionism in the state during 
these two decades. In accotmting for the rate and extent of the xmion 
revival, much greater significance is placed on the influence of the 
1905-7 split in the PLP and the role of professional union officials, 
especially during the first decade. 
The expansion and influence in the union movement of the Amal-
gamated Workers Association of Queensland and the consequent donise 
of the AIF are described and analysed in chapters five and six, A 
major concern of chapter six is the significance of the 1911 sugar 
strike and the 1912 tramway strike in deciding what direction the 
closer unity movement would take in the second decade. Chapter 
seven continues to analyse the importance of the AWA in the Queens-
land union movement. Consequently, it traces and analyses the sig-
nificance of the MA's amalgamation with the Australian Workers 
Union in 1913 and the new amalgamation's attempts to become the 
One Big Union, 
Chapter eight is concerned with the influence on the Queensland 
closer unity movement, of the first world war and the social, polit-
ical , economic and industrial crises which occurred in Australia as 
a result of the war. It accounts for Queensland's rejection of the 
OBU as a suitable structural form for achieving closer unity and em-
phasises Queensland's preference for the Labour Council structure. 
The lead given to the Queensland trades union movement by the 
Brisbane trades unions in achieving closer unity is outlined in the 
last chapter. In describing the development of the movement that 
lead in 1922 to the re-establishment of the Brisbane Trades and 
Labour Council, the basic divisions that developed within the Queens-
land union movement and in the total labour movement in the state 
are revealed. The trades union movement is shown to be divided on 
the basis of a new definition of militancy based, chiefly, on align-
ment or non-aligrmient v/ith the Queensland Labor Party. 
Finally, in the conclusion an evaluation is made of the 
significance of the developments and experimentation of the period 
1900-1922 in establishing the future patterns of trades union 
structure and organisation in Queensland, 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 1889 onwards, significant groups within the Queensland 
trades union movement attempted to establish a central organisation 
to bring closer iinity to the industrial wing of the labour movement. 
Until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the focus 
for the hopes of closer unity advocates was the Austra.lia.n Labour Feder-
ation, The years after the end of that decade were marked by much ex-
perimentation in forms of central organisation in an attempt to find the • 
form that would satisfactorily meet the needs peculiar to the Queensland 
trades union movement. This was evident both within the structure of 
individual imions and within the whole industrial movement of the state. 
The major fonas of structure experimented with by individual unions 
were the traditional craft union, the **new model" craft union of the 
style of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the industrial union which 
embraced all unionists in an industry, skilled or unskilled, within the 
one framework, mass unions organised either in a loose regional structure 
or controlled closely by one central executive, and state-wide and nation-
wide federations or amalgamations of kindred unions. At an inter-xinion 
level, the main forms ¥/hich were experimented with were the traditional 
trades and laboxor council, the loosely organised federation, the tightly-
knit amalgamation, and the highly-centralised One Big Union structure with 
its emphasis on the organisation of unions into industrial groups. This 
XX 
was a period fertile in ideas and theories of union structure. Ex-
perimentation to find the most stable and most acceptable form was a 
persistent feature of industrial development and growth in the era. 
Despite the interest of nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century unionists in closer unity, Queensland historians, with few 
exceptions, have concentrated their research and their publications on 
other aspects of trade union development, most notably the major strikes, 
the growth in size and organisation of individual unions and the unions* 
relationship with the political wing of the local labour movement. There 
have been analyses and descriptive accounts of the structure and organ-
isation of the political labour movement and how it evolved but the de-
velopment of the structure and organisation of the industrial wing has 
received far too little attention. 
This thesis provides the first descriptive accotint and analysis of 
the evolution and development of the present structural forms most of 
which can trace their initiation back to the first few decades of the 
twentieth centiiry and, for a few, beyond that time. While the thesis 
concentrates mainly on the formation of a stable, widely acceptable form 
of central oi'ganisation for the whole state, it, at the same time, anal-
yses and accounts for the consequent re-organisation on more closely-knit 
and more centra.lised lines of the already established and the newly formed 
unions. These tv/o movements developed parallel to each other. Each 
exerted significant influence on the other so that the final forms adopted 
by one, were related to the developments in the other. 
iii 
As there was a similar movement to greater closer unity in other 
Australian states and in overseas countries notably Great Britain, 
United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and in continental 
Europe, the relevant aspects of these movements and the ideas, 
ideologies and theories they generated have been investigated. The 
main treatment has been to evaluate their influence especially that of 
the Great Britain, United States of America and the broader Australian 
movements, on the local movement. While the Queensland closer unity 
movement did not evolve completely independently of outside influence, 
it showed a strong pragmatism that prevented it from following slavishly 
any one "imported" form of organisation or ideology. 
One local factor, that was especially critical in forming opinions 
concerning what ideas and models would be and woxild not be acceptable 
to the closer unity advocates was the close relationship that existed 
between the political and industrial v/ings of the local labour movanent. 
Though not all unions and unionists favoured a close relationship with the 
Parliamentary Labor Party, the close link between the two wings of the 
labour movement grew to be a strong, stable, permanent relationship. 
The uneven development and growth of this relationship has been examined 
in great detail as a major determinant of the type of central organisation 
that would receive the support of unionists, 
A chronological approach has been adopted as the best means of re-
vealing the growth of unions and the evolution of the closer unity move-
ment. Nevertheless, there are several persistent themes which are de-
XV 
veloped throughout the thesis. The central theme explores the phen-
omenal growth in xinion membership and numbers of unions, the major 
social, industrial, economic and political crises and their relation-
ship to the experimentation in form and stanicture in the union movement. 
It is argued throughout that in times of union growth, unions respond 
to major social, economic, political and industrial crises (that are not 
so severe as to cause a complete collapse of the industrial movement, 
as occurred during the latter half of the 1890s) by experimenting with 
forms of structure and organisation. 
In the examination of the relationship between union growth, crises 
and experimentation in structural forms, it has been necessary to re-
examine a number of previotisly accepted historical interpretations re-
lated to the Queensland labour movement. As a result, the thesis pre-
sents major revisions of the existing explanations of the factors which 
led to the accelerated growth of unions and unions' membership in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. I have placed much greater 
emphasis on the role of the political party and paid professional union 
organisers and executive officials whose co-operation in a concerted cam-
paign to encourage the already growing movement to even greater growth 
was the major factor in deciding the extent of the union revival, es-
pecially in the years immediately after 1907, The involvement of the 
parliamentarians in this endeavour was related to their need to re-
build the electoral base of the PLP after the breakaway of Kidston and 
his followers left the 'straight' Labor Party remnant in disarray. 
other major areas of revision are the alleged reputation of the 
Queensland labour movement as being more socialistic than others in 
Australia and the reputation of the unions especially the northern 
Queensland tinion the Amalgamated Workers Association, as being, if 
not syndicalist, at least inclined towards being revolutionary social-
ist. This reputation has been related to interpretations of the strikes 
of the early years of the twentieth century by writers such as Childe 
and Turner, The re-appraisal of this reputation has led to a re-
interpretation of the criteria tha-t should be used to decide what con-
stituted militant behaviour by unions in the era. It has been estab-
lished that at least in the perception of the unionists of the period, 
the criteria used to detemiine what was militant behaviour and what was 
not,changed markedly between 1907 and 1922, This change has not always 
been detected by historians and this has led in the past to some mis-
interpretations of union behaviour. 
However, while these themes are significant for the new inter-
pretations they give of important aspects of the Queensland industrial 
movement in the era 1900 to 1922, the main value of the thesis lies in 
its exploration of the important but generally neglected area of change 
and innovation in \inion structure and organisation at the inter-iinion 
level. Out of the experimentation of the era examined, evolved the 
structural forms that have remained virtually unchanged vintil this day. 
The events and developments in no other era in Queensland history ha.ve 
had as great an effect on the structural organisation of the Queensland 
vi 
industrial movement as those of the period 1900 to 1922, 
Chapter One 
CLOSER UI-JITY 
The fundamental doctrine that **unity is strength" was the basis 
on which the structure of individual unions, whatever their type, was 
built. This fundamental belief led logically to the broader principle 
that in order to maximise the strength of the whole of the working-class 
there should be one great union of all workers. From early in the 
nineteenth century the idea of "closer unity", of organising workers 
iiito one large body instead of small. Isolated, sectional units had been 
a pervasive ideal that had led to a number of attempts to establish a 
universal vinion in each of the English-speaking countries which had 
strong industrial movements. 
Early English attempts at creating a great union, the 1818-19 
"Philanthropic Society" or "Philanthropic Hercules" organised by John 
Gast for the purpose of raising a strike fund, the National Association 
for the Protection of Labour which grew out of the Lancashire cotton 
spinners' strike in 1829 primarily as an attempt at organising a general 
strike fund, Robert Owen's Grand National Consolidated Trades Union and 
the Trades Union Congress inspired further experimentation in their own 
covintry and on the American and Australian continents. Developing as 
parallel movements but aware of and influencing each other, the closer 
unity movements in America and Australia spavmed their own attempts at 
creating centralised union structures. In the United States of America, 
the earliest form, the Federation of Organized Trades Unions, dominated 
by the Knights of Labour, gave way to the American Federation of Labour 
which in turn was challenged by the Industrial Workers of the World's 
(IW/) One Big Union (OBU), 
Though influenced by both the American and Shglish examples, 
Australian tinionists were slow to experiment. L,G, Churchward in his 
definitive article "The American Influence on the Australian Labour 
1 
Movement" has analysed the reasons for the Australian rejection of 
the Knights of Labour tsrpe of organisation. Similarly, Rod Sullivan 
2 
in his work "The Australian Labour Federation 1889-1914" has explained 
the failure of that 1889 organisation to gain the approval of Australian 
unionists except for a few in Western Australia and Queensland, In the 
latter state, the Queensland Provincial Council of the ALF lingered on 
tintil 1914, The main remnants of nineteenth century closer unity that 
continued on into the twentieth century were the Trades and Labour 
Councils and the 'general' or 'mass union' doctrines that had led to the 
formation of industry-based general unions such as the Amalgamated Miners' 
Association, the Amalgamated Shearers' Union and later the Australian 
Workers' Union that was organised on the principle of one great vinion for 
1, L,G, Churchward "The American Influence on the Australian Labour 
Movement" Historical Studies. V, 19, 1952, 
2, Rodney Sullivan The Australian Labour Federation 1889-1914, 
unpublished M A (history) thesis 1973, Queensland University, 
4 
all Australian workers. 
Parallel with the establishment of the Trades and Labour Councils 
and the organisation of unskilled workers, there was a trend amongst 
some unions for organisation along the lines of the "New Model" craft 
unions which created broader occupational organisations by either 
absorption of, or amalgamation or federation with other craft tinions 
in their industry. Sidney and Beatrice Y^ febb in The History of Trade 
3 
Unionism outlined the English development of these tinions especially 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and gave them a special place in 
the closer unity movement in that country. Though the more recent 
English histories of H.A. Turner Trade Union Growth Structure and Policy 
5 
and A.E. Musson British Trade Unions 1800-1875 challenged the all-
pervasive influence of this type in England during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, their influence in Australia at least was still 
important, 
0 
K,D, Buckley's The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia 1852-1920 
and J. Hagan's Printers and Politics presented accounts of the development 
of this nineteenth century phenomenon in the Australian industrial 
movement and the undoubted example they gave to other tinions. The 
3, Sidney and Beatrice Webb The History of Trade Unionism, (London, 
1920), 
4, H.A, Turner Trade Union Growth Structure and Policy. (London, 1962), 
5, A,E. Musson British Trade Unions 1800-1875. (London, 1972). 
6, K,D, Buckley The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia 1852-1920. 
(Canberra, 1970). 
7, J, Hagan Printers and Politics. (Canberra, 1966), 
4 
spread of this new type of craft union from England was not confined 
to these two industries and the number of 'New Model* unions increased 
during the early years of the twentieth century. 
The theories of craft unionism, mass unionism and 'New Model* 
unionism were joined in the last years of the nineteenth century and 
the early years of the twentieth century by industrial tmionism which 
varied from: 
,., in the wider sense ...a near syndicalist theory 
of social revolution: C "toj in the narrower ,,, a 
theory of trade tmion organisation only, the advocacy 
of that 'organisation of industry* which, by those who 
held to the more extreme definition, was regarded as an 
essential preliminary to the syndicalist seizure of 
power ,.,^ 
Mass unionism, New Model unionism and industrial unionism had one 
main organisational characteristic in common, an emphasis on closer 
unity. Inherent in mass unionism and industrial unionism was the 
*one big union* doctrine that aimed to create a central organisation 
for all workers while New Model unionism as previously outlined 
promoted broader craft organisation which transcended the traditional, 
narrow craft beliefs. New Model unionism, like craft unionism itself, 
embodied a more closed type of organisation than either mass unionism 
or industrial xinionism. While these three forms of closer unity 
co-existed as reactions against the early predominance of traditional 
craft unionism, they conflicted each with the other as the basic 
8, J,DJi5, Bell "Industrial Unionism: A Critical Analysis" in W,E.J, 
McCarthy Trade Unions. (Middlesex, 1972), p 109, 
organisational principle of each form cut across that of the other two. 
This conflict was exacerbated by divergent views of just how closer 
unity within an industry should be achieved and to v/hat purpose it 
shotild be used once it was achieved. Whether to federate or 
amalgamate or remain completely independent became a vital issue 
during the period under examination 1900-1922. The evolutionary 
or revolutionary ideologies of trade unionism further complicated the 
environment in which the twentieth century closer unity movement 
occurred, 
It is necessary here to differentiate between two types of closer 
unity structure, 'horizontal* and * vertical'. The first refers to the 
attempt to organise all workers in an occupation or industry into one 
union while 'vertical' closer unity involved the formation of a universal 
union which either embraces all workers in all industries or occupations 
in one mass union or links individual lonions loosely in an ALF type 
structure or a Trades and Labour Council, or groups workers into 
industries or 'departments' which are governed by a central agency 
such as the One Big Union of the IW?, 
Unions could be involved with either or both types of closer unity 
at various times of their evolution or even both at the same time, 
Australia's largest mass union, the MW, began on the basis of 
organising all workers into one great union but during the nineteenth 
century and the first decade of the twentieth century, it recruited 
only tinskilled pastoral workers. After its amalgamation in 1913 with 
1 
the Amalgamated Workers Association of Queensland (AWA) and a number 
of southern rural unions, it once again embarked on a course of universal 
9 
unionism designed to make it the One Big Union of Australian unionism. 
Similarly before 1913, the AWA acting on the principle "every unionist 
10 
should be a member", organised horizontally absorbing by amalgamation 
as many smaller and large unions as possible while it was also involved 
in a vertical closer unity movement, the ALF, After the amalgamation 
with the AWU, the AWA leaders participated in that union's attempts to 
11 
become the OBU, 
Australian labour historians, generally, emphasise the 'social 
revolutionary* tj^ pe of industrial unionism, as exemplified in Australia 
by the IWW, as the main influence on the closer unity movement in the 
second decade of the twentieth century. The IWW's doctrines emphasised 
the highly centralized vertical type of closer unity of the OBU which, 
eventually, resulted in the formation of the Workers Industrial Union 
of Australia (WIUA) in 1919, However, dating from the end of the nine-
teenth century, the narrower theory of 'organisation by industry* as 
an end in itself without the syndicalists* revolutionary intention but 
still with some political and social objectives, was a strong influence. 
This influence, particularly in Queensland, had a more important and 
longer-lasting significance than the lYffrs syndicalism. 
In Queensland, the Australasian Meat Industry Employees* Union (AlilEU), 
9 . See ch 7 , 
1 0 . See ch 5 . 
1 1 . See ch 7 , 
the Millers, Bakers and Confectionary Employees Union amongst others 
organised on industrial lines for the purpose of taking in all workers 
in their respective industries without their aspiring to create any 
all-embracing organisation for all Queensland workers although both 
organisations did become involved in vertical closer xmity movements 
quite distinct from their attanpts to organise their own industry, 
12 
While the OBU had a very brief existence, in Queensland, the other two 
organisations continued on with at least the AMIECJ being still in 
existence today. The continuing influence of the horizontal type 
of closer unity is manifest in the recent movement of the 1970s for 
amalgamation, especia,lly in the metal industry. 
Successes achieved by organising within an industry or occupation 
often encouraged rejection of vertical types of closer unity. This was 
evident in Queensland in the 1910 and 1911 Trades and Labour Union 
Congresses where one of the major obstacles in the way of efforts to 
expand the influence of the ALF was the interests of national 
amalgamations and federations. Continually, throughout the period to 
192^ the two movements came into conflict preventing any universal 
union being created despite determined efforts by the advocates of 
closer imity of the vertical type. Failures of the number of attempts 
during the period to form a strong, centralised, universal union which 
could provide for the needs of the union movement encouraged those xmions, 
12, See ch 8. 
13, See ch 4. 
organised on a horizontal basis, to strengthen and extend this type of 
closer unity, Hagan*s work on the printing trade has shown clearly this 
trend in the Queensland Typographical Association. Under the leadership 
of Albert Hinchcliffe and later William Colborne this union embarked 
on a campaign of organising the sectional unions within the printing 
industry in the state into one union. In this, they were highly 
successful. At the same time, the QTA played an important part in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century moves to fotind and expand a 
strong central universal union, the ALF, However, when the failure 
of the 1912 general strike brought repressive measures from the Denham 
government and a consequent loss in QTA membership, the QTA rejected 
the vertical type organisation and concentrated on expanding nationally 
within its own industry. As Hagan states: 
From 1912 onwards, the QTA concentrated its 
strategy on the creation of an Australian-wide 
printing union which would register with the 
Commonv/ealth Arbitration Court and seek a 
federal award. 
The success of the horizontal closer unity movement led to the 
institutionalization of sectionalism in the Queensland and the 
Australian industrial movements so that today there are still over 
three hundred separate unions in Australia despite the continued 
advocacy of the need for fewer unions and the still strong desire 
of many iinion leaders to organise on industrial lines. 
14, J, Hagan "The Queensland Typographical Association" in D,J, Murphy, 
. R,B. Joyce, Colin A, Hughes (eds) Prelude to Pov/er. The Rise of the 
Labour Party in Queensland 1885-1915. (Brisbane, 1970), p 162, 
9 
This suggests that the most important long-term influence on 
trade union organisation and structure in Australia was the desire 
for sectional autonomy on which the more centralist closer unity 
doctrines made little impression. The strong pull of sectional 
autonomy even from unions organised industrially meant that no 
movement advocating a highly centralized universal union structure 
could succeed. Unions, desiring a forujia for the inter-change of 
ideas and the formation of policies on matters of common concern, 
favoured the Trades and Labour Council structure. This ensured that 
the Trades and Labour Council, historically the oldest existing closer 
unity structure in Australia, dating from the establisliment of the 
Melbourne Trades Hall Council in 1^4 would be the most persistent form 
of vertical closer unity organisation in the Australian industrial 
movement, 
Despite wide-spread experimentation in vertical organisations and 
attempts to deviate from the traditional Trades and Labour Council 
structure in the period 1900-1922 the long-term result was, in 
Queensland, at least, to consolidate the place of this type of structure 
within the industrial movement. As Richard A. Lester discovered in his 
analysis of the evolution of American unionism, such short-term move-
ments or swings as occurred in Queensland during 1900 to 1922 might 
cause "actual developments to deviate from the long-run trends but 
generally do not basically alter the latter, and the influence of the 
lO 
15 
trends predominates over long periods of time". The trend of 
creating Trades and Labour Councils interrupted in the 1890s by the 
establishment of the ALF and in the second decade of the twentieth 
century by the OBU movement survived the short-teim swings to re-
emerge with the establishment of the Trades and Labour Council of 
Brisbane which aspired to be and eventually did become the Trades and 
16 
Labotir Council of Queensland. 
Nevertheless, references to the closer unity movement of this 
period, in general histories and most histories of the Australian 
labotir movement usually stress the movement to achieve a vertical 
closer tmity of the highly centralized kind. This thesis also 
explores the trends and developments in the creation of a vertical 
type structure within Queensland. However, cognizant of the 
significance of sectional autonomy, it stresses as a continuing 
theme the expansion of state-wide and national federations and 
amalgamations within an industry or occupation as a major development 
of the period 1900-1922. That this trend in Queensland was encouraged 
by the establishment of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court and the repressive measures of the Denham government is manifest 
in the experience of the QTA. Nevertheless, the trend to organize 
horizontally and vertically became a general movement throughout 
Australia which accelerated in the ferment of the period just before, 
during and immediately after World War 1. 
15. Richard A. Lester-As Unions Mature An Analysis of the avolutjon of 
American Unionism,. (Princeton, 1958), p 112. 
16. See ch 9. 
11 
Though Ian Turner in Industrial Labour and Politics The Dynamics 
of the Ai:tstralian Labour Movement in Eastern Australia 1900-1921 saw 
the influence of the IWW and its advocacy of industrial unionism as 
the " ,., new impetus to the top-level movement for closer unity 
17 
fi,e, the 'vertical* closer unity movementj ,., ", the increased 
activity and experimentation to find more suitable organizational 
structures both for individual unions and for the closer unity 
movement stemmed from a more general source than the influence of the 
doctrines of one ideology. That the syndicalist ideology of the TM 
was influential in deciding what type of structures would be attanpted 
at this time is not doubted but the view that designates it the main 
causal role in inducing the experimentation of this time is rejected. 
The role of the IWW was more formative than causal. Its ideology 
acted as one of the sources of ideas for trade iinion structure at a time 
when social, political, economic and, in the Queensland context, legal 
factors created an environment of crisis that caused the unions to seek 
a re-structuring of the way in which they were organised internally, 
state-wide, or even nationally. It is a general tendency for organisations 
faced v/ith radical changes in their environment to attanpt to break with 
tradition and seek new structures, H,A, Turner foimulated the general 
theory thatj 
The character of organisations, like tha,t of 
people, is very much a product of ancestry and 
17, Ian Turner Industrial Labour and Politics. The Dynamics of the 
Labour Movement in Eastern Australia 1900-21. (Canberra. 1965). 
p 65. 
12 
the circumstances of their early grov;th. Once 
these things are set, only a rather radical 
change in an organism's environment can usually 
disturb its character , . , 
Lester, also, noted the tendency of labour movements to seek change 
in periods of ferment: 
,.. the labour movement does experience periods 
of extensive ferment and fairly general advance 
followed by consolidation and levelling off to 
a plateau. Ferment is generated by disturbance 
and strains that require readjustments and 
stimulate worker protest ,., Usually unions 
have experienced upswings in membership during 
wars and inflations and loss of momentvim during 
post-war eras.l® 
In his explanations for the periods of structural change within 
the union movement in the United States of America, Irving Bernstein 
20 
in "Union Growth and Structural Cycles" linked these two factors 
isolated by H,A, Turner and Lester i.e. the seeking of structural 
changes in times of ferment and the growth of membership in such an 
environment to create a cyclic theory of structural change that applies 
to organisational changes in the Queensland union movement between 
1900 and 1922. It is possible that it can be applied to the whole 
Australian movement but to ascertain this would entail an investigation 
far beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is an area that 
deserves further investigation which should be attesapted by Australian 
18, H.A. Turner Trade Union Growth Structure and Policy, op clt p 14. 
19, Lester, op cit. p 108, 
20, Irving Bernstein "Union Growth and Structural Cycles" In 
W. Galeraan and S.W. Lipset (eds) Labor and Trade Unionism an 
Interdisciplinary Reader, (New York, 1960). 
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labour historians. 
Bernstein combined the *crisis growth* generalization that 
crises such as domestic social cataclysms or wars, resulted in 
"an acceleration of the secular rate of trade union expansion** 
with the rate of structural growth in trade unions to formulate 
a theory of union growth and structural cycles which established 
that "... the crisis growth of union membership is closely related 
22 
to structural change in the trade union". As Bernstein stated; 
Workers and then trade union leaders have 
embarked upon adventures in organization only 
in those short spans of time when they have 
been so disillusioned as to challenge the 
existing social order .,, New structures are 
born in the convulsive labour pangs of a dis-
tressed society. 
In the period 1900-1022, Queensland society was in a state of 
ferment characterised by a political split in the labour movement, 
major indtistrial unheavals, economic hardship, legal insecurity for 
the trade union movement, a world war and the consequent social, 
economic and political upheavals that the cataclysmic effects of the 
war had on the whole Australian nation. This period was also marked 
by phenomenal growth in tmion membership and the number of unions. 
The conjtmction of these two factors produced major structural changes 
in the internal and external organisation of the Queensland labour movement. 
Similar structural changes occurred in other eastern Australian States 
which experienced similar crisis growth conditions, 
21, Ibid, p 78. """" ' ~ 
22, loc cit 
23, ibid, p 88 
A Special factor in the Queensland circxmstance was the parallel 
growth of the political and industrial wings of the Queensland labour 
movement. After 1907, there developed a close relationship between 
the two wings which became an important formative influence on the 
extent and type of structural change. In this period, the Queensland 
laboiir movement did not comply with the traditional "swing of the 
pendulum" theory that depicts working-class activity as oscillating, 
according to economic conditions, between political agitation in bad 
times and trade unionism in good. This *trade cycle* theory has tended 
24 
to become a basic assumption in labour historiography. Though, during 
the era 1907 to 1920, there were periods of both good and bad economic 
conditions, there was also a strong dependence on both political and 
industrial methods to achieve objectives. This unity, less strong 
towards the end of the period, grew out of a co-operative response to 
the crises of the era that brought strength and cohesion to the 
Queensland labour movement. 
Therefore, parallel to the movement for closer unity vrithln the 
Queensland industrial moveaent there developed an increasing unity 
between the political and industrial v/ings of the labour movement 
which is even today a particular feature of the Queensland labour 
movement, This provided an added dimension to the Queensland closer 
unity movement in this era which was not present in similar movements 
in some other Australian states. 
24. Turner Industrial Labour and Politics op cit, p 82 
15 
Before 1915, the growing strength of the labour movement 
coincided with an increasing militancy amongst unionists. Faced by 
growing unemployment, spiralling prices and attempts to cut wages, 
maintain "sweated" working conditions and a government which 
supported the employers who fought strenuously to prevent the spread 
of vinionism and any industrial reforms, many unions resorted to strong 
25 
industrial action to force concessions. According to V.G. Childe , 
from 1908 inwards, imion "militancy" in Australia was checked by the 
likelihood of the Labor parties' gaining power in the executive 
legislatures of the chief eastern States and by what he terms "the 
disastrous results of experiments in direct action under hostile 
26 
Ministries which recalled the lessons of the nineties". While Childe 
did not define the term "militancy", it is clear he shared Ian Turner's 
view that the term: 
'Militant* .., signifies industrial action rather 
than reliance on arbitration and legislation, an 
uncomprising attempt to win all that is denanded 
rather than settle for a part, an attitude v;hich 
asserts the clash of class interests rather than 
27 
a commvinity of interests ,,, 
Turnex" did admit the relative nature of such a term but both he and 
Childe used "militancy" in the narrow absolute sense of strike action. 
They assumed that militancy was based upon a concept of industrial 
conflict being at least in part, a manifestation of the class struggle, 
25. V.G, Childe How Labour Governs A Study of Workers' Representation 
in Australia, (London, 1923), Chapter VIII. 
26. ibid. p 104. 
27. Turner Industrial Labour and Politics, op:cit p XV. 
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Yet, confrontations betv/een employer and employees can be of a 
28 
highly combative nature and not involve the withdrawal of labour 
by the employee, or the right to work by the employer. Likewise, to 
consider all militancy within the industrial movement as having a 
political or an ideological basis precludes the seeking of purely 
economic objectives per se. It ignores the fact that industrial 
conflict can be "a mere stirface symptom of more fundamental 
characteristics of rtile making and administration in a given 
29 
industrial context". 
Certainly, much of the militancy in Queensland in this period 
can be explained in terms of the economic changes occurring and the 
attempts by employees and employers to adjust to the new situation 
in which an expanding union movement brought, for the first time, 
strong orga-nisation into industries such as the sugar industry, the 
mining industry of the north, the railway and tramway industries and 
into other industries and areas where already existing weak unions 
were replaced by strong, well-organised bodies run by professional 
officials committed to seeking a share of increased profits and shorter 
hours in order to overcome the depressed conditions of the workers. 
Their militancy was mostly defensive in the face of the employer'^ 
and government's refusal to recognise their rights and principles. Many 
28. Margaret B, Cribb Trade Union Militancy; Case Studies in Transport, 
unpublished M A thesis (government) 1972, Queensland University. 
29, John T. Dunlop Industrial Relations Systems. (New York, 1958), 
p 380, as quoted in D,W, Oxnam "The Incidence of Strikes in 
Australia" J.C. Isaacs and J.V/. Ford (eds) Australian Labour 
Relations. (Melbourne, 1968), p 30, 
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of these xinions were equally committed to bringing to power a Labor 
Party that they perceived as the political wing of the labour 
movement with the same aims as they. 
Therefore, it is considered that any union was militant which 
exhibited an aggressive attitude to the employer or employers in an 
industry or the goverrmient and actively confronted him or them in oi^er 
to ameliorate the conditions of its monbers. Active confrontation or 
militancy did not necessarily mean withdrawal of labour or other aspects 
of direct action, though it could, and during the period under discussion, 
did, at times, involve this. It did not demand an uncompromising 
ideological clash of class interests even though this might be present 
and was present as a contributing or even the sole factor in some of 
the conflicts of this period, 
Childe and Turner viewed militancy from the standpoint of the 
extrone left-wing of the industrial movement and condemned as mod-
erates those unions that used arbitration and/or supported the Labor 
parties. At the extreme, they equated militancy with revolutionary 
socialism and anything less than that was non-militant. This inter-
pretation of the phenomenon applied more to the period after 1919 and 
was in accord with the perception of the criteria for militancy held 
SO: 
by unionists from that time. 
However, in the conservative, capitalist society of Queensland 
in the first decade and the early part of the second decade of the 
30, See ch 9, 
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twentieth century, the mere refusal to accept the economic status 
quo, to actively seek to expand unionism, to use union organisation 
and funds to bring to power a Labor Party committed to state socialism, 
preference for unionists, recognition of the legal status of unions, 
the passing of an Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the evolut-
ionary reconstruction of society to ensure a more equitable economic 
system, was to pursue a policy of militant unionism deplored and 
bitterly opposed by the government, its supporters and many craft 
unionists. This militant policy of "socialistic iinionism" or "poli-
tical unionism" was pursued to reconstruct the labour movement in the 
face of a hostile government which refused to register iinions which 
had political objectives in their inles. The so-called "disastrous 
resxilts of experiments in direct action under hostile ministries" in 
the form of 1911 and 1912 strikes did not quell this militancy. On 
the contrary, militancy of the tjrpe described above increased in the 
union movement especially in the south-east region of the state bring-
ing a greater impulse to the moves for closer unity and greater co-
operation betv/een xmionists and the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP). 
In the period after 1900, strikes and lock-outs became prevalent 
as the unions and employers tested each other's strength. Initially, 
in most instances the employers won these trials of strength. Failure 
in isolated strikes convinced the union movement that only closer 
unity, industrially and politically would bring long-term success. 
Therefore the period to 1922 was marked by persistent experimentation 
to find satisfactory forms of horizontal and vertical tinity to meet 
the needs of an industrial movement beset by crises. 
IM 
Chapter Two 
UNION REVIVAL 1900-1907. 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Queensland 
trade union movement underwent a major revival and re-organisation 
of its structxire. New unionism, the impetus of the nineteenth century, 
that created the large mass unions of unskilled rural workers still 
siarvived but was not the dominant force it had been during the late 
1880s and early 1890s, Nevertheless, it continued as an important 
organizational influence during the early years of the new century 
in which the reviving industrial movement struggled to establish 
itself and find a structure that would achieve its long-held dream 
of one great union for the whole state. At the turn of the century, 
the Queensland Provincial Council of the Australian Labour Federation 
(AI^) lingered on as a reminder of ninete^ath century aspirations. 
Its loosely-knit structure was to come under strong challenges from 
advocates of more centralised structures epitomised by the highly 
centralised One Big Union, 
Craft -unions formed by men engaged in skilled trades such as 
plumbing, carpentry, tinsmithing and bootmaking continued unchanged 
as elites which jealously excluded all from membership except those 
sharing common skills and techniques. Strongly craft conscious, 
they clung to their independence and prized their autonomy of action. 
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Most craft unions had generally held aloof from the political 
aspirations and militancy of the mass unions in the nineteenth 
century. Important exceptions were the Bootmakers'Union and the 
Printer^ Union which led by David Bowman and Albert Hinchcliffe 
respectively played leading roles in Queensland unionism especially 
1 
in the 1880s and 1890s. Their exclusiveness and reluctance to 
become involved in industrial militancy earned thean the opprobrium 
of the new unionists who branded then as sectional and obstructionist. 
In the twentieth century, the central position of new vinionism 
as the inspiration for union organisation was taken by the theory 
tiiat unionism would be stronger and better organised if all workers 
in an industry skilled and unskilled were members of one union. 
This refin^nent of nineteenth century "new unionism", stemming mainly 
from development in the industrial movement of France, U,S,A, and Great 
Britain became known as industrial unionism. Organisation by industry 
rather than by trade or occupation became an ideal that increased the 
growing emphasis on centralized union structure, with the aim of 
overcoming the obstacles to unified action that craft divisions had 
created in the past and perpetuated by the continued existence of 
craft unions. The ideal was never achieved in Australia although some 
industries such as the meat and the railway industries came close to 
achieving this aim. 
As the twentieth century union revival gathered momentum, all of 
1, J. Hagan Printers and Politics, op cit. 
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the three main types of union organisation, craft unionism, mass 
unionism and industrial unionism continued to exist side by side 
fragmenting the industrial movement and placing insurmountable 
obstacles in the way of the achievament of one completely unified 
industrial structure. Despite its failure to achieve unity, the 
reviving trade union movement once again became an important and 
influential part of the Queensland labour movement. 
The trade union movement in the 1880s and 1890s had been a 
significant force in the Queensland labour movement. By the beginning 
of the twentieth century, its influence had diminished greatly. 
Indicative of this decline was the marked decrease in numbers of 
unions and union membership. The 1891 census listed forty-two 
2 
unions with a total membership of 16,542 registered under the 
Trade Union Act of 1886, By 1900, the ntiraber of registered unions 
had fallen to thirteen and the membership to 4,740. The membership 
continued to decline xmtil the end of 1902, In 1905, Tom Mann the 
dynamic English unionist, after a three months tour of the east coast 
visiting Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba, Gympie, Maryborough, Bundaberg, 
Rockhampton, Mt. Morgan, Townsville, Charters Tow^ ers and Cairns assessed 
the state of unionism in Queensland in the following terms: 
I am sorry to say I found industrial organisation 
at a very low ebb; so low in some places as to 
have no existence, and in others but a feeble, 
occasional wash as from a receding tide, 
2. D,J, Murphy, R,B. Joyce and Colin Hughes (eds) Prelude to Power, 
p 315, Appendix H, 
3. Interview with Tom Mann in Worker. 27 May 1905. 
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Mann was appalled that the once strong union town of Gympie with 
a population of 14,000 had not even one union committee to represent 
the interests of the miners. This was a new experience for the 
fervent advocate of industrial unionism who was to figure prominently 
in the industrial battle for vra.ge justice and the rights and principles 
of unionism in the Broken Hill industrial conflicts. To this inter-
national socialist, the Queensland industrial movement was in the 
5 
"weakest state of any civilised country**. 
The decline had begtin with the defeats of unionism in the early 
1890s. Before the unions could recover frcan the reverses of 1891 and 
1894, they suffered a further setback with the failure of the economy 
when the boom conditions of the previous years were replaced by a severe 
depression. Conditions for unionism worsened when the economy was hit 
hard by the disastrous drought which lasted in some areas from 1898 
until 1906, There was a consequent weakening of the rural unions which 
had been the dynamic militant force in Queensland unionism. 
In contrast to the lack of trade unions, Tom Mann found political 
organisations existent in almost every centre he visited, but these 
were doing little or nothing in the way of educational work; there was 
no literature on sale and no educational meetings were being organised. 
He lamented the concentration on political work which was not used to 
supplement and complete the work of unionism, but which became a 
substitute for it. This he claimed was against the general trends 
4. loc cit 
5. loc cit 
6. loc cit 
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elsewhere in the world, "every other country resorts to more 
industrial organisation or trade unionism as they enlarge their 
7 
sphere of political activit5/". His advice to the Queensland 
laboTxr movement was that a systematic, organised campaign, at the 
political and industrial levels, should be comraenced to arouse the 
workers to the support of the overall labour movement. However, the 
Queensland labour movement was to be slow in heeding Mann's advice. 
The revival came, but only after a major ci-isis rent the movement apart 
and forced it to re-appraise its ideology and organisation. 
Mann's characterising the union movement as a "receding tide" 
was not absolutely accurate. From 1903 onwards, as a result of 
renewed interest in unionism following the first Inter-State Trade 
Union Congress of 1902, which tried to assume the role of the inter-
colonial tirade union congress of the 1880s, and the successes of the 
Labor Party in the Federal elections of 1903, unionism grew slowly 
and steadily, tuitil 1906, By the end of that year, there were twenty 
trade tinions registered under the 1886 Act v/ith a total membership 
i 
exceeding 7,750, 
The expansion of unionism was xineven and patchy, undergoing 
great impetus in some areas whilst there v/as a continuance of stagnation 
in others and even a continuing decline in a few. In Brisbane, the 
main industrial centre, unionism existed fitfully. Brisbane had always 
7. loc cit 
8. loc cit 
9. Annual Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1906, QPP. 
I, 1908, pp 372-73. 
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been aiaongst the most backward of capitals in union development and 
this trend continued until after the 1912 General Strike. In 1904 
there were only eleven unions in Brisbane registered with a member-
ship, of 1,832 of which 1,055 belonged to two unions - The Federated 
Seamen's Union of Australasia and the Federated Waterside Workers' 
10 
Union. Nine out of the eleven registered unions had a falling 
membership. There was a decline of 135 in union membership in the 
capital. This is in contrast to an overall increase in membership of 
377 throughout Queensland. The annual report of the Brisbane Eight 
Hour Anniversary Union for 1904-05 lamented the falling number of 
11 
unions represented in the procession. Though the situation was 
slightly better in 1905, there were still seven out of twelve unions 
12 
with a smaller monbershi^ p than that of the previous year. 
Despite the poor state of unionism in Brisbane, there was an 
increase in union membership throughout the State in succeeding years. 
This was mainly due to the large increases in enrolments in the rural 
workers' unions in the pastoral districts of Longreach and Charleville, 
There, the newly fonned branches of the mass union the Australia.n 
Workers Union (AWU), resulting from the 1905 amalgamation of the 
Amalgamated Workers Union of Queensland (AmalWU) with the A W , were 
beginning to attract more workers. AmalWU membership rose by 500 in 
1904 and in 1905 the new AWU's membership rose by 812 accounting for 
10. loc cit 
11. Fortieth Annual Report Brisbane Eight Hour Anniversary Union^ 
(Brisbane, 1906), p 1. Held by Queensland Trades and Labour Council, 
12. Annual Report of the Registx'ar of Friendly Societies for 1905, 
QPP. I, 1906, p 1688. 
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more than the total increase in overall union msnbership in the 
13 14 
State in 1904 and for the great part of it in 1905. Improvements 
in wages and conditions were soon obtained by the AY/U in the Federal 
Arbitration Court and flowed on to the Queensland workers. Employers 
showed respect for the strength of the new union in negotiations over 
wages and working conditions. 
While the west was being re-awakened to the benefits of unionism 
by the AWU, the eastern and northern districts were dormant. Apart 
from some flicker of life in the coastal provincial towns amongst the 
wharf labourers recently federated with the Australian body and the 
members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, union activity was 
almost non-existent. In 1904 and 1905, there were five country unions 
15 
registered, three of which were branches of the AWU, Labourers, miners, 
sugar workers and craftsmen were mainly unorganised industrially. Wages 
were low; "sweated" conditions were prevalent and the employers generally 
could and did dictate the terms of wages and employment conditions. 
Unemployment was high and rising so there were plenty of workers to take 
the place of union agitators. Unionists often found their affiliation 
with a union counted against them when they sought employment. In the 
face of victimisation by employers, unions except the AWU were powerless 
to support their members. Those unions which did exist, again except 
the AV/U, the QTA and the Bootmakers were non-militant, craft organisations 
13. ibid 1904, ^ PP, I, 1905, pp 639-40. 
14. ibid 1905, £PP, I, 1906, p 1688. 
15. loc cit 
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chiefly concerned with their own problems and unprepared to aid 
fellow trade unions in trouble. There were instances where unions 
•scabbed' on striking unions in kindred crafts and contributed to 
the defeat of their fellows who were striving for better conditions, 
16 
The Australian Labour Federation (ALF) since 1889 the central 
organisation for Queensland unions seemed, at least temporarily 
to have vacated or was unable to maintain, its position of unifying 
leadership. The lack of central leadership allowed unionism to fade 
as an influence in the labour movement in Queensland and the dream of 
the ALF leaders of creating one union if not for all of Australia at 
least for Queensland, which had been close to realization before the 
1890 strikes, had faded into the memory of the few remaining enthusiasts 
such as Albert Hinchcliffe its secretary and member of the Legislative 
Council and union and political stalwart David Bowman in the first decade 
of the twentieth century. Few unions were affiliated with the ALF as 
they were tmprepared or were xinable to pay the affiliation dues, Tlie 
17 
inspiration of the "new unionism" of the 1880s was almost forgotten. 
Under those conditions, the revival of unionism in the western 
areas was welcomed as an encouraging sign for the future of the labour 
movement especially as the movement was faced with a conflict within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and between the PLP and the Labor 
16. R. Sullivan, op cit 1973, has the most recent and best accotint 
of the structure, functions and history of this organisation. 
17, Robin Gollan Radical and Working Class Politics. A Study of 
Eastern Australia 1850-1910. (Melbourne, 1967); W.G. Spence 
Australia's Awakening (Sydney, 1909) and History of the AWU 
(Sydney, 1911); Brian Fitzpatrick A Short History of the Aust-
ralian Labour Movement (Melbourne, 1944) all contain accounts 
of this phenomenon of Australian unionism. 
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Party oi'ganisation that appeared to foreshadow a disastrous split 
in Labor party ranks. Regarding the union revival, the major labour 
journal in Queensland the Worker commented: 
•., it is surely a coincidence of good augury 
that industrial xonionism should at this precise 
moment exhibit unmistakeable signs of vigorous 
revival. The large increase in the membership 
of the AWU - especially the magnificent record 
of the Charleville Branch - is in itself a fact 
to inspire with hope and resolution. ¥/hen, in 
addition, we see political defeat on the Towers 
infusing new life into their union and in the 
sugar-growing districts perceive the work of 
organisation progressing steadily, it must 
be admitted by the most sombre-eyed amongst 
us that there are streaks of brightness on 
the horizon. 
The upsurge in unionism in the middle of the first decade of 
the twentieth century has generally been attributed to the improvement 
in the economy caused by the break in the seven years' drought. One 
historian, John Dalton, has written: 
In Queensland the drought broke in 1904 and good 
seasons returned to dispel the spectre of un-
employment that had kept unionism subdued , . .'^^ 
His argument is. extended to propose that workers in Queensland 
seeking to share in the new prosperity of the colony joined already 
existing unions or organised new unions to meet their needs. Un-
doubtedly, this v;as a major factor in the growth of unionism in some 
areas, but the theory is not valid for the whole State or for the 
whole period especially after 1907 when the most spectacular increase 
in numbers of iinions and union membership occurred. 
18. Worker. 13 January 1906. 
19, J,B, Dalton "An Interpretive Survey; The Queensland Labour Movement", 
Murphy et al op cit. pp 3-27, 
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There had been growth in the mmbevs of unions registered since 
1900 when the branches of the AaialWU of Queensland re-registered under 
the Act, but apart from that year union membership generally remained 
20 
low until 1902. Hov/ever from 1902, despite the drought, xmion 
membership began to match the rise in nujiibers of unions until by 
the end of 1906 union membership had almost doubled. 
Most of this increase can be attributed to increased enrolment 
in the pastoral areas. There the breaking of the drought did attract 
more rural workers to the industry and this swelled the ranks of the 
AmalWU branches at Charleville and Longreach, In Hughenden where relief 
from the drought did not arrive until a few years later, union member-
ship continued to fall and the lament of the tinion organiser in that 
area in 1904 was indicative of conditions in other areas before the 
drotight broke: 
The membership shov/s a slight decrease on that 
of last year, but I am pleased to believe that 
this is not due to revulsion of feeling towards 
the AWU but rather I regret to say to apathy 
and indifference. While many members have not 
been in a position to renew their tickets at the 
time of my visit they have neglected to do so 
after?/ards. I trust that in future, members will 
not forget there are agents in all towns where 
they can procure tickets. On the other hand, there 
are some who have used all sorts of excuses to 
dodge paying their just dues. These as well as 
• others in arrears should recognise that it is 
21 
only just that they should pay up. 
The failure of the Hughenden Branch eventually caused the AWU Executive 
to close it and re-organise the whole Queensland branch to absorb the 
20, ibid, p 315, Appendix H, 
21. Mount Morgan Argus. 18. February 1904, 
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Hughenden organisation. 
Overall, the re-organised MJU was well served by enthusiastic, 
energetic and efficient union officials and organisers, who were very 
successful in persuading rural workers that the newly formed xmion 
with the weight of the continent-wide body behind it could obtain 
favourable v/ages and conditions from the Pastoralists' Union, 
individual employers and the Federal Arbitration Court. The new 
22 
award was finally achieved in July 1907, Before that date the 
now more confident shearers had been able to force employers in 
Queensland to increase rates of payment and to improve working 
conditions in the shearing industry. Their solidarity and their 
success proved an inspiration to other v/orkers in rural areas to 
organise into unions in order to achieve better wages and better 
working conditions and to resist the attempts by ©nployers to cut 
wages, to deny workers the benefits of such industrial reforms as 
the ?/orkers* Compensation Act, and to continue to exploit "sweating" 
practices. 
Despite Dalton's claim, working conditions in Queensland did 
not improve with the breaking of the drought in 1904, The number 
of tinemployed continued to rise. Unemployment was increased further 
by the enlarged immigration programme promoted by the government in 
face of PLP and trade union opposition. The Worker in the latter 
half of 1905 expressed growing concern at the increasing number of 
22, Spence History of the AWU. op cit. p 110. 
tinemployed and decried the unsympathetic attitude of the government 
23 
to this situation, A number of unions were organised, especially 
in the mining industry at a time v/hen the industry was experiencing 
a slump with conditions becoming extremely difficult for workers as 
employers adopted an increasingly stiffer attitude towards them by 
cutting wages and lengthening hours to produce more competitive 
prices for their minerals in order to meet strong opposition from 
the southern states and from overseas competitors, 
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Table I 
Six Months Ending 31A2 30/6 31A2 30/6 31A2 30/6 31A2 30/6 
1906 1907 1907 1908 1908 1909 1909 1910 
Registration of 1274 3019 2593 3742 2837 3966 5710 4834 
persons seeking 
employment 
Number found 
employment 
Not found 
employment 
854 
420 
1905 
1114 
1872 
721 
1939 
1803 
1766 
1071 
2180 
1786 
4234 
1476 
2813 
2021 
Such was the cause of the re-organising of the Gympie miners in 
25 
March 1906, After a number of attempts to form a union had failed, 
it was finally created in a burst of indignation against the actions 
of mining companies in the area. Ys'hen the Workers' Compensation Act 
of 1906 became law, some companies determined that they would defeat 
23. Worker. 29 July 1905, 
24. Compiled from figures in the Annual Reports of the Department of 
Labour, £PP, 1906-10. 
25. Worker, 27 Jxme 1908. 
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the object for which the humanitarian measure was enacted. The 
intention of Parliament was that companies should compensate 
working-men injured in their service but a few of the companies 
decided that the cost of the compensation should come out of the 
pockets of the working-men themselves. Gympie mining companies 
reduced wages by twopence per shift. 
This defiance of the intention of the Act caused much anger 
among the miners and in response to a notification that a meeting 
was to be held to form a union, about three hundred assaabled. A 
xinion was formed ^nd within a week had a membership of four hundred. 
However, after the first burst of enthusiasm, the numbers fell away 
until the revival of union spirit in late 1907 and early 1908 reversed 
the trend. Thus another of Tom i\!ann's predictions had been proved 
accurate: 
I am sure that if any action be taken by employers 
to crush thesa lower in the least degree this would 
be the stimiilus to effective opposition."'® 
Oppressive actions in other mining areas such as the West Moreton 
coal fields caused the re-organisation of unions which after the first 
flame of anger had abated, declined, only to be re-vitalised after 
27 
1907, One miners' union that sprang into life during a slump in the 
copper mining industry which resulted in unemployment and attempts to 
lengthen hours and lower wages was the Amalgamated Workers Association 
of North Queensland at Irvinebank on the Athei-ton Tableland. This was 
ieT ibid. 27 May 1905. ' ~ ~ " ™^ ~ 
27. ibid, 28 March 1908. 
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one iinion that did not suffer a slxraip after its formation but its 
continuous rise in strength and influence was due to other factors 
than the growing prosperity of the state. 
At the same time as the miners' union began to appear and the 
organisers of the three branches of the M U were reviving tinionism 
in the interior, the sugar workers were beginning to bestir themselves. 
Tom l^lann claimed he had toured the sugar areas accompanied by George 
Barber Labor MLA for the Bundaberg district. The men in the mills 
worked tv/elve hour shifts, six shifts per week for twenty-two shillings 
and six-pence a week and keep, valued at eight shillings a week. Most 
of the men were discharged at the end of the five or six months season 
and them 'humped the bluey' getting casual work where they could. They 
usually averaged one week's work in four while carrying the swag. While 
in the mills, they were housed in rough barracks often with dirt floors, 
without adequate provision for hygiene. Discontent amongst white 
workers was high. 
During the 1904 season, meetings were held to discuss the need for 
29 
an eight-hour day and higher pay. In most districts such agitation ha,d 
no results. Hov/ever, in December 1904, the first union of sugar workers 
30 
was formed at Cairns. This was soon followed in 1905 and 1906 and 
in subsequent years by the establishment of Sugar Y/orkers' Unions at 
Herberton, Mossraan, Mackay and Bundaberg with sub-branches being founded 
28, Tom Mann Memoirs. (London, 1923), p 153, 
29, loc cit 
30, Worker. 10 June 1905 . 
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at centres throughout the sugar areas. In a few years the 
organisation of sugar workers spread to all sugar areas including 
the Northern Rivers of New South Wales which became an affiliate 
of the central organisation of the combined sugar workers' unions 
31 
formed in 1909, These unions were chiefly for the unskilled 
itinerant labourers and marked a resurgence of the "new unionism" 
of the previous century. 
The establishment of the sugar workers' unions was a logical 
development of the greater percentage of white workers employed in 
the sugar industry caused by the change from Kanaka labour, which 
Federal legislation had forced. Cane growers and mill-owners, 
especially the Colonial Sxigar Refining Company of Australia, used 
to employing non-white labour at low wage rates and providing sub-
standard working conditions, were unprepared to improve conditions 
for white v/orkers and in fact, in many instances, resented being 
forced to use white labour. These circumstances forced the sugar 
workers to combine industrially to attempt to obtain the conditions 
that many of them as itinerant workers were used to in other states or 
in other industries, 
A most important factor in the formation of the Sugar Unions was 
the example of the AWU. In many areas, the influence of the AY/U 
overflowed into the coastal regions to make the sugar workers more 
aware of the benefits of unionism. The closely oi-ganised AV7U became 
31, loc cit 
» 
with its success a great inspira.tion for all unskilled and semi-
32 
skilled itinerant workers. Increasingly, larger numbers of 
western men who w^ ere already raanbers of the AY/U sought work in the 
sugar areas. Some of those who became organisers and union 
officials in the new tinions such as Charles O'Malley, John Swann 
and Henry Hall and others were former members of the MV, Their 
presence and the success of the MW encouraged some branches of the 
34 
sugar unions to attempt to amalgamate with the western union. This 
was not achieved and most of these new unions affiliated with the ALF 
adding to its strength and encouraging it to exert greater efforts to 
35 
organise the coastal workers. 
The sugar workers' unions were established to achieve better wages, 
36 
a shorter working day, better accommodation and food and showed a 
growing militancy and interest in politics especially as the government 
failed to introduce the promised legislation that would have allowed them 
to achieve their aims in the same manner as the M U , The growing dis-
appointment can be discerned in the Mackay Stogar Unions' statement in 
the Y/orker: 
Many of our unionists are somewhat disappointed 
with the state of affa,irs politically. Y/e 
certainly expected an up-to-date Compulsory 
Arbitration and Concilia,tion Bill passed last 
session. But we are beginning to think the 
32. ibid. 3 October 1905. 
33. ibid, 13 October 1906. 
34. loc cit 
35. ibid. 12 October 1907. 
36. ibid. 26 August 1905. 
Morgan government cannot carry it, as the 
Council will play v/ith such drastic and 
37 
necessary legislation. 
In later years, they followed the trend of becoming more involved 
in politics and exerting greater efforts to achieve political gains 
for the PLP in regions where they had most influence. 
One important trend that encouraged v/orkers to become unionists 
and increased the number of tmions in the i^ tate was affiliation with 
southern unions to form federations and amalgamations. This device 
was used to place local unions as the state branches of the f edei^ ations 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Arbitration Court where decisions 
especially by R!r Justice Higgins gave promise of a more sympathetic 
approach to the needs of the worker. The waterside workers, clothing 
trade workers, printers, railv/ay workers and many others became 
federated with southern imions. This strategy became more popular as 
it became clearer that the State government v/as not inclined to create 
the long-promised State Conciliation and Arbitration Court. The 
memory of the amalgamation that created the MV was again an example 
to rural unions in Queensland of what could be gained by inter-state 
affiliations. 
One of the most important federations as far as its influence on 
the trade union movement in Queensland, was the Australian Federated 
Butchers' Qnployees'Unions (AFBSU) which later became the Australian 
Meat Industry Employees Union (AJalEU). In 1905, this union had reached 
37. ibid. 30 December 1905. 
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the end of a long decline having then a total membership of thirty-five. 
The decision to federate with the southern unions brought immediate 
growth. In June 1906, J.T. Gilday v/as elected permanent secretary 
39 
and organiser. By the end of that year, the union membership had 
risen to 480 including a good majority of those employed in the meat 
40 
trade within the metropolitan area. Organised strength brought quick 
improvements for tmion members. A conference in Febrtiary 1907, which 
gained concessions from meat works managers, while not bringing 
conditions in the industry up to those in other states, so much 
bettered conditions that it ma<ie the foundation of the union secujfe. 
Success in southern Queensland encouraged the Butchers' Union to 
attempt to oi-ganise the north. There, the energetic recrtdting of 
W.R. (Jack) Crampton, brought the establishment of branches in most 
provincial centres. By the end of 1908 the membership had almost 
41 
trebled. The Butchers' Union was able to attract to its ranks over 
ninety-five per cent of workers, skilled and tinskilled, in the 
Queensland meat industry. It came closest to being a true "industrial 
42 
tmion" in the contemporary sense of the term in Queensland. 
Another factor which caused the formation and expansion of xmions 
was the establishment of the Y/a^ es Board system. The passing of the 
38« ibid. 24 October 1908. 
39. loc c i t 
40. loc c i t 
41. loc c i t 
42. The meatworkers' union was unable to organise a few groups of 
craftsmen such as engineers who maintained their independence and 
separate organisations despite continued attempts by the large 
unions to absorb them. 
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Wages Board Act in Queensland in 1906 induced v/orkers in many 
industries to organise industrially so that they could gain 
representation on the board which was to decide future v/age and 
working conditions in the industries for which these bodies were 
granted. Though much dissatisfaction was expressed with the 
workings and composition of the boards most unions became re-
presented on them and worked through them to obtain improved 
conditions. 
The existence of the Wages Boards v/as most influential in 
Brisbane, The boards were composed of eqtial ntmibers of workers' 
representatives and employers with a chairman being chosen by the 
43 
government and the v/orkers' representatives being elected by workers 
in the calling concerned. The union official was eligible to stand 
for election to any wages board. Employers were to elect their own 
representative but there were no restrictions on who was eligible for 
election. To ensure that the workers' representatives were not tools 
of the employers, unions were forced to organise workers in their 
craft to obtain stifficient voting strength. The Bi^sbane Trades and 
Labour Cotmcil became very active in this organising revival in the 
capital. Its succ,ess encouraged it to seek closer tinity within the 
tinion movement, in the fonn of affiliation with one central union 
body, to overcome the weakness of union spirit and organisation in 
44 
coastal towns compared to that of inland areas. 
43. Worker. 4 August 1906. 
44. ibid. 16 October 1909, 
Although widespread verbal support was given to the idea of 
affiliating with the existing agency for closer unity in the state, 
the ALF, no major move was made by craft unions to fulfil their 
promises. Craft unionists, regarded by all militants, political 
or industrial, as sectional and divisive in unionism were determined 
to confine their activities to trade pi'actices and provide friendly 
society benefits. They rejected the political action of the ALF 
as a legitimate part of union affairs and resented attempts by 
industrial unionists to denigrate craft tmionism as an outmoded 
form of trade tmion organisation. 
At the same time as the movement towards closer unity was 
gathering pace, the organisation of craft unions and the merging of 
many of those unions into nation-wide federations provided an 
important impetus to the gi-owth of unionism in Queensland as well as 
in the rest of Australia. H. Christopherson, an early twentieth 
century trade union historian, referred to the time between 1900 and 
45 
1915 as the "era of craft unionism". 
Statistics show the growth in the ntimber of unions in Australia 
between 1901 and 1915 from 198 to 713 with an increase in membership 
46 
from 55,066 to 528,031 members. This was, for the number of unions, 
an increase of twenty-five per cent. Queensland's grov/th v/as more 
than twice that of the Commonwealth's. The expansion of fourteen to 
eighty-nine registered unions brotight an increase of 536 per cent in 
45. ibid, 26 August 1915, H. Christopherson '*History of Trade Unionism'*, 
a series of articles published in the Worker. 
46. Commonwealth Year Books, 1901-1915, 
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the ntimber of unions. During the period 1906-1907 Queensland's 
rate of growth was over four times the Commonv/ealth's. In 1912, 
out of 621 unions in Australia, there were 408 district unions, the 
remainder being either state branches in federations or amal-
gamations. 
47 48 .« 
The craft tmion histories of Buckley, Hagan and Proctor by 
examining in detail the ejsperiences of particular craft imions have 
shown the resurgence but slov/ development of craft unions in the 
period before 1910, Though a growing ntimber of craft tmions were 
established in Brisbane and the provincial towns, they were mostly 
small and comparatively tmappealing to workers in the crafts which 
they represented. Proctor shows this clearly in his study of the 
plumbers. 
From 1904 to 1909, membership of the Plumbers' Union hovered 
between seven and thirty despite there being 200 craftsmen working 
50 
in the trade in 1905-6 and 280 in 1907-8. By 1910, the proportion 
of tmionist craftsmen had risen to almost twenty-five per cent v/ith 
ninety-two out of the three hundred and ninety-tv/o craftsmen in the 
Pltirabers' Union. However, Proctor by declaring that " ,.. the arrival 
of the Y/ages Board of 1908 proved a small stimtilus to tmion member-
47. Buckley op cit 
48. Hagan op cit 
49. S.K. Proctor A History of the Brisbane Branch of the Plumbers and 
Gasfitters' Employees' Union of Australia 1904-1919, tmpublished 
B A honotirs (history) thesis 1964, Queensland University; "The 
Rise and Fall of the Australian Building Industry Ssnployees' Union 
in Brisbane 1912-1918", Labour History. 13, November 1967. 
50. Proctor "The Rise and Fall of the Australian Building Industry 
anployees' Union in Brisbane 1912-1918*,' op cit p 22. 
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ship ..," shows that he failed to perceive the direct relationship 
between the establishment of the Boards, the appointment of a ftill 
time organiser J.A. Moir by the Brisbane TLC for the express purpose 
of enrolling all members of a craft in the associated tmion to ensure 
tmions had sufficient ntimbers to elect tmion representation on Wages 
Boards and the growth, albeit rather slowly, of metropolitan unions 
after 1908, 
Craft tmions v/ere slow to apply to their own sittiation the 
lessons of having full-time organisers, clear in the successes of the 
large rural and miners unions. Once they did appoint full-time 
secretary-organisers and/or paid organisers, their tmions grew quickly 
in membership and in the number of branches. With the expansion of 
the economy and the consequent growth of specialisation in industry, 
a number of groups in a particular industry perceived a common set of 
skills that placed them apart. There was a proliferation of craft 
tmions with a small membership throughout the metropolitan area and 
provincial towns. The Toowoomba Pltmibers', Gasfitters', Tinsmiths' and 
Sheet Metal Workers' Union was an example of this trend. I>/Iany of the 
small unions had a short life either being absorbed into larger 
organisations or failing for want of support as many craftsmen saw 
in the expanding economic conditions the chance to set up in business 
52 
for themselves.. Sydney and Beatrice ¥/ebb detected what could be a 
51, loc cit 
52, Sidney and Beatrice Webb op cit. pp 8, 481, quoted in S,K, 
Proctor **Brisbane Unionism and the Pltmibers' Union 1904-15'*, 
Murphy et al op cit. p 144, 
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working general law in the building industry in the similar 
experience of the hired journeymen of the Middle Ages and in the 
British Operative Society of 1920. Both organisations failed to 
command anything like the whole of the craft and the formation of 
permanent combinations in economic conditions that favoured the 
prospect of economic advancement. The law certainly applies to 
the fluid conditions of the early years of craft unionism in 
Queensland in the twentieth centiory, keeping many such tmions 
relatively small despite increasing ntimbers aaployed in their 
craft. 
To ascribe the slow but steady revival of unionism in 
Queensland before 1907 to the breaking of the drought is too 
simplistic. Once the drought was over, the economy based on rural 
industries revived and prospered; workers did attempt to improve 
wages and working conditions as they had done from the beginning 
of the century and before that. However, new union organisation 
occurred in other industries not affected by the drought, the sugar 
industry and the mining industry. The basic premise that v/ith more 
prosperous times there came a spontaneous revival in unionism ignores 
the steady tminterrupted growth of tmionism from 1902, at least two 
years before the drought ended, to 1906 and does not account for the 
dramatic increase after 1906. It also ignores the influence on the 
trade tmion movement of political successes both federal and state 
between 1903 and 1905 and the implementation of the Y/ages Board 
42 
legislation. 
It is surely no coincidence that the first major upward turn 
in tmion membership occurred in 1903, the year after the first Inter-
state Trade Union Congress in the twentieth century and the first 
year of major political success for the Labor party in the state 
sphere. The promise of the implementation of the Labor party's 
industrial reforms especially the passing of a Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act provided an encouraging environment in which 
workers perceived a greater effectiveness for industrial organ-
isation. When the reforms did not come, they v/ere bitterly dis-
appointed. This was a factor which was to prove a major impettis to 
the slowly expanding tmion movement and cause a great acceleration 
to its growth after 1907, Nevertheless, the foundation for the faster 
growth after 1907 had been laid before 1906, 
Inspired by the lead of the AWU, rural unions began once again 
to give a lead to the rest of the state. The union revival gave new 
hope to the advocates of closer tmity in the industrial movement 
but the proliferation of craft unionism was an ominous threat of the 
sectionalism that was to divide the union movement and thwart attempts 
to achieve one great tmion for all Queensland, 
M 
Chapter Three 
A I'JEYif DIRECTION. 
Though there was a slight quickening of the already reviving 
tmionism after 1904, the major renaissance in tmionism occurred during 
and after 1907. Between the beginning of 1907 and the end of 1911, the 
number of registered unions increased by fifty per cent while registered 
1 
tmion membership almost trebled. In the five year period after the end 
of 1911, the number of tmions registered and their membership, both 
almost trebled, rising to eighty-nine registered tmions with 58,310 
members. Improving economic conditions are insufficient in themselves 
to promote such growth. 
This growth coincided with the split in the Labor Party and became 
part of a concerted attempt to give the labour movement an ideology and 
organisation closer to that of the 1890s than it had had during the first 
few years of the twentieth century. The crisis years 1905-1907 forced 
the labour movement once again to become more independent and more 
socialistic and to rely more heavily on the unions for support than 
it had done since the failure of the strikes of the 1890s. They 
stimulated the growth of unionism and turned union leaders' attention 
1. Annual Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1911, 
QPP. II, pp 38-39. 
2, Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report. 6, p 17. 
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to re-structuring vmion organisation on a more centralised basis. 
By the beginning of 1905, the new road being travelled by the 
Queensland labour movement seemed to be leading the Political Labor 
Party within sight of complete political success. In the 1903 
Federal election, there was a fifty per cent Queensland Labor vote 
for the House of Representatives' candidates giving Labor seven out 
3 
of the nine Queensland seats. Even greater success was achieved 
in the Senate contest when with 53.5 per cent of the vote, all the 
4 
Labor candidates were elected. This was succeeded later in 1903 by 
the defeat of the bitterly anti-Labor conservative pai-ty led by Robert 
Philp and the formation of a Liberal-Labor coalition with Labor members 
W.H. Browne and W. Kidston becoming part of a joint party cabinet, 
under the premiership of Arthur Morgan the leader of the liberal de-
fectors from the Philp party. 
The more moderate policies and actions of the labour movement 
apparently had great appeal to a wider section of the electorate. This 
support was affirmed in the 1904 state elections when Labor won thirty-
5 
four out of the seventy-two seats. The extension of the franchise 
in the state by the Adult Franchise Acts of 1904 promised that the 
strength of the workers would finally receive its full weight so that 
complete Labor Party control of the government seeaed close at hand. 
» For the socialists and the more radical members of the labour 
3, Colin Hughes and B.D. Graham Atistralian Government and Politics 
1890-1964. (Canberra, 1968), p 293, 
4, ibid, p 294. 
5, ibid, p 511. 
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movement it was irksome that the government benches had to be slmred 
with the Morganites. It was even more irritating that ^ Jd.th the 
majority of members in the coalition, the PLP was prepared to allow 
Morgan to be pronier and to hold only two portfolios in the cabinet. 
The majority of the party, eager to grasp the long-denied prize,were 
prepared at first to accept this modified success and give their 
support to the coalition. 
Discontent within the labour movement grew as the new government 
not only failed to introduce much needed and promised reforms such as 
a Compulsory Arbitration Act but also implemented policies completely 
contrary to the Labor platform. Kidston, former leader of the PLP and 
treasurer in the Morgan government, soon became known by his critics 
6 
in the labour movement as the "meanest treasurer ever". His policy 
of cutting back on capital works' expenditure to avoid committing the 
government to large overseas borrowings exacerbated unemployment. This 
was mitigated to some extent by his land clearing policy but critics 
emphasised the areas of diminished government expenditure linking them 
with rising unemployment. More contentious was his policy of raising 
revenue by selling crown land to syndicates which were to build the 
state's much needed inland and central railways. This policy was 
directly against the declared Labor policy of not alienating crown 
land. Cotmtry Labor organisations, especially, were opposed to this 
policy of Kidston. 
6, Andrew Thompson A Criticism of the Labor Party's Socialism, 
(Sydney, 1905), p 10. 
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Growing dissatisfaction with these policies and others led to a 
direct confrontation with the leaders of the parliamentary party at the 
1905 Labourr-in-Politics Convention in Brisbane, For some time the 
Workers Political Organisations (WPO - the grass roots Labor Party 
organisation in the electorates) had beai discontented with the 
performance of the PLP, I&ny shov/ed this dissatisfaction at the 1905 
Conference by foregoing the use of parliamentarians as proxy delegates 
and seeking direct representation by sending delegates specially chosen 
7 
by plebiscites v/ithin their electorates. 
At the Convention, amongst a number of contentious issues, two 
produced the most reaction - the socialist objective proposed in various 
forms by three organisations and the re-affirmation of the crown land 
plank in the Labor platform. Both were strenuotisly opposed by the PLP 
leader George Kerr, a supporter of Kidston, Kerr delivered a strongly 
worded speech against the socialist objective in which he stated that 
the party v/ould lose the support of the moderate, liberal members of the 
8 
community whose vote had swung the elections, Kidston before and after 
the Convention claimed he was a socialist of the "Lord Salisbury** type 
and by his policies as treasurer exhibited his complete lack of adherence 
to socialistic ideas. The Kidston-Kerr group within the labour movement 
used these two measures to cause the split which led to the defection 
from the party of Kidston and and a ntiraber of important parliamentarians 
as well as a significant number of supporters. Kidston and many of his 
7, Mount Morgan Argus. 22 March 1906, 
8. Official Record of the Proceedings Labour in Politics Convention 1905. 
(Brisbane, 1905), pp 15-16, 
followers eventually joined forces with the Philp party to form a new 
alliance at first tinder Kidston and later tmder Digby Denham as bitter 
opponents of Labor especially the industrial wing of the movement. 
Kidston claimed at the time and afterwards that the 1905-07 
split was engineered by the "Trades Hall" intimating that it was the 
trade unions which had forced the socialist objective and the alienation 
of land plank through the 1905 Convention. Other contemporary critics 
claimed that the Social Democratic Vanguard was responsible for the 
measures. Labor opponents of Kidston claimed that he deliberately 
forced the confrontation as a means of splitting the party so that he 
cotild mould a new party combining the moderate Laborites with the 
Liberals, 
Modern interpretations of the event have agreed with Kidston 
and swayed by later twentieth century trends in the labour movement 
have portrayed the confrontation as parliamentary party verstis trades 
9 
hall, Andrew Fisher, leading Labor parliamentarian, later Prime 
Minister of Australia and present at the 1905 Convention denied this 
emphatically: 
I am sorry to see lir Kidston had stated at three 
of his meetings that the Labor party was directed 
by what was called the Trades Hall, It was one 
of the deplorable things of public life to find 
public men making such paltry and tmfounded 
assertions ... The assertion is not true and 
10 never was true, 
9, J.B. Dalton op cit and K,J. Wanka"\(filliam Kidston - llie Dilemma 
of the Powerful Leader", Murphy et al op cit. 
10. Worker. 20 April 1907. 
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It has been popular to cotmt the number of parliamentarians 
present, eleven out of thirty-eight delegates and prestime that because 
the majority of the delegates v/ere not parliamentarians then the 
Convention was dominated by trade unionists. There were trade 
unionists present and the ALF was ably represented by Albert 
Hinchcliffe. However, to assume that all non-parliamentarians were 
trade tmionists or even that the majority were trade tmionists is a 
misinterpretation of the condition of trade unionism at the time. 
The union movement was still very weak; it was the political 
organisation, the WPOs, which held the grass roots strength within 
the party. 
In very few electorates were unions sufficiently strong enough 
at that time to obtain control of the electoral organisation as they 
did in later years. The WPOs were beginning to feel their ov/n strength 
and failed to tindei-stand the minor role the Labor party asstimed in the 
coalition and its support for a government which broke basic Labor 
principles, contradicting the expressed desires of the party 
organisation. The editor of the Labour newspaper, the Motmt Morgan 
Argus aptly expressed the grass roots dissatisfaction when he wrote: 
... worse than the abuse of their opponents is the 
ingratitude of those men v/hom the organisations have 
put into parliament who have turned and tried to rend 
those who assisted them. ,.. We wotild remind those 
members that the WPO can do very well without them, 
there are other and better men ready to fill their 
places, but can the obstructive Labor members do 
without the WPO? One or two succeed in winning 
a seat against the YiJPO but this will not continue 
very long. It is a difficulty which must be faced 
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and fought as it was in France, The question is, 
 shall those rule who do the work, find the money 
for election purposes, and framed the platform 
at the convention - or shall it be those members 
of Parliament for whom they battled. 
The trade unions were part of that grass roots organisation but did 
not have the numbers to dominate. 
The strv^gle was a manifestation of frequent conflicts which 
develop in the labour movement between the organisation and the 
parliamentary wing concerning who shall decide policy. These 
crises in more recent times have been depicted as battles between 
left-wing trade unionists powerful within the party organisations 
and the more moderate politicians. 
In the early years of this century despite cries of "Trades 
Hall Junta", the trade unions were too disorganised, too disunited, 
too few in ntimber to play the role designated to them by some modem 
labour historians. Too much has been made of the socialism - anti-
socialism dichotomy. Just as important and possibly more important 
to many contemporaries was the conflict over the government*s crown 
land alienation policies and the alliance with the Liberals, It is 
significant here that Kidston*s "statement" outlawing the unions for 
the split in the party and attempting to rally support to his break-
away groups gave equal importance to three points; the socialist 
objective; the plank in the Fighting Platform "Immediate stoppage of 
the sale of all Crown Lands - lease hold only; fixity of tentire"; and 
11, Mount Morgan Argtis, 22 March 1906, 
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the need for Labor to maintain its alliance with the Liberals, 
As the conflict developed, Kidston, especially, used the "red 
tiger" bogey to increase the gap developing between him and the 
labour movement. In doing this, he moved ftirther to the political 
right until, eventually, he was able to unite quite easily with the 
conservative, Robert Philp, At the same time, the labour movanent 
as so frequently occurs in times of ideological and organisational 
crisis found it necessary to reaffirm its socialistic purity and 
working-class fotmdations. H,E, Boote, edi tor of the Y/orker and 
leading member of the group desiring a more independent and more 
socialistic role for the PLP proclaimed: 
The Movement must become consciously Socialistic. 
It must finally recognise that only in approximating 
to the Co-operative Commonwealth can relief be 
found, ,,, Nothing short of a policy of straight-
out Socialism, vigorously and persistently pursued 
can be of much avail,•'•^  
It has become commonplace to interpret the conflict at that time 
as nothing more than a power struggle for control of the local machine, 
in which militants like Boote, Reid, Hinchcliffe, and Bowman 
manipulated the organisation for pragmatic purposes. Proponents 
of this argument see the **maniptilators of the left, the a-visionary 
machine-men" turning the movement along the path to socialism in 
order to satisfy their own search for pov/er. They ignore the 
possibility that Kidston provoked the split in the mistaken belief 
12. Worker. 25 March 1905, 
13, D,P, Crook "The Crucible - Labour in Coalition 1903-1907", Murphy 
et al op cit, p 73, 
51 
that he could rid the party of the left-wing elements and retain the 
leadership of a party more amenable to his right-wing policies. They 
especially discotmt the evidence that the grass roots organisation 
itself strongly desired to place the Queensland labotir movement in 
the main stream of the nation-wide and world-wide movement of la.bour 
forces away from alliances with liberal and other moderate groups; 
that it consciotisly wished to adopt a more independent course closer 
to radical socialistic principles, in line with developments in 
Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, 
Defections from the Labor Party of Kidston, Kerr and a ntiraber 
of their supporters brought defeat to the PLP in the 1907 elections. 
Support for the party diminished to such an extent that the number of 
Legislative Assembly members fell to eighteen, the lowest since the 
turn of the century. To the Worker, the v/ay out of the depths to which 
the Labor Party had pltmged was clear; "Trade tmions are the most potent 
14 
powers to av/aken the democratic spirit latent in htimanity". Its 
editor, Boote, urged the labour movement to heed Ka.rl Iflarx's advice to 
15 
"Organise, organise, organise'*. The burgeoning trades union movement 
became the target for its propaganda as it urged the rest of the move-
ment to take heart at the tmion revival: 
In Queensland the upward trend in Unionism is 
very significant and encouraging treading as 
it does upon the leader heels of political 
14. Worker. 29 Jtily 1905, 
15, ibid. 13 January 1906, 
52 
apathy. ... The Spirit of Unionism is in the air 
and when that is so its realisation in a concrete 
form becomes inevitable. And this is that v/ay 
out not industrially only but politically also. 
The fervent political parties are those that 
reach their foundations down to the industrial 
bedrock. 
From this time onv/ards, the Yiforker increasingly preached working-
class unity and the benefits of closer organisation as the base for 
a sound political party and a strong industrial movement, "Only the 
Trade Union is capable of setting afoot a true political party of 
17 
Labour," it stated, Boote and later editors drev/ on the v/ritings 
of Karl Marx, S,V. Debs, Daniel De Leon, Jack London, George Bernard 
Shaw, James Connolly and other international socialists to direct the 
growing union movement to reject craft tmionism, to embrace industrial 
unionism, closer organisation, federation, amalgamation and eventually 
the One Big Union but always in association v/ith non-revolutionary 
political involvement. 
The disastrous political experiences of 1906 and 1907 forced 
from Albert Hinchcliffe, Labor member of the Legislative Cotmcil, 
trade tmion leader, secretary of the ALF and secretary of the 
Central Political Executive of the Labor Party in Queensland, the 
18 
rallying cry of **Back to the Unions". The Worker tempered 
Hinchcliffe's slogan v/ith the caution that unionism had to be linked 
16. ibid. 19 January 1907, 
17. Karl Marx as quoted by Worker. 4 May 1907. 
18. Minutes Annual Reports and Balance Sheets of the Northern 
Hughenden and Charleville Branches of the AY/U together with 
the ALF and Worker Reports and Balance Sheets for 1906. 
(Brisbane, 1907), p 29, 
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With politics if it was to be effective in achieving its aims. 
While political action was necessary and cotild not be dispensed 
with, it had to be based on the firm foundation of a widely and 
closely organised union movement which would form the electoral base 
from which the labour movement wotild once more grow to be a power in 
the state. 
The next year practical application v/as given to Hinchclif fe's 
plea by the appointment of Gympie union stalwart Charles Collins as the 
20 
ALFfe first permanent general organiser, Collins was given the task 
of promoting tmionism in tmorganised centres along the coast and 
assisting in those mining and sugar areas where unions were already 
established. On his appointment, the new organiser pledged himself 
21 
to organise workers "industrially and politically". 
Wherever he went, he preached the gospel of unionism, of 
affiliation v/ith the ALF and tmion involvement in politics. Though 
he spoke against craft unions, he aided many struggling craft unions 
to re-organise on sotmder lines, his basic task being to involve workers 
in a union organisation. Whenever he discovered there was no existing 
union he attempted to form General Workers' Unions which he encouraged 
to embrace all grades of labour, skilled and unskilled. Generally, 
the GWUs were formed amongst labourers particularly da the railway 
construction sites. The task of organising the railv/ay v/orkers and 
19. Worker. 22 Jtme 1907. 
20. ALF Queensland Provincial Council Sjjecutive Minutes, 6 April 1908, 
21. Worker, 2 May 1908, 
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other tmskilled labour along the coast v/as one that received close 
attention from all those assisting in promoting industrial unionism. 
At every opportunity, Collins emphasised working class unity as 
the basis for the achievement of political reforms and the improvement 
of wage and working conditions. Already established unskilled unions 
such as the Sugar Y/orkers' Unions and the emerging m.ass union the MIA 
received valuable assistance and support at vital times in their 
development from Collins and the men who succeeded him as ALF 
organisers. 
Other unions appointed paid organisers to persuade workers to 
become union members. The sugar tmions already had energetic and 
effective organising officials in Harry Hall, John Swann, Charles 
O'Malley and others. Jack Crampton despite bitter opposition from 
the meat companies had great success amongst the northern m.eatworks 
for the Butchers' Union. In the far north, E.G. (Ted) Theodore was 
appointed organiser for the Irvinebank AY/A for a three months' 
organising tour to establish branches of the tmion in mining centres 
on the Atherton Tableland. 
The era of professional union officials which v/as to bring 
greater strength, greater stability, but yet greater conservatism 
to the union m.ovement, had commenced. Professional, paid officials 
v/ere very much concerned to maintain the status quo, to resist 
amalgamation and the more centralised of the closer unity schemes 
especially if such schemes contained the possibility of the loss 
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of their position of power within their smaller unions. Nevertheless 
at this time in the development of the Queensland industrial movement, 
the professional men gave an impetus to the expansioifi of trade unionism 
that lifted it to the level of a major revival. 
There was great co-operation between these organisers who were 
fired with a zeal for the development of unionism. Y7herever possible, 
they assisted each other and if by chance they fotmd themselves 
addressing workers in an industry for which one of the other unions 
was responsible they encouraged membership of that union and even at 
times enrolled men for those tmions. Y/hen Theodore had to forego 
his role as organiser to remain in the Irvinebank tinion office to 
replace the general secretary who had been sacked by his employer 
for his tmion activities, ALF organiser Collins v/ent to the Tableland 
and assisted in the organising work. 
Their chief aim v/as to organise the forces of labour in order to 
present a united front to employers so that wages and conditions could 
be improved and the crisis that faced the labour movement could be 
overcome. They attempted to convince workers that if progress was to 
be made, there had to be political and industrial unity. Y/orkers were 
urged to ensure that, if they v/ere eligible, their name was on the 
electoral roll and the importance of using their vote to support the 
Labor Party if they were to achieve industrial reforms, was preached. 
The AY/A of Nox'th Queensland made it compulsory for all of its members 
22 
v/ho had the necessary qualifications to exercise their right to vote, 
22, Northern Miner. 28 April 1908, 
Si 
The Political Labor Party, deeply affected by its defeat at the 
1907 elections and reduced drastically in ntimbers by the defection of 
the Kidstonites and their supporters, m.et the need to rebuild the party 
strength by embarking on an energetic programme of propaganda and 
organisation. Evolving as the 'straight' Labor Party, the remnant 
of the once powerful PLP presaged the direction that its development 
would take by electing David Bowman, ex-tmion organiser, as its leader. 
Together with Hinchcliffe, Bowman directed this organising and pro-
pagandizing activity towards the reviving trade union movement. 
,^  Increases in union strength meant increased growth of the Labor 
electoral organisation. In the financial year 1908/09, nineteen new 
23 
WPOs and unions affiliated with the CPE. Union involvement iRlth the 
Labor Party continued through succeeding years so that the number of 
affiliated tmions grew to twenty-four in 1913 and thirty-nine in ^ 916, 
with a number of tmions becoming the sole Labor organisation in many 
24 
electorates, 
The 'straight' Labor Party welcomed and actively promoted this 
growing support from the industrial wing. Many Labor parliamentarians 
enthusiastically assisted in the systematic, organised campaign both 
political and industrial, of forming the workers into unions and 
spreading the doctrine of "political tmionism". For some, such as 
Dave Bowman, George Ryland, John (Harry) Coyne, this v.'as but a return 
to the work of earlier days but for other parliamentarians it was a 
23. D,J. Murphy "The Changing Structure of the Party", Murphy et al 
op cit. P 102, 
24. loc cit 
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new experience. 
Bowman had been active in this field before 1907. As early as 
March 1906, he and Hinchcliffe began the work of directing the reviving 
tmion movement towards industrial tmionism and political involvement. 
The two politicians ansv/ered the call of the Provisional Council of the 
Bundaberg and District Workers' Union to assist in the oi-ganising of 
25 
that union. At a meeting on the 11 March, they addressed a gathering 
on the advantages of industrial tmionism. On the next day, the union 
was organised with a membership of sixty-six. By the end of the year, 
the new tmion with a membership of four htmdred had heeded their advice 
and affiliated with the ALF, In Jtay 1906, with the assistance of 
26 
W, Ryott-Maughan Labor member for Ipswich, Bowman visited the West 
Moreton coalfield to speak at the invitation of a group of miners, who 
were attempting to organise a tmion, on the benefits of unionism and the 
interdependence of the industrial and political wings of the party. 
There Ryott-Maughan expressed his disappointment that it was left to two 
politicians to awaken the workers to the need for industrial tmionism. 
However, neither he nor Bowman shirked the task then or later. 
In great demand for his skill as a popular speaker. Bowman, despite 
his chronic bad health, travelled far and wide throughout the state 
suffering great hardships in his efforts to promote unionism and 
strengthen the industrial wing of the labour movement. His efforts 
were complemented by those of other Labor politicians who also worked 
25. Worker. 13 Jtme 1908. Report of the history of the Bundaberg and 
District Workers' Union. 
26, Motmt Morgan Argus. 19 July 1906. 
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with energy to implant the message that "from unionism sown in the 
hearts of people, will come the harvest of good things for the 
27 
legislative sickle". 
After the PLP expressed their willingness to do propaganda 
Mm 
work, the CPE in 1908 adopted a systematic plan to spread its 
29 
message throughout the state. The secretary of the CPE, Hinchcliffe, 
notified the industrial organisations that parliamentarians were 
available to carry out organising work and allotted particular areas 
30 
for each PLP member to visit. 
On such a visit, George Ryland went to the Boyne Valley railway 
tmder construction from Gladstone to Many Peaks to ascertain the 
31 
possibilities of forming a union amongst men employed on the job. 
He spent a few nights with the men on various camps receiving a hearty 
welcome. There was little necessity to prompt them to action as the 
subject had already been mooted; all that had been needed v/as for some 
authoritive person or persons to lead them. Immediately, Ryland 
communicated the situation to Hinchcliffe, as secretary of the ALF. 
At once, a series of meetings along the line were planned; handbills 
were printed and dispatched the same evening to Alex Glegg - for years 
the rallying centre for Labor activity in the Port Curtis area. He 
agreed to distribute the literature which announced that Labor members 
Bowman, Hinchcliffe and Ryland would address the planned meetings over 
27. Worker. 15 February 1908. 
28. CPE Minutes, 24 July 1908. 
29. loc cit 
30. loc cit 
31. Worker, 17 September 1908. 
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the coming week-end. 
The three men journeyed from Brisbane on the Friday night on the 
Rockhampton mail train. On arx'ival at Gladstone, on the following 
Saturday afternoon, they rode bicycles to Main Camp to address a 
large group of railway men at an open-air meeting at seven o'clock 
that night, Y/hile Ryland remained in camp overnight. Bowman and 
Hinchcliffe returned to Gladstone, again by bicycle, to make the 
necessary arrangements for the successful candying out of the newly 
created union. Early the next morning, Glegg, with Martin Mtillen, 
joined Ryland at Main Camp and the party journeyed on along the line, 
holding meetings at the various camps they visited throughout the day. 
They did not complete their v/ork until eight o'clock Stmday night. The 
following Tuesday morning, Ryland and Hinchcliffe returned to Brisbane 
but Bowman proceeded on to Rockhampton to fulfil similar engagements 
there and later at Motmt Morgan and Anakie in company v/ith another 
PLP member Herbert Hardacre, 
The energetic tour of the Port Curtis area was eminently successful, 
both because of its immediate success in forming a tmion of one hundred 
and thirty members that resolved to become affiliated v/ith the ALF and 
because it prompted other railway v/orkers to seek similar assistance. 
Almost immediately, the men employed on the Caboolture4?oodford railv/ay 
extension invited Ryland and Hinchcliffe to initiate steps to form a 
General Workers' Union of the same type as that of the recently formed 
32 
tmion in Boyne Valley, 
32, ibid, 24 September 1908, 
10 
In this tmion revival the militant leaders Bowman, Reid, 
Hinchcliffe, Boote, Theodore and McCormack, realising that the 
development of the industrial wing of the party had not kept pace 
with the political organisation, co-operated with the already committed 
militant tmions, the AY/U, the variotis Sugar Workers' Unions and later 
the ASWU, the Butchers' Union, and the AWA to "infuse increased life 
33 
and vigour into the union movement," in the belief (as expressed by 
Hinchcliffe)that: 
.., if half the time, energy and zeal now 
devoted to that end (the v/inning of seats in 
Parliament) were occupied in strengthening ' 
existing unions and establishing new ones, 
our progress would be more rapid and the 
reforms secured more substantial,34 
The importance that Bowman and Hinchcliffe placed on the role of tmions 
in achieving and maintaining political success was manifest in their 
strong opposition at the 1908 Annual Conference of the MJV to a move 
to close the AWU branch office at Hughenden, Both men emphasised the 
political importance of the Hughenden branch and suggested that if it 
was dispensed with, it wotild be essential for the AWU to establish some 
agency there to carry on the political propaganda work. 
There was increasing evidence that the growth of unionism was 
bringing electoral progress and success in a greater ntimber of areas. 
In the western electorates, the wide-spread tmion giant, the AWU, 
had obtained consistent electoral success in areas where its organisation 
33, Secretary's Report Provincial Council of ALF, 13 February 1908 
published in Worker, 15 February 1908, 
34, loc cit 
35, ibid. 22 February 1908, 
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was the strongest, Y/hile the Labor Party was generally sure of success 
in the far-western areas, it repeatedly failed to vd.n seats on the 
Darling Downs where the closely settled farming districts resisted 
attempts to spread MW influence. This situation persisted until 
T,J, Ryan deliberately won over the southei^ n farmers v/ith specially 
36 
designed policies for the 1915 election. In that election the far-
western seats lost because of the effects of the 1912 Goieral Strike 
on rural support for the PLP were also regained. 
Along the coast, electoral successes were quickly gained at 
Y/oothakata in 1909 with the defeat of Kidstonite Labor member G, 
Mick Woods by the MSA union organised E.G. Theodore mainly on the 
strength of the M A members' vote; Vernon Y/instanley won Charters 
Towers in 1908 and 1909; Y/illiam Lemion represented Herbert in 1907, 
1908 and 1909; Thomas Foley gained Townsville in 1909. In areas where 
the sugar unions v/ere strongest, the Labor vote vdthout achieving the 
election of members to the state legislatures, except for George 
Barber, member for Bundaberg from 1901, did assist in the federal 
victories tha-t gave the whole Queensland labour movement great hope 
for the future by bringing to power the Fisher Labor government that 
was so sympathetic to unionism. While not all these victories v/ere due 
solely to union organisation, it was the perception of many at the time 
that tmion influence had been important in obtaining these seats for 
Labor, 
36. D.J. Murphy T.J, Ryan - A Political Biography, unpublished PhD 
(history) thesis 1972, Queensland University, p 116, 
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Despite the success and expansion of the 'Apolitical union" 
movement, it did not receive the total support of the industrial 
movement. Most craft tmions v/ere, at least initially, opposed to 
involving themselves in politics. There was a strong sentiment that 
trade societies should confine themselves to trade affairs, unless 
politics obviously impinged upon them as in the case of the Trades 
Disputes Bill where in a rare show of unity the metropolitan craft 
unions urged on by the Brisbane TLC, formed a combined deputation to 
37 
place before the government a protest against the bill, Scsne craft 
tmions continued for a time their support for the Kidstonite rtimp of 
the Labor Party even when it threw off all pretence of being a Labor 
party giving their support to partictilar members who had been and still 
were members of their tmion. 
In objecting to derogatory remarks made by "Cintra** in the Worker 
about Kidstonite unionists, R, Mulvey, secretary of the Federated Iron, 
Brass and Steel Moulders' Union of Australasia protested: 
I say 'Cintra* has iio right to take good unionists 
to task because they do not follow the Labour Party, 
because we had trade tmions before we had Labour 
parties and Vanguards ... I will allow no man to 
question in reference to the Labour movement that a 
trade unionist is compelled before being called a 
good unionist, to become adopted to the Labour Party, 
At a later date, the Moulder's Union affiliated with the ALF and changed 
its policy of non-commitment to one of support for the PLP, 
Some other unions did not change their stand on this issue. When 
37. Worker. 30 April 1910, 
38, ibid. 10 August 1910, 
the Central Political Executive (CPE) of the Queensland Labor Party 
in 1909 circularised all unions v/ith the reminder of their right 
to participate in the pre-selection of candidates for the coming 
state election if they indicated they approved of the Labor platform, 
39 
very few replied, A large ntimber of those who did, refused to 
accept the platform and thereby abrogated any affiliations with the 
40 
PLP. 
Y/hile the majority of unions established before and during the 
early years of the twentieth century v/ere eraft unions or their 
branches, the dynamic force in union organisation in that era in 
Queensland v/as the drive towards closer unity and towards closer 
involvement v/ith the Labor Party. Elsewhere in the world and in 
Australia in this era, the move to a more centralised structure for 
tmionism led to divisions betv/een political and industrial wings. In 
Queensland, closer tmion organisation coincided with greater political 
involvement even amongst craft unions. The organisers, both politicians 
and tmionists, promoted affiliation v/ith the ALF as the central industrial 
agency which would provide the unity needed to gain the strength to de-
feat the enemies of the labour movement. During and after 1908, the 
41 
ntimber of ALF affiliates increased m-arkedly. Affiliation of a tmion 
39, CPE Minutes, 22 February 1909 et passim, 
40, ibid, 5 April 1909 et passim 
41, Stillivan op cit, Appendix H, ALF Membership 1889-1913, 
Year Membership 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2. 
,700 
,460 
,200 
,000 
,800 
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with the ALF involved the payment of a subscription to the Worker. 
Consequently, the propaganda v/ork begun by the organisers v/as 
supported and consolidated by the la,bour nev;spaper*s continual 
advocacy of industrial unity and the importance of tmionism to the 
labour movement. 
From 1905 the Worker had begtm to adopt an increasingly radical 
stance, praising the efforts of the Russian v/orkers to exert their 
strength in the general strikes of 1905 and promoting the idea of the 
general strike as an example of the potency and invincibility of organ-
ised labour: 
Let the people know that, in order to strike the 
enemies into fear and submission, they have only to 
stand still; that the most invincible of all pov/ers 
is the pov/er of refusing to do,42 
The alleged successes of general strikes in Germany, Italy and Great 
Britain were extolled as examples of the strength of working class 
unity. The v/orkers v/ere urged to join the "Axroy of Labour'*, to become 
consciously socialistic, to use their ntimbers to seize political control. 
Such a stance has earned the Queensland union m.ovement of the first 
decade and a half, especially the tmions of the far north, the reputation 
41. (cont) Year 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
Membership 
3,320 
4,000 
7,000 
10,000 
11,000 
13,000 
18,284 
21,813 
23,668 
42. Worker, 18 November 1905. 
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of being strongly syndicalist. 
However, after 1908 the syndicalism of the Intei'national Workers 
of the World especially that of the Chicago group v/a.s rejected because 
of its hostility to the Labor Party and political involvement. Before 
then, Queensland militants had agreed with the sentiments of Albert 
Hinchcliffe who, in refusing an invitation for a delegate of the ALF 
to attend the conference held in Chicago in 1905 to forra the IW, wrote: 
... my Executive are in sympathy v/ith the class-
conscious spirit which animates your manifest, 
and I am desired to v/ish the efforts being put 
forth in this direction every success ... 43 
Nevertheless, v/hen the 1908 Chicago conference took from the DW/ 
preamble the following political clause: 
Between these tv/o classes a struggle must go on 
tmtil the toilers come together on the politica.1, 
as well as the industrial field, and take and 
hold that which they produce by their labour 
through an economic organisation of the v/orking 
class without affiliation with any political 
party -4 
the Worker defended against criticisms from v^ ithin a.nd outside the tmion 
movement, the industrial wing's affiliation with the Queensland Labor 
Party and the political role within that party of the unions. 
The 1908 split in the American movement betv/een the Chicago a.nd 
Detroit factions v/as to be reflected in the development of the 
Queensland labour movement after 1915 but generally befoi-e that date, 
the militant tmions v/ere committed to closer tmity and supporting 
43. Bertha Walker Solidarity Forever. (Helbourne, 1972), p 127. 
44. loc cit 
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the Labor Party as the means of obtaining industrial justice. A 
weak challenge to the policy was made by members of the Social 
Democratic Vanguard in 1909. It was easily brushed aside thereby 
delaying the main challenge to the party until after 1918, 
45 
Defence by Boote, against the criticisms of Jack London, of 
Australian labour's political affiliation provoked members of the 
46 
Social Democratic Vanguard, E.H. Ktinze and A.M. Anderson to challenge 
the revolutionary nature of the Queensland labour movement. Anderson, 
accusing the Labor Party of being a party of "little capitalists", 
of seeking to bltmt the working class revolution by accepting timely 
capitalist palliatives like Wages Boards, urged the adoption of the 
Chicago IWW preamble, and the clearing away of the Labor Party "as 
47 
so much rubbish in the path of the Australian proletariat". 
A debate on the Marxian orthodoxy of the Labor Party ensued 
48 
in the coltimns of the newspaper. The Worker quickly defended the 
true Marxian nature of the party scathingly dubbing Anderson a 
49 
"Theoretic Marxian", Quoting from Marsc and Engels, the Worker warned 
against such "strutting little middle class revolutionaries" who lost 
in the labyrinths of Fabianism, Clarionism, Graysonism, Hyndamnism and 
syndicalism, were too scientific to bother about working class organis-
50 
ation. It praised the pragmatic union organiser-politician of the 
45, Worker. 20 February 1909. 
46, ibid, 27 February 1909, 
47, loc cit 
48, ibid, 13 March 1909; 20 March 1909; 15 May 1909, 
49, ibid. 13 March 1909. 
50, ibid. 20 March 1909. 
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Keir Hardie ilk as the true Marxist. In answer to Anderson's charges, 
the Worker put the question first posed by the noted American socialist 
Robert Hunter; 
Who is a Marxist? One who knows the Bible by 
heart and quotes verse and chapter, or one who, 
fighting in trenches v/ith Labour gjives to 
Labour, organisation and tmity and points out 
the way for emancipation? 
The dispute created fears within the labour movement that the new-
found unity of the political and industrial wings v/otild be damaged. 
Boote, tmder the guise of the "Touchstone" coltimn in the Worker attempted, 
in a clownish light-hearted vein to ally any disquiet the internecine 
quarrel in the labour movement might create by arguing: 
... that out of strife comes progress, that from 
conflict of interests would come a better social 
state.^^ 
Alarm amongst the militant leaders of the party was unfounded at 
this stage. No breakavyay socialist party appeared (as it did in New 
South Wales and Victoria) to divide once again the nov/ united ranks of 
labour and no strong following developed at this time for the anti-
political ideas of the lY/W. 
The Queensland labour movement leaders chose from the EflV v/ritings 
the propaganda that reinforced their policy of v/orking class tmity, 
industrial unionism and strengthening the Labor Party through tmifying 
the political with the industrial wing. The Worker gave prominence to 
the writings of those international socialists who favoured the achieve-
51. loc cit 
J. 
52. loc cit 
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ment of reforms through first gaining control of the legislature by the 
use of the combined strength of the workers organised industrially. 
53 
James Connolly's the "Axe to the Root" and his other v/orks were later 
seized upon as definitive treatises on the true course for socialist 
action. Selection from this work and the works of other writers 
Debs, London, Trautman, Shaw, J,!arx and Mann both British, American 
and continental European usually excluded reference to criticisms of 
politicians and emphasised the use of existing political institutions 
for gaining the local Labor objectives. Even the British labour hero, 
Tom Mann, was sneered at when he wrote against the labour movement's 
54 
having ties with the political party. 
Before 1915, the debate remained at the theoretical level. Fears 
that the schisms occuri-ing in southern la.bour movements would be duplicated 
locally v/ere unfounded. The socialist clubs remained on the fringes of the 
main Queensland labour movement and were discredited as Queen Street 
theorists. The challenge in the union movement came later but even then 
55 
the IWM had not the influence in the Queensland movement that Ian Turnei^, 
56 57 
Robin Gollan and V.G. Childe have ascribed to it in the southern 
labour movements. Most tmionists at the time agreed with shearer D. Murphy 
of Winton: 
I do not knov/ much about Marx or Engels ... 
It seems to me that Revolutionary Socialists 
53. ibid. 24 December 1910 et passim especially, 31 December 1910. 
54. ibid. 7 January 1911. 
55. Turner op cit. pp 65-66. 
56. Gollan op cit. p 213. 
57. Childe op cit. p 131. 
69 
are afra.id that palliatives ( of more v/a,ges 
and better conditions that the Labour Party 
is trying to get for us for the present) could 
delay us on the way to the raillenium but they 
need not fear. Do the 'Revolutionary Socialists* 
think that hard work, starvation and tyranny v/ill 
hurry up the millenium? In my opinion such 
conditions may make a French Revolution or a 
'Caesa.r's ColtiJim' but never a millenium.^^ 
Alf Pain, the secretary of the Herberton branch of the AY/A and an 
r/f# disciple, was a lone voice in the union ranks to receive a hearing 
in the Worker. He advocated a type of tmionism based on H7W principles 
that proved most unpopular with northern unionists: 
Yes, industrial tmionism is what v/e want along 
the lines of the lY/Y/'. Form tmions everywhere 
bring the workers in, never mind their creed, 
colour, or politics, v/eld them into one vast 
v/hole .. ,^ ^ 
Very few tmionists, then or later in the period, were prepared to 
extend their egalitarianism and v/orking-class unity to include non-
European workers. Even non-British European workers, except the Russians, 
fotmd acceptance diffictilt to achieve. Pain was roundly condemned as 
60 
"... either ignorant of the labour movement or a traitor to it'*. 
To give warning of v/hat it sav/ as the devisive, destructive doctrine 
of the IIW, the Worke;r published a serial The Red League;. A Tale of the 
61 
General Strike in Australia by John and Alen Kent. In a discursive, 
58. Worker. 3 April 1909, 
59. ibid. 20 November 1909. 
60. ibid. 18 December 1909. 
61. ibid. 20 March 1909, This was a v/eekly serial later published as a 
book. Just who John and Alen Kent were, is not known. It is possible 
that H,E, Boote used their names as a nom-de-plume as he did the 
nom-de-pltjme "Touchstone" to allow him to make comments through the 
"Touchstone" columns, a regular feature of the Worker. 
melodramatic plot, the authors presented a picture of Brisbane under-
going a general strike that v/as turned into a revolution by the Xi'A'/ 
thinly disguised as the "Red League", The second instalment published 
in the Worker 10 April 1909 and subsequent instalments carried this 
preface: 
The purpose of this tale of Revolution in Australia 
is not prophetic. It makes no pretence to forecast 
the probable development of the class strength here. 
Nor does it indicate the line upon v/hich any school 
of Socialism v/ould desire progress to manifest itself. 
But it has to be recognised that we have reached a 
stage when conflicting social forces are so equipoised 
that a push this v/ay or that way v/ould suffice to 
precipitate a situation that few Socialists contemplate 
and none are consciously striving to bring about. An 
extraordinary event, such as at times we have been upon 
the verge of, or the appearance of a ranarkable person-
ality bending the circtirastances of the moment to a daring 
conception of his mind, and the clash of interests might 
easily become the clash of arms. *The Bed League' is 
meant to illustrate one of the paths of peril which the 
economic movement may be diverted shotild the capitalist 
classes attempt to maintain their threatened ascendency 
by means not unfamiliar to them, and seek by treachery 
and violence to nullify, the political victories of the 
workers. While the following pages, therefore, are not 
in any sense a prediction, they set forth in the form of 
fiction a possible phase of historical evolution. For 
alv/ays it has to be borne in mind that man is not the 
helpless puppet of forces outside himself, but, for 
better or worse the shaper of his own destiny,^ -^  
It was clear from the narrative of The Red League that the Worker 
believed adherence to the IWW doctrines held the dangers of "a possible 
phase of historical evolution" that v/ould be disastrous for the labour 
movement. Not that the Y/orker or the leaders of militant labour v/ere 
against direct action or general strikes. On the contrary the following 
62. loc cit 
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period is remarkable for its steady build-up of industrial pressure, 
in which both political a.nd industrial wings of the Queensland movement 
participated and co-operated, that burst into a series of major strikes 
that v/as prematurely capped by the ill-planned eruption of 1912. 
The desired direction of the movement in Queensland v/as the 
political road to democratic socialism, but along the way, while 
political power v/as not held, economic justice had to be and v/as 
obtained by industrial action, Miile political action v/as anathema 
to the revolutionary tmionism of the Chicago-style syndicalist "wobblies", 
it was more in accord with developments elsewhere in Australia and in 
Great .Britain where the Independent Labour Party led by Keir Hardie and 
linked with the trade tmion movement was achieving success. 
The seizure of political control was always considered in the 
British terms of obtaining a majority in parliament through the ballot 
box. Control of the legislature wotild be iised to initiate the reforms 
that wotild achieve the re-con struct ion of society, gradually. The 
militancy was designed to revive the spirit that had existed in the 
1890s. Attempts to achieve political control by alliances with 
moderates v/ere regarded as side-tracks that had detoured the movemoit 
from its true course. The present and the future development of the 
labour movement was linked with the inspiration of the 1880s and 1890s -
a trade tmionism growing in strength to fight on the industrial front 
but at the same time, using its organisation to seek direct representation 
in the parliament through its support for and influence in the Labor 
Party, 
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Y/hile seeking its origins in the past glories of the labour movement, 
the leaders of the union movement mapped out a nev/ direction for the 
industrial wing. The ideology of class war was emphasised in their 
attempt to make the workers more consciously socialistic. It v/as not 
the Utopian Fabianism of the nineteenth century but the pragmatic 
socialism of state ownership which would achieve v/orker control by the 
indirect method of involvement in and control of the political party 
and its organisation. At the same time as pledging itself to ridding 
the commtmity of non-European influences and the financial di-ain of 
foreign trusts, it maintained the eiiaotional appeal of the nationalistic 
role of tmionism in achieving a distinctive Australian economic system 
and society. The Worker declared: 
If Labour is ultimately to triujnph, if it is to re-
construct the foundation of civilisation and revivify 
the arts and ethical institutions raised upon them, 
it is from the traditional organisation primarily 
that the developing force must come. Political action 
63 is the inevitable sequence to trade unionism. 
The newly emerging militant unions the M U , the Australian Sugar Y/orkers' 
Union, the Federated Butchers' Union, the AY/A of North Queensland and the 
many smaller unions established and encouraged by the ALF and its organisers 
v/ere comiTiitted to using their growing strength not only for industrial 
action but also for political action. 
The first major indication of the grov/ing power of the industrial 
movement in the Labor organisation came at the 1907 Labour in Politics 
Convention. There the direct union representation of the industrial v/ing 
63, Worker. 2 May 1908, 
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on the CPE was strengthened by the addition of representatives of the 
64 
three branches of the AV/U; the ALF already held two seats. Greater 
influence at the grass roots level was obtained with the right of 
taking part in plebiscites for selection of Labor candidates being 
65 
granted to tmions v/hich acknowledged the Labor Party platform. The 
concessions v/ere not only manifestations of the greater influence of 
militant industrial groups within the Labor Party oi^anisations, but 
also acknowledgement of the close co-operation of these groups in the 
concerted effort of the political and industrial wings to build a new 
and more powerful organisation in which the industrial v/ing under the 
co-ordinating influence of the ALF was to have a more important role 
than it had played for a decade. 
Under the concerted efforts of dedicated parliamentarians, tmion 
organisers and the labour press, the spirit of unionism, especially 
industrial unionism, spread slowly, gathering strength as it invested 
v/orkers v/ith a new hope that they v/ould achieve economic and political 
justice. This hope was expressed by the secretary of the Mackay Branch 
of the ASY/U when he v/rote: 
This organisa-tion £ASY/U - Macka.y Branch] looks to 
the education of the sugar v.rorkers as a means of 
obtaining political and industrial justice. By 
loyalty to the principle and tmity of purpose 
only can we succeed,66 
In a relatively short time, the ntiraber of unions expanded greatly, 
64, Official Record of the Proceedings of Labour in Politics Convention. 
(Brisbane, 1907) p 20, 
65, loc cit 
66, Worker. 22 August 1908, 
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Harry Ha l l s e c r e t a r y of t h e ASY/U r e p o r t e d a boom in tmionism in 
Btmdaberg: 
,,, six months ago the A3i7U v/as the only 
industrial union in existence here, nov/ 
v/e have five viz the Waterside Y/orkers, 
the Butchers, the Harness-makers, the 
67 
ASWU and the Painters meet next week. 
The extent of the revival after 1906 is directly related to the 
needs of the militant leaders of the labour movement who provided the 
co-ordinating force and ideological zeal necessary to change the 
developing union revival into a major renaissance of unionism. Their 
dynamic leadership gave it a new sense of purpose, a new direction with 
an almost evangelical zeal in its quest to purge the labour movement 
of impurities in order to use the tmited strength of the v/orkers to 
create a new society. 
67, ibid, 30 September 1908. 
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Chapter Four 
"THE KEY TO II€)USTRIAL DE&IDCRAC^* . 
Queensland industrial militancy followed three main lines during the 
period 1907-12; active fostering of the grov/th in ujiion mCTibership and the 
use of those ntimbers in direct action against employers who, supported 
<^ 6vei*tly, but at times overtly, by the government resisted union attanpts 
to gain recognition of their right to organise in order to improve 
unionists' v/orking conditions and v/ages; support for the PLP; and attempts 
to form central organisations of tinions v;ithin crafts, industries and 
the whole state. 
Registered union strength in nujnbers and membership greatly increased 
during this period of militancy, more than doubling in numbers from 
1 2 
thirty by the end of 1909 to sixty-seven by the end of 1912, There 
v/as an even greater increase in registered union membership with the . 
3 4 
ntimber of tmionists growing from 16,423 to 44,768. However, this 
increased ntimber must be measured against the whole work-force. The 
1912 figure was in the Australian context a low 27,5 per cent of the 
1. Annual Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1908, £PP, 
II, 1909, p 53. 
2. Australia-n Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour and Industrial Branch 
Report. 2, p 9. 
3. Annual Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1908, op cit. 
4. Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour and Industrial Branch-
Report . 2, op cit. 
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total v/ork-force. 
More important in the industrial movement than the increases in the 
number of unions and tmion membership was the grovrbh of large powerful 
unions because of both union grov.^ h within the state and national 
amalgamations and federations. Craft unions such as the Queensland 
Typographical Associa.tion expanded by federating v/ith kindred tmions 
6 
in the state on the principle of industrial tmionism. Others such as 
the Boot Trade Union fotmd strength by federating with inter-state 
7 
bodies. The Butchers' Union by federating inter-state gained a new 
8 
lease of life. Through their strong bargaining position, created by 
the perishable nature of the product they handled, the meat workers 
were able to establish virttial workshop control of the means of pro-
9 
duction in Queensland meatv/orks. Their special circumstances allov/ed 
them to build an industrial tmion structure that was later used by ad-
vocates of the One Big Union (OBU) as the ideal for all industries to 
10 
achieve. 
The M\] consolidating on its successes of the previous decade 
5. ibid, p 12 cf v/ith a tmion organised v/ork-force of almost sixty per 
cent in Nev/" South Wales, over forty per cent in Victoria, Y/estern 
Australia and South Australia and the Commonwealth as a whole. Not 
all tmions registered and at times there was a large gap betv/een 
the total ntimber of unions and number registered. 
6. Worker. 19 Septeatber 1908. 
7. Australian Boot Trade Employees' Union Queensland Branch Minutes, 
24 February 1906, 
8. Y/orker, 24 October 1908, A History of the AFBEU Queensland Branch 
shows it became part of the Federation in early 1906. 
9. J. Child Unionism and the Labor Movement. (Melbourne, 1971) p 123. 
10. A.D. Dodds How A One Big Union Works - An Australian Example. 
(Melbourne, n d), p 29. 
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continued to be the dominating influence in the pastoral industry while 
the ASWU expanding in membership, the ntimber of branches and regional 
influence struggled to obtain recognition from the CSR and hold the 
grotmd it had already gained. A loose organisation attempting to bring 
all sugar workers into one organisation it suffered from lack of 
organisation and leadership. The AWA of North Queensland emerged from 
the northern raining districts as the dynamic force of the Queensland 
union movement by spreading its influence south through amalgamating 
with the ASWU, v/ith small unions formed on the construction sites of 
the new coastal railways and even with some sma.ller craft unions of 
Brisbane, Toowoomba, Longreach and most coastal provincial towns. 
Many historians, especially those of the left, describe activity 
and mordancy, expansion and decline, aggressiveness and defensiveness 
in trade unionism in terms of large-scale desertions from trade unions 
into politics and vice-versa. The "pendtiltim theory" depicts the labotir 
movement swinging from industrial militancy to political action and vice-
11 
versa according to disillusionment with first one and then the other. 
12 
It became common amongst early Labor historians and amongst some later 
IS. 
left-wing writers to ascribe the origins of the ALP to just such a 
11. Turner op cit. p 82, 
12. Brian Fitzpatrick op cit: V.G. Childe op cit. 
13. E.W. Campbell History of the Australian Labotir Movement. (Sydney, 
1945); W.J.H. Harris First Steps; Queensland Y/orkers' Moves 
Towards Political Expression 1857-1893. (Canberra, 1966) and The 
Bitter Fight - A Pictorial History of the Australian Labour Move-
ment. (Brisbane, 1970, 
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swing after the strikes of the 1890s, Other research is however 
challenging that interpretation of the origin of the Labor parties 
of Australia and is looking to a more evolutionary development of the 
political movement beginning at the latest in the second half of the 
14 
1880s. 
The same pendulum theory has been applied to the development of 
the Australian labour movement in the first decade of this century 
reversing the move of the late 1890s so that the svriLng v/as against 
political action as the industrial wing became disillusioned with the 
performance of Labor politicians in office and in opposition. The 
15 
explanation is extended further by some to describe the consequent 
increased militancy of the industrial movement and its disaffection 
with the parliamentary wing in terms of the influence of the IWW ajad 
16 
syndicalist doctrines. Whatever the accuracy of this historical 
explanation in relation to the development of the labour movements in 
other states of Australia, it is not an adequate interpretation of 
developments in Queensland in this period. __„__ 
14. R.N, Ebbels (ed) The Australian Labor Movement 1850-1907 (Sydney, 
1964); L,F, Crisp The Australian Federal Labotir Party (Melbourne, 
1965), (The authors and works listed in Footnotes 13 and 14 
are not intended to be an exhatistive list but rather to be re-
presentative of the main proponents of both views). For ftirther 
discussion see the articles Mrs June PtiilipP 1890 - "The Turning 
Point of Australian History?" in Historical Studies of Australia 
and New Zealand. IV, 1949, pp 145-154 and Jean C, O'Connor A Turn-
ing Point in History: A Reply to Mrs, Philipp Historical Studies 
of Australia and New Zealand. IV, 1951, pp 355-365; D.J. Murphy 
"Queensland" and Humphrey McQueen **Victoria" in D,J, Murphy (ed) 
Labor in Politics The State Labor Parties in Australia 1880-1920 
manuscript to be published by the University of Queensland Press 
Brisbane in 1975, 
15. Childe op cit, pp 104-109; Harris op Pit, PP 178-180, 
16. Dalton op cit. pp 19-26. 
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Superficially, the theory might appear applicable to the events 
in Queensland during these decades. There v/as a split in the labotir 
movement which showed dissatisfaction with the Political Labor Party 
and which restilted in the Kidstonite rump breaking away from the main 
labour movement. From that time onwards there was an expansion in 
numbers of unions and union membership and certain sections of unionism 
showed much greater militancy partictilarly from 1910 onwards. V.G. 
Childe argues a prima facie case for the pendulum theory to explain 
developments in Queensland in this period. However, his is a sim-
plistic, superficial explanation of the events. The developments in 
the Queensland labour movement are much more complex than Childe's 
basic theory implies. 
In the previous chapter of this thesis, the expansion in tmionism 
has been shown to derive from a number of inter-relating factors. 
Predominant amongst those factors was the concerted and combined 
campaign by the PLP, CPE, ALF and the large mass unions of un-
skilled workers to encourage the revival of tmionism that H.E. 
17 
Boote had detected as early as 1903, and their attempt to direct it 
towards industrial tmionism but especially towards "political unionism" 
and the achievement of the ALF's long-held dream of a tmified in-
dustrial movement; the formation of one great union encompassing all 
workers and all industries. 
At no time in this period did there develop a gap between the 
17. Worker, IS April 1903. 
80 
militant unions and the parliamentary wing of the labour movement as 
there did in the southern states particularly in New South \7ales and 
Victoria. This may have been due to the lack of strength of the 
socialist clubs and the lack of follov/ing for the Bf.'/, It is 
significant that when trade tmion congresses were held in 1910 a.nd 
1911 in Brisbane there was no challenge to the PLP and there were no 
serious challenges similar to those that had occurred in the Helbourne 
18 
Trades Hall Cotmcil in 1908,, and at the New South V/ales Ti-ade Union 
19 
Congress of the same year, from IW^'/ supporters for the reorganis-
ation of the tmion structure along Iv7Y/ lines. Such a move to change 
the direction of the Queensland movement did not come until after 
1915. 
In contrast, both Queensland Trade Union Congresses unanimously 
affirmed their commitment to complementing political action to the 
Labor Party and praised its efforts in seeking reforms and its support 
for the industrial v/ing. Both congresses appi-oved closer unity in the 
form of a federation based closely on the structure of the MF and 
approved a continuance of a militant indtistrial policy. 
As the new union movement gained strength, promising to pi^ ovide 
the electoral base that cotild oust the anti-Labor party from power 
and did obtain wage concessions and improvements in v/orking conditions 
through direct action, the government became increasingly hostile, 
supporting employer groups that came into conflict with the unions, 
18. Turner op cit. p 60. 
19. loc cit 
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It tried also to break the close link betv/een the militant unions 
and the PLP and the growing political support for the PLP from 
unions of all types, craft, mass or industrial. In this respect 
its measures to crush the militant unions rebotmded upon it creating 
even greater support for the PLP within the industrial v/ing of the 
movement. Nevertheless many tmions, mainly craft oriented still 
refused to accept politics as a legitimate area for their parti-
cipation. A distinct division remained within the industrial 
movement on this issue. This split affected the closer unity move-
ment as its leaders at tha.t time were also advocates of union 
affiliation with the Labor Party, 
A constant threat to the unions v/ere the 1906 decisions of the 
20 
Heggie v Shipwrights' Provident Union and R.H. Standley v Queensland 
21 
Typographical Association cases which placed in jeopardy the very 
existence of trade tmions and which could be used to limit the 
activities of militant unions under the threat of dissipation of 
their funds in hopeless legal battles. In both cases Eeggie v 
Shipwrights' Union and Standley v QTA. the Queensland Supreme Court 
22 
using the Taff Vale case as its precedent rejected the unions' 
20. Worker, 17 March 1906. 
21. ibid. 31 March 1906. 
22. A strike took place on the Taff Vale railway in Wales in August 1900 
v/hich lasted fourteen days, during v/hich time the railway station was 
picketed. The ra.ilvra,y company applied for an injtmction against 
the officials of the tmion to restrain them from watching and 
picketing the Cardiff railv/ay station on the grotmds that it v/as 
illegal. The granting of the application made this practice 
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claim to the right of instructing its members not to v/ork v/ith 
non-tmionists and by allotting damages to both Heggie and Standley 
cut at the very heart of unionism in Queensland. An appeal by 
the Shipwrights to the High Court was rejected. The verdicts 
left the Queensland unions open to attacks on their ftmds any 
time they attempted to enforce tmion membership and were considered 
to place them at the mercy of the employers who could induce 
'blacklegs' to instigate proceedings against unions in order to 
break them. 
The threat to their legal status and their funds brought a 
temporary unity to the tmion movement. Y/hile this manifestation 
of concerted action was fleeting, the reltictance of the government 
to remove doubts concerning the rights of tmions became an in-
creasing spur to closer tmity within the industrial wing and v/ith 
23 
the political v/ing of the labour movement. At a series of meetings, 
instigated by the Brisbane TLC, the combined unions agreed to demand 
that Premier Kidston shotild introduce dtiring the coming parliamentary 
session a bill amending the Trade Union Act of 1886 to provide greater 
security for trade union ftmds similar to a measure that had already 
22. (cont) illegal for the first time since 1871; but the verdict 
went further by declaring that the funds of the union cotild be 
a.ttacked in payment of damage for acts coMititted by its officials, 
This decision was reversed by the Appeal Court but the House of 
Lords re-raffirmed the first judgement, 
23. See Theodore's presidential address in the Official Report of 
Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade and Labour Union 
Congress 1911 (Brisbane, 1912), pp 4-5, 
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24 
passed its second reading in the House of Commons. 
In October 1906, the government introduced to the Legislative 
25 
Assembly the Trades Disputes Bill, It was imraediately criticised 
by trade tmionists for its failure to emulate the simplicity of 
the House of Commons' measure but more particularly for its placing 
of greater power in the hands of the political head of the Crown 
26 
Law Office over the rules of unions and their use of ftmds. Clause 
3 of the bill gave the Crown Law Office the power to refuse regis-
tration to any union of whose rules it did not approve on any p-rounds 
27 
v/hatsoever. Clause 6 decreed that; 
No part of the funds of any registered trade 
union shall be used for or applied to any 
purpose outside the scope of the rtiles of 
such union,^ 
The combined pov/ers of these clauses gave the party in office 
great restrictive control over the activities of trade unions. Though 
at the time of the passage of the bill the government denied the claims 
of George Kerr then leader of the PLP that these pov/ers cotild be used 
for political purposes to prevent financial support of the Y/orker 
29 
and the donation of funds to the CPE from unions, by 1911 the attitude 
of the government had changed. In that year the Registrar of Friendly 
24, Worker, 1906. Commencing on the 14 April 1906, the Y/orker reported 
the attempts throughout the next fev/ years to organise opposition 
to the governjTient's hard attitude to tmions, 
25, gSS.f XCVIII, 17 October 1906, p 1194. 
26. Worker. 27 October 1906, 
27, ibid, 
28. ibid 
2 9 . QPP. X D / I I I , September 1906, pp 1366-1375. 
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Societies invoking the powers given to the state government by the 
Trades Disputes Bill and the decisions in the Osborne case judge-
ment, refused to approve the revised rules of the M'JA, The 
particular rtiles to v/hich he objected v/ere; 
(d) To assist in the movement for the social-
isation of the means of production, dis-
tribution, and exchange; 
(e) To gradually replace the competitive systCTi 
of distribution by a co-operative system; 
(f) To secure direct representation of Labor 
in Parliament; 
(g) To establish and assist in the maintenance 
of Labor journals, 30 
This denial of registration to the AY/A caused Theodore, Labor member 
for Y/oothakata and then president of the Mi A to move in parliament that 
the government should introduce legislation to amend " ,.. the lav/ 
relating to trade tmions so that the tmjust disabilities v/hich now 
31 
operate against those bodies may be removed'*. 
Throtighout the debate, the PLP strongly defended the right of trade 
unions to be free to use their funds for whatever purposes they de-
sired and especially to have the freedom of having avov/ed political 
aims. Both government and opposition speakers reduced the debate 
to the basic issue of whether the amount of financial and electoral 
support the industrial unions, particularly the AY/U and the M A 
were providing for the PLP v/as to be allowed i.e. whether or not 
30. ibid. CVIII, 20 July 1911, p 160, 
31. ibid, p 158. 
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"socialistic unionism" or '*political tmionism'* v/ould be counten-
anced by the government. 
The change of attitude to the union movement that led to the 
use of the restrictive powers of the 1906 Trades Disputes Act to 
refuse industrial registration to the AWA is indicative of the 
tension and disti-tist which developed betv/een the militant unions 
and the government and employer groups. The conflict betv/een these 
groups reached its climax in the major strikes of 1911 and 1912, 
It was v/ithin this crucible of motmting crisis that the moves 
for closer tmity v/ithin the industrial movement were re-generated. 
In defence of the rights already achieved by the tmions and against 
what appeared to be a concerted attack on them by employers organ-
ised into strong associations and the obdurate refusal of the govern-
ment to recognise the right of Queensland unions to have the legal 
status assured to tmions in other states and Great Britain, the 
tmions attempted to find some form of close association in v/hich 
their unity and strength of ntuabers would give them protection. 
In Brisbane, disputes in the bootmaking industry, the iron 
moulding industry, the building trade, amongst the gas employees 
and betv/een the tramway coraioany and its employees, revived the 
militant spirit amongst a grov/ing number of the capital city's 
unionists. In July 1910, in a brave burst of unity, the labour 
movement, exhibited its strength by forcing the re-instateiiient of the 
32, loc cit 
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secretary of the Gas Employees' Union, Y/. Wilson, v/ho had been 
dismissed by the Brisbane Gas Company because of his tmion 
activities, A combined deputation of tmionists and politicia,ns 
to the Minister for Y/orks, Y/,H. Barnes and to the Premier brought 
government presstire to bear on the Gas Company to reconsider its 
decision. Almost the whole PLP joined with Hinchcliffe as 
secretary of the ALF and representatives of the coalminers of 
Bundamba, stokers, seamen, waterside v/orkers, butchers, printers, 
carpenters, saddlers, brick-la,yers, v/oodv/orkers, bootmakers, carters 
and lightermen to form the deputation to the minister. This show of 
unity encouraged many unionists to believe that closer tmity in the 
union movement could be achieved v/ithin the embrace of the ALF, 
At the centre of the re-av/akening of Brisbane unions v/as the 
Brisbane Trades and Labour Cotmcil v/hich had been re-fomied in 1904 
after the failure of the 1890fe experiment of replacing the TLC with 
a District Cotmcil of the ALF. The decision of the sma,ll metropolitan 
unions to resurrect the TLC rather than reform the District Council 
was indicative of their rejection of the militancy of the ALF and 
its advocacy of political involveraent. It emphasised their desire to 
retain craft orientation v/ith its concomitant autonomy of finances 
and actions. Hov/ever the problems of the latter half of the decade, 
unemployment, the threat from the government immigration schemes, the 
high cost of living, and most impoi-tantly, the threat to their finances 
33. Worker. 5 November 1910. 
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34 
and their legal status, forced the leaders of the Brisbane TLC 
to seek some other means by which unity within the industrial move-
ment could be achieved. 
Struck by the strength of the mass rural unions, the ASY/U, 
AY/U and AWA, compared v/ith the weakness of the tmions in coastal 
areas, the TLC resolved to hold a State Trade Union Congress as a 
stimtilus to tmionism and to create "a better spirit among industrial 
35 
workers". The invitation sent to all tmions to attend the Congress 
stressed its dual purpose of improving industrial organisation and 
encouraging unions to take a more active part in the political life 
36 
of the state. The TLC's support for the PLP and increased unity 
v/ithin the industrial movement placed it shoulder to shotilder with 
the ALF. 
As publicity for the forthcoming congress increased, it beca,me 
clear that those most vocal in support of unity visualised the ALF 
as its agency. Despite the call by Joe McDonald, Mossman ASY/U branch 
37 
organiser, for an "Industrial Union Congress" not a "Trades'* Union 
Congress and by various other writers in the Worker for adoption of 
industrial unionism within the various industries the v/ider tmity was 
34. ibid. 23 July 1910. 
35. So vital did many trade unionists regard this issue tha.t at the 
1910 Trades Union Congress they seriously considered calling on 
the PLP to "refuse to vote for supplies tmtil the question £a 
Trades Disputes BillQ is carried or otherv/ise in the Assembly" 
Official Report First Queensland Trade and La.bour Union Congress 
1910 (Brisbane, 1911), p 5, 
36. Worker, 16 October 1909. 
37. ibid. 30 October 1909, 
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to be achieved through "a broader and more effective Fedei-ation of 
38 
Labour'*, v/hich v/ould enable individttal tinions to act together in 
39 
unity but not allov/ outside interference in purely intei-nal concerns. 
The movement v/as not yet ready to entertain the ideas of complete 
tmity and central control that v/ere to gain many supporters in the 
next decade. 
Support for the Congress v/as v/idespread vrith representatives of 
40 
thirty-nine unions, the Brisbane TLC, the ALF and the Trades Hall 
present during Brisbane Exhibition Y/eek in August 1910. In his 
address to this, the First Queensland Ti-ades Union Congress, its 
president, E.J, Hanson, secretary of the Pltniiibers' Union and president 
of the Brisbane TLC, named the creation of the Federation of Labour 
«1 
**t:he closer tmion of unions" as the most important business to come 
before the assembled unionists. On the previous evening after the 
question had been debated for a '*lively and exhaustive'* three hours, 
42 
a, committee ha,d been foraied to formulate a comprehensive scheme for 
complete federation of tmions but providing for autonomy foi- the various 
43 
"callings". (The use of the v/ord "callings'* is interesting as it 
38. ibid. 11 December 1909, 
39. ibid. 11 June 1910, 
40. ibid. 9 July 1910. 
41. Official Report First Queensland Tra.de and Labour Union Congress 
1910 op cit p 7. 
42. The committee v/as comprised of A, Hinchcliffe (ALF) C.W. Martin 
(Boot Trade Union) J.H. Crampton (Federated Butchers') T;.!.:. I.IcCabe 
(V/aterside Y/orkers') H. Coyne (ALF) Y/. L'Estrange (Colliery Employees' 
Union) J.J. McCartney (Seamen's Union). The President and Secretary 
of the Congress v/ere ex officio members ibid p 7. 
43. ibid, p 6. 
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seems to deliberately avoid the advocacy of industrial or craft 
tmionism as the basic tenet for union organisation within the structure 
of the federation). The committee subsequently presaited a report to 
the Congress which recommended the acceptance of the rules and 
constitution of the Queensland Provisional Council of the ALF (v/ith 
44 
modifications in respect to representation on District Cotmcils) 
as the best means of achieving unity within the industrial movement. 
After a lengthy discussion, the committee's recommendations were adopted 
by acclamation. 
The record of the previous evening's debate a.nd events after the 
Congress shov/ that there v/as no unananimity on the question. Brisbane 
Y/aterside Y/orkers' Union representative, M. McCabe summed up the 
opinions of the small metropolitan unions when he claimed that the time 
4S 
had not arrived for taking such a step. Theodore of the AY/A im-
patiently dismissed the timidity of the small unions v/hen he pro-
claimed that their lack of support should not be allov/ed to stand in 
the v/ay of closer unity. He firmly believed that sooner or later these 
"lesser" unions wotild affiliate v/ith the ALF. There was no sign at that 
point in time of his la,ter lack of confidence in the ALF to ftilfil the 
role he was advocating for it. Up to that time, he had fotmd the ALF 
46 
"equa.1 to every emergency". However, the lack of support for the ALF 
and the federation of labour scheme is manifest in the instruction by 
44. loc cit 
45. ibid, pp 8,9. 
46. ibid . p 6. 
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Toowoomba Bricklayers* Union to its representa.tive to v.'ithdrav/ 
47 
from the Congress and return to Toov/oomba, once the decision had 
been made to adopt the ALF scheme for closer unity. 
During the rest of 1910 and for the first half of 1911, 
Queensland unions showed clearly their real opinion of the closer 
tmity scheme; only tv/o further tmions affiliated with the ALF, the 
Queensland Branch of the AFBSU and the Queensland Branch of the 
Federated Ironmotilders' Union though a ntmiber of other tmions did 
indicate their intention to join the ALF ranks. Hinchcliffe as-
cribed their failure to do so by the beginning of 1911 to their 
" ... delaying action tmtil such time as arrangements have been made 
48 
to provide for the increased expenditure which affiliation entails." 
Childe and, more recently, Sullivan have argued the lack of 
support for the ALF was due to v/idespread dissa.tisfaction v/ith the 
federation principle and a belief that the ALF v/as obsolete in its 
provision for autonomy for its members allov/ing them to continue 
their adherence to craft unionism to the detriment of industrial 
tmionism. That these beliefs were held by some unionists is manifest 
in J,H, Sherry's motion at the Second TUC in 1911 to amend the 
structural basis of the ALF, However there is little proof that their 
47. ibidTT^ ^ ~^  """^  
48 , Minutes Annual Reports a.nd Balance Shee t s of t he Northern (Long-
reach and C h a r l e v i l l e Branches of t h e J,/U t o g e t h e r v/ith t he AIJF 
and Y/orker Repor ts and Balance Shee ts for 1910 (Br i sbane , 1911) , 
P 1 6 . 
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49 50 
beliefs v/ere v/idely supported. Both Childe and Sullivan cite 
as their chief reference in support of their claims a Worker letter 
by R.C, Anderson, Sawmill a.nd v/oodv/orkers' Union, of 26 November 1910 
51 
hea-ded "Craft Unionism v Federated Unionism". Though Sullivan does 
not quote directly from the letter, Childe does, but hopelessly out 
of context. Anderson far from attacking the ALF wholeheartedly 
supported the recommendations of the TUC and concludes by declaiming, 
52 
*' ... Where craft tmionism has failed federated unionism will succeed'*. 
Leading militant Jack Crampton, AFBSU, similarly supporting the TUC 
scheme stated bltmtly: 
... To gain our right we must become militant, 
and to become militant we must become class 
conscious. There is today nothing better 
offering to bring this about than the feder-
ation of labour ..,^3 
It is clear from the evidence v/hich emerged from the debate on 
ALF affiliation at the 1911 TUC that while concern over craft union 
autonomy within the ALF structure may have deterred a fev/, the major 
obstacles blocking mass affiliation with that body v/ere; the reluctance 
of most tmions to pay the affiliation dues, ties v/ith interstate and 
international federations v/hich objected to the diversion of funds to the 
local central organisation, the conservatism of many tmionists in the 
49. Childe, op cit. p 115. 
50. Sullivan, op cit, p 390, 
51. Worker, 20 November 1910. 
52. loc cit 
53. ibid. 5 November 1910, 
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areas of indtistrial militancy and politics. The existence of the 
Brisbane Trades and Labour Cotmcil providing an alternative means of 
union combination encouraged many metropolitan un.ions to delay 
affiliation with the ALF. Recognition of this fa.ctor led the committee, 
appointed to frame a scheme for closer organisation for the approval 
of the 1911 Congress, to recommend the creation of a District Cotmcil 
55 
of the ALF for metropolitan tmions from 1 January 1912, On the 
31 December 1911, the Brisbane TLC disbanded in favour of the District 
Council and a ntimber of metropolitan tmions subsequently affiliated 
v/ith the ALF. However, support was not v/idespread, despite the increase 
in affiliates after the 1912 Tramv;ay strike. 
S6 57 
Both Childe and Sullivan viev; the reluctance of tinions to affiliate 
with the ALF after the 1910 TUC as an indication that those who fav-
oured closer tmity were divided on the question of amalgamation or 
federation. They point to the success of the AWA and argue that its 
growth through the amalgamation of the noi-thern tmions raised it to the 
level of a rival for the ALF, Sullivan argues further that the MA 
officials were actively plotting the demise of the ALF v/hile they used 
its fading influence to further their campaign to replace the loosely 
structured ALF with the OBU. The relationship hetvreen the ALF and the 
AWA especially during the 1911 Sugar strike v/ill be analysed in greater 
54. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade 
and Labour Union Congress op cit. pp 6-15. 
55. ibid, p 14. 
56. Childe op cit. p 115. 
57. Sullivan op cit, p 390. 
58. ibid, p 390 et passim. 
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detail in a later chapter but, while it is agreed that in the 
grovrth and expansion of the AY/A can be detected the beginning of 
the end for the ALF, the AV/A in 1910 and even during 1911 was pre-
pared to work within the framework of the ALF in furthering the 
industrial cause within the state. 
The Machiavellian interpretation of the intentions of the AY/A 
is difficult to sustain in the light of the fraternal atmosphere of 
the close of the 1911 TUC. On behalf of the Congress, J.H. (Harry) 
Coyne MLA, ALF representative and chairman of the Standing Orders 
Committee of the Congress presented a gift to the youthful Theodore in 
appreciation of his services as president of the Congress and stated 
" ... You have devoted yourself to the interests of the ALF and I 
59 
think you have a great future ahead of you ,,," In response, 
Theodore expressed his wish that they wotild meet in future Congresses 
60 
under the auspices of the ALF, Of course, in the euphoria of winding 
up what appeared to be a successful Congress, it cotild be expected 
that, if friction and divisions existed, they would be glossed over. 
However, Theodore himself, in setting the tone for the Congress in his 
61 
opening addi^ess, made clear the AWA's deference to the ALF as the 
agency for closei' unity. Further evidence of the close relationship 
between the AWA and the ALF can be found in the defence of that 
relationship by ^ A representatives. During the course of the some-
59. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade 
and Labour Union Congress op cit. p 24, 
60. loc cit 
61. ibid, pp 4-5, 
times heated debate on the principle which wotild govern the future 
attempts at closer tmity in the state, J.J, Miley vice-president 
of the Congress and president of the TLC, summed up a somewhat 
confused exchange concerning the AWA-ALF relationship, with the 
comment: "The thing seems to be resolving itself into two warring 
62 
camps". Jack Moir, representative of the Southern District branch 
of the M A quickly showed his resentment at the attempt "to raise a 
63 
bogey" between the two bodies and pointed to the fact that the two 
organisations were working side by side in the sugar strike at that 
very moment. At no other time was the matter raised; the Congress 
apparently accepted the role of the AWA as a powerful affiliate of 
the ALF working for that body's expansion to include all tinions with-
in the state. 
Nevertheless, during the 1911 Congress, the concept on which the 
ALF had been organised since 1889 was strongly challenged not by 
supporters of the AY/A but by some advocates of industrial tmionism. 
Before the 1910 and 1911 Congresses took place, there had been much 
dissemination of industrial unionism propaganda by the Worker and 
other Labour journals both Queensland and interstate. The local 
socialist group, the Social Democratic Vanguard which included 
amongst its members a nuinber of trade tmionists e,g, R.C. Anderson, 
secretary of the Federated Sawmill and Woodworkers' Union, publicly 
espoused industrial unionism as the principle for union organisation. 
62. ibid, p 13. 
63. loc cit 
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While it is difficult to determine just hov/ much influence inter-
national sources exerted on the spread of this idea, it is reason-
able to argue that European and American ideas ha.d only indirect 
influence as the most influential orga,n of socialist propaganda 
the Queensland Y/orker regurgitated the interna,tional theories 
only after translating them into terras harinonious with its demo-
cratic socialist ideology. 
That the change in attitude betv/een the 1910 Congress and that 
of 1911 v/as influenced by this propaganda is certain but other 
influences v/ere also brought into play by the events of the inter-
vening twelve months. In tha-t time, the great ama.lgamation of 
northern unions had been engineered by the ALF and ii",/A; three 
major strikes had occurred, the 1910 Sugar Strike v;hich ended in 
defeat for the disorganised i'iG,;U, the ironmoulders strike v/hich ended 
unsatisfa-ctorily for the ALF and the tmionists involved, and the 1911 
Sugar Strike v/hich was still in progress during the course of the 1911 
Congress; there v/as a consequent increased tmion milita^ncy; there ha,d 
been no change in the precarious legal position of unions as no 
alteration had been effected in the 1886 Trades Union Act and no 
Trades Disputes Bill had been introduced into parliament; the re-
ferendujB to ensure union preference had been defeated; fev/ tmions had 
heeded the recommendation of the 1910 Congress to affiliate v/ith the 
ALF; the government immigration schemes ha.d been stepped up. The 
combined effect of these factors v/as to create grea,ter questioning 
Si 
of the usefulness of the ALF ?,nd the efficiency of its loose structure. 
The initia,l opposition to the ALF scheme came from some elements 
of the transport v/orkers' tmions notably the Townsville a-nd Brisbane 
branches of the Federated T/aterside Y/orkers' Union and the Federated 
Seamen's Union, Queensland Branch, These tmions already involved 
in nationv/ide federations agreed v/ith Arthur Cooper, general secretary 
of the Seamen's Federation that the first step to be taken was to 
64 
organise the transport v/orkers under one executive, Othei" trans-
port Y/orkers' unions, the Brisbane bi-anch of the Federated Ca,rters, 
Trollejnnen a-nd Draymen's Union and the Queensland Railv/ay Stiployees* 
jlssociation also showed their support for this principle. Further 
support for grouping tmions on an industry basis ca>.me from the Queens-
land Typographical Association, Australian Federated Butchers Employees' 
Union, Austra,lian Boot Trade Employees' Federation, Federated Ca-^ T/mill 
and Y/oodv/orkers' Union a,nd the Pltimbers, Gasfitters and Galvanised 
Iron Workers' Union. All v?ere tmions that had achieved at least some 
degree of industrial union organisation v/ithin their ov/n industry. As 
a group, they corapi^ ised a significant force at the 1911 Congress v/ith 
Brisbane interests strongly represented in its members. 
It is not 3.rgued that they v/ere deliberately organised to form a 
block determined to promote industrial tmionism as a riv2.1 for the ALF; 
there is no evidence of such collusion. Nevertheless there does se&a. 
to have been a unity of belief that stemmed from their ovm experiences 
64. ibid, p 7. 
97 
rather than the example of the AY/A, Y/ha„t they desired v/as really 
contrary to the mass tmionism of the northern union, Araal gamat ion 
v/as their means to remove sectionalism but not for the same organ-
isational objective as that of the AY/A. 
Their first attempt to divert the federation movement towards 
restructuring the ALF on industrial union lines occurred in the 
65 
second session of the Federation of Labour debate. In elaboration 
of the ilTA's motion to re-open the discussion of the formation of a 
Federation of Labour " ... and if possible, the lines on v/hich 
organisation should proceed ...", J.H. SherryV'Queensland Railway 
Employees', proposed as an amendment: 
That it be a recommendation to the ALF to alter 
its constitution so as to carry the principle of 
the solidarity of Labour into active practice by 
supplanting the Federation v/ith an industrial 
workers organisation,67 
Speaking to the amendment. Sherry ma.de it clear tha,t he was not against 
joining the ALF but was opposed to that part of the ALF's constitution 
which allov/ed sectional and craft unions to retain their autonomy 
v/ithin the ALF's structure. The AliF's role as the centi-a,! agency for 
closer tmity v/as not challenged. Subsequently, Sherry withdrev/ his 
amendment with a personal explanation that he had not intended to 
68 
block the formation of a federation of labour,. 
Later in the Congress, some confusion arose over R.C, Anderson's 
65, ibid , p 10, 
66, ibid, p 6, 
67, ibid, p 10, 
68, ibid. p 12. 
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comments in support of his motion that a committee of nine delegates 
be appointed to formulate a plan to implement the purpose of the 
original motion to create - **the federation of the whole of the 
69 
industrial unions represented at the Congress", Anderson's 
claim that the main objective was to amalgamate as one union 
under the A M with the ultimate objective of federating with the 
ALF, raised a stomi of protest against this apparent move to 
supplant the ALF with the MA, In explanation, Anderson denied 
having made any invidious comparisons betwean the ALF and the 
AWA: he was just trying to make the move to affiliate with the 
70 
ALF easier for those who had raised objections, especially finan-
cial. He agreed all unions should affiliate with the ALF and saw 
two ways this could be achieved firstly by affiliating with the 
ALF as a separate industrial union and secondly by amalgamating with 
the AWA and becoming linked to the ALF through the AWA's affiliation 
with that body. The latter method would overcome the problem that 
his own union was having in raising the finances to pay the ALF 
71 
affiliation dues, 
72 
It is clear that many delegates, just as some modern historians, 
misinterpreted his intentions. Later, the Congress obviously accepted 
his explanation of his intentions by carrying his motion and appointing him 
as one of the committee with Hinchcliffe, W, Bertram, W,P, Colborne, 
69. ibid, p 6, 
70. ibid, p 13. 
71. ibid, p 12. 
72. Sullivan op cit, p 390; Childe op cit. p 115, 
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R. McCormack, Sherry, C.W. Martin, '*Earry" Coyne, E. Foley and Moir. 
The attempt to direct the ALF to industrial ujtiionism culminated 
in the amendment to Anderson's motion made by Y/. HcCosker, QTA, and 
seconded by Cooper, general secretary Federated Waterside Y/orkers' 
Union. HcCosker's amendment stated; 
1, That this Congress recommends all unions, 
partictilarly unions in and arotind cities to 
affilia-te v/ith the ALF, 
2, That sections of industries at present organised 
in separa,te unions take steps to bring these 
sections into one tmion comprehending all 
workers in the industry. 
3, That the Brisbane Trades and Labour Council 
be requested to' consult its affiliations and 
recommend them to merge the Council into a 
District Cotmcil of the AIF J^ 
Though the amendment v/as soundly defeated twenty-four to eight, 
sections one and three were embodied in the eventual recommendations 
of the committee for the Federation of La.bour which were adopted by 
the Congress. The omission of section two from the comraittee's 
recommendations suggests that its provisions for industrial tmionism 
were what brought the amendment's defeat. 
In stimming up the significance of the 1911 Congress's adoption 
of the constitution and rtiles of the Queensland Provincial Council 
of the ALF "as the best means of bringing about the federation of 
75 
labour", Childe has claimed that the " ... delegates v/ere still 
73. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade 
and Labour Congress 1911 op cit. p 13. 
74. ibid, p 14. 
75. ibid, p 13. 
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under the spell of federation, and that principle carried the day 
against amalgamation". However, the federation principle was not 
in dispute. All speakers, except the Plumbers' Union representative, 
supported the formation of a federation of labour under the auspices 
of the ALF. Once the red herring of the brief burst of discussion 
77 
on ALF, AY/A rivalry is placed in its correct perspective the real 
issue emerges as whether or not the tinions were to be organised into 
allied trade groups each affiliated v/ith the ALF or allowed to retain 
the craft unionism and mass unionism of the past. Then and later, 
most tmions showed clearly their preference for the latter. 
In the brief Indian summer of poptilarity that follov/ed the 1911 
Congress, the ALF followed two organisational paths. Firstly, the 
ALF rules were changed so that it became increasingly easier for 
unions a.nd Queensland branches of nationwide unions to become in-
dividual affiliates. As a second avenue for increasing membership, 
the ALF encouraged the amalgama,tion of rural and provincial city 
unions with the AWA and the expansion of the AWA into areas such as 
the Darling Downs to include in its ranks workers previously un-
organised industrially. These methods produced a growth in ALF 
membership unequalled in any period since the 1880s, In accordance 
with the recommendation of the 1911 Congress, the Brisbane TLC was 
replaced by the Brisbane District Council of the ALF and moves were 
76. Childe op cit. p 120. 
77. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade 
and Labour Congress op cit, p 13. 
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initiated to establish a District Cotmcil at Toov/oomba. The Sugar 
Strike v/as successfully resolved in such favourable terms that it was 
hailed as the greatest victory since Jondaryn. It seemed that the 
harvest of closer unity was about to be reaped, H.E. Boote, Y/orker 
editor, encapstilated the hopes, aspirations and confidence of the 
more closely united union movement when he v/rote " ... Industrial 
combination is the key to industrial democracy. YHien united in-
78 
dustrially the pov/er of the v/age-earners will be irrestible'*. 
However, in the very confidence created by the nev/ unity and 
strength lay the seeds of its ovm destruction and the end of the 
ALF*s revival. 
78, Worker, 18 November 1911, 
102 
Chapter Five 
**A BROADER SPIRIT OF UNIONISM" 
The months which followed the 1911 Congress produced one of the 
most turbulent crisis periods in Queensland industrial history. It 
proved to be a major demarcation point for the closer unity movement. 
From that time onwards, the movement diverged sufficiently from the 
traditions of the past and its insular attitude to outside influence 
to be more in accord with the contemporary Australian and Inter-
national industrial movement. The force which led Queensland union-
ism along this path was the new mass tinion giant that had emerged in 
the twentieth centviry - the Amalgamated Workers Association of Queens-
land. 
Before 1913, under the intelligent and determined leadership of 
Theodore and William McCormack, the AWA had developed to be the largest 
single tmion in Queensland. This union, which was to bec<»ae the most 
militant union in the state, began at the mining caitre of Irvine-
- ' ' ' • 1 •' 
bank on the Atherton Tableland in September 1907 as a defensive 
measure against the hardening attitude of mining companies faced with 
falling world mineral prices. This had forced an abortive strike by the 
miners against reduced wages and longer hours. From the beginning, it 
was inteaded to be the nucleus of a larger union that would tmite 
1» Worker. 1 August 1908, 
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itinerant workers just as the /SffU had done in the previous century. 
However tmlike the AWU, it did not concentrate on one industry but was 
prepared to include miners, railway workers, navvies, aigineers (both 
skilled and tmskilled workers) in its ranks at first on a limited 
regional basis but later encompassing the whole east coast and some 
inland areas. It was organised at a time when there was a burst 
of industrial activity in mining districts with tmions springing up 
in a number of mining centres - Gympie, Cloncurry, Chillagoe, Howard 
and Mtmgana. 
That the AWA of Irvinebank of all these unions should grow into 
the giant AWA of Queensland was due partly to the unsettled industrial 
conditions of the time, to the severe slump in the mining industry but 
mainly to the organising skill of Theodore and the stalwart support he 
received from William McCormack. Theodore had experienced the unity of 
the miners and the protection of the miners' tmions at Kalgoorlie and 
Broken Hill when he had worked there between 1902 and 1906. Certainly 
his youthful experiences at Broken Hill were shown in the early organ-
isation of the AY/A which borrowed from the rules of the AMA and the 
Broken Hill Mining Federation. Another inspiration in union organ-
isation was the AWU whose officials assisted in the AWA's efforts to 
organise unattached workers and whose structure influenced that of the 
2. Irwin Young Theodore - His Life and Times (Sydney, 1971), pp 9, 10. 
P. Bray E.G. Theodore and the Queensland Labour Movement 1909-1925, 
unpublished B A honours (history) thesis 1941, Queensland University, 
3. Young op cit. p 12; Worker. 1 August 1908, 
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AWA, 
Theodore's great friend and colleague, McCormack, was an equally 
good organiser. Although he does not seem to have had the same 
initiative and innovating zeal as llieodore, McConnack proved him-
self a pragmatic, talented, determined and hard-working leader in 
union affairs and in politics where he, like Theodore, was to become 
premier of the state. His work in organising the amalgamation of the 
sugar unions with the AWA of North Queensland, his leadership during 
the 1911 sugar strike and his efforts during the amalgamation negot-
iations with the AWU mark him as a major force in the develojment of 
the AWA and the Queensland industrial movement of that era. 
Quickly, the small tmion at Irvinebank was joined by branches at 
5 
Herberton, Smith*s Creek and Stannary Hills, One of the first actions 
6 
was affiliation with the ALF, It was the only far northern tinion with 
representatives at the Annual Queensland Provincial Cotmcil meeting of 
7 
the ALF held at Brisbane in February 1908. 
From the beginning, it is clear that Theodore and McCormack 
realised that for unions to be effective industrial organisations, 
they had to be unified and to exert influence politically. They were 
pragmatic tmionists who attempted to find a practical means of applying 
4. K.H. Kennedy The Public Life of William McCormack 1907-1932, 
unpublished PhD (history) thesis 1973, James Cook University of 
North Queensland, 
5. Worker. 1 August 1908, 
6. ibid. 14 December 1907. 
7. ibid. 15 February 1908, 
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principles that had been clear to industrialists before and after 
Harx,both overseas and in Australia, Their eventtaal solution was the 
amalgamation of all unions in Queensland into one big union to 
straigthen the labour movement industrially and politically. 
The AWA's first step towards developing closer unity was re-
gional. Early in 1908, Theodore aaglneered the amalgamation of the 
small group of unions 0a the Atherton Tableland, the Irvinebank, 
Stannary Hills, Herberton, Smith*s Creek branches of the organisation 
formed at Irvinebank on September 1907 pins the two other small unions 
on the mining field the 0,K, Miners, Smelters and General Workers 
Union and the Mungana Miners, Smelters and General Workers Union, 
Theodore's far-seeking aim of closer unity and improving the structure 
of unionism in the north is evident in his report of the amalgamation 
conference in the Northern Miner, There he claimed the conference was 
held: 
to found a sch@ae for the eomplete amalgamation of 
all existing unions in the north, under one con-
stitution and under one controlling body, and for 
the purpose of propounding a system for better 
organisation of the workers of northern Queensland 
generally.® 
The intention to expand the new organisation to include other 
northern c^itres was manifest in the resolution of the conference to 
10 
appoint a full-time paid organiser. The importance Theodore placed 
8, ibid, 1 August 1908. 
9, Northern Miner. 28 April 1908, 
10, loe cit 
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on the expansion of the union is shown by his taking, as well as his 
position of general secretary, to which he was elected at the 
amalgamation conference, the position of organiser for three 
months to tour the district and organise and establish branches of 
11 
the union at the various northern centres. He was returned as 
organiser at the next annual conference and McCorraack became general 
12 
secretary. The immediate aims of the organisation were to obtain 
13 
improved working conditions, shorter hours and recognition of unionism. 
At the first annual conference, a fighting platform was devised 
by Theodore and McCormack assisted by C.H, Landgren, newly elected 
president of the AWA of North Queensland. Its planks were: 
1. Advocacy of the Minimum Wage in Northern Queensland. 
2. Advocacy of a 44 hour week in Mines. 
3. Advocacy of State control of all conditions of 
employment in all industries. 
4. Abolition of all forms of Alien Labour. 
5. Better inspection of mines. 
6. Official recognition of the Union of Employees. 
These measures emphasised the pragmatic motives of the new union: 
they owe nothing to Marxian orthodoxy and little to socialist ideology. 
However, the broader intentions of the organisation and the under-
lying ideal of using union strength for political purposes can be seen 
in the clauses of the original constitution and re-affirmed at later 
conferences for the union to seek to play an important role in the 
selection of parliamentary candidates and the inclusion of a rule 
11. loc cit 
12. Worker. 6 March 1909. 
13. Northern Miner, loc cit. 
14. Worker. 6 March 1909, 
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making it compulsory for all unicm menbers yAio had the necessary 
15 
qualifications to exercise their vote. This policy led the union 
to seek control of the WPOs in the Herberton area and brought both 
Theodore and McCormack into the Parliam^itary Labor Party where they 
continued their involvemaat in the union movement using their in-
fluence as politicians to increase the power of the AWA and unionism 
in gaieral in the labour movenent. 
Formed as a militant, progressive, industrial organisation -
shedding benefit sections from its rules at the amalgamation con-
ference - the AWA had a policy of strike action forced upon it by 
the refusal of employers to negotiate with the union or even to 
recognise it as its members* advocate. Determined that their union 
would not be crushed, Theodore and McCormack adopted a policy of 
forcing recognition and improved conditions. This involved it in a 
number of strikes, lock-outs and skirmishes with «aployers in the 
16 
region, but, wherever possible, it att^ipted to negotiate and 
eoneiliate with employers for the improved industrial and economic 
conditions it sought, 
17 
The claim that the AWA adopted a deliberate policy of strike 
15. loc cit 
16. Theodore summed up the AWA's attitude thus: 
"Hen who are dissatisfied and have ccme to the conclusion that 
the ordinary methods of improving their conditions or securing 
redress of their grievances are not suitable to the occasion, 
have to resort to other means, ev&a. to viol^ce", QPP. CXI, 
17 July 1912, p 263. 
This certainly is not a direct actionist view but discloses a 
preference for other methods, with the strike or other direct 
actionist strategy as a last resort, 
17. Sullivan op cit,|q9 391-404, 
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action is not supportable. Nowhere in its constitution or at any of 
its conferences or in any statements of its officials was such a 
policy entmciated. Certainly, it took pride in its fame as a "fight-
ing union" but such a boast does not necessarily mean the adoption of 
a strike policy. In the conditions of northern Queensland where the 
tmion began and flourished a vinion* s adoption of a policy of reform 
and improvemait of its members* wages and conditions automatically 
meant that it would be involved in strikes and other industrial con-
flicts as northern employers consistently refused to grant reforms or 
to negotiate with, or even to recognise the existence of a union 
unless forced to do so. 
In almost all instances of the union*s involvement in a strike, it 
was the result of the employers' refusal either to negotiate agree-
ments relating to wages or to conditions of employment. Most of the 
early strikes in which it was involved were the result of enployers' 
attempting to cut wages or to introduce conditions of esnplojrment un-
favourable to the employees or to maintain unsatisfactory industrial 
conditions. 
There was a general policy of first exploring every avenue of 
negotiation with the employer involved to achieve a satisfactory 
arrangonent. Only after such negotiation had failed did the Executive 
18 
authorise strikes. On a few occasions, notably at the O.K. Mine in 
19 
Townsville and amongst the engine drivers of Mount Elliott, hasty 
18. AWA of NQ Executive Minutes, 5 Novaaber 1909, 
19. McCorraack to W. Pemberton (Secretary Selwyn Branch AWA of Q) 
109 
actions by union officials and rank-and-file unionists precipitated 
strikes before the possibility of arranging a satisfactory solution 
by negotiation had been ^qplored. In these instances, the Executive 
backed the action of its officials and members publicly but privately, 
it agreed the strikes were mistakes and the conflicts would have been 
better and more quickly resolved by negotiation. Usually, the officials 
involved received a sharp rebuke from the Executive for their hasty 
20 
actions. The AWA officials followed the traditional course of 
militant rural unionism in Australia. They were prepared to use the 
best available means to achieve improved working and social conditions 
for their members. At various times, they exploited all av^iues except 
Wages Boards, open to a union of that era to achieve its objectives, 
legal, political, conciliatory and direct actionist. 
Its frequent use in its early years of the strike method which 
earned it the reputation of being a **direct actionist" union was 
necessary in the circumstances. As the AWA in noxi:hem Queensland and 
later throughout the whole state forced recognition from employers 
because of its unity, strength and better leadership and organisation, 
it used the strike method less and less and favoured negotiations which 
19. (cont) 15 February 1912, Secretary's Outward Letterbook, AlA 
Records, ANU Archives: 
" ,,, We might point out that this same Enginedriver trouble 
occurred at Selwyn about twelve months ago, and althou^ the 
position became strained, still it was satisfactorily arranged 
without recourse to a Knock off of all the works. It appears 
that this trouble might have been arrai^ed had a little delay 
taken place and the Executive Officials be given time to get to 
the scene of the trouble ,.,** 
20, McCormack to Pemberton, 13 March 1912, ibid. This letter outlined 
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caused less "imnecessary loss of time and money to members". 
Nevertheless, it became recognised throughout the state as the 
most militant union in Queensland in this era. Such a militancy 
22 
has been attributed to IWW influences. But this seems most unlikely. 
While it is true that IVm influence had reached this area and its 
ideas and doctrines were regarded favourably by some workers, the 
leaders of the northern union movement did not accept syndicalism or 
the IWW as the source of their policies, nor were they. 
The ideas of Theodore and McCormack were more influenced by Aust-
ralian circumstances and traditions that were more British than Amer-
ican or Continental European. In organisation, the AWA v/as closer in 
structtire to the Mm and its origins in the mass unionism of Robert 
Owens' Grand National Consolidated Trades Union. It was more centralised 
than either of the other tv/o unions and rejected managing benefit funds 
23 
as a legitimate function of a union, Hov/ever, it retained regional semi-
autonomous divisions as the base for its hierarchical structure while it 
demanded tighter and greater control of finance and industrial action 
of its sections. The only structural change the K/Y/ influences poss-
ibly forced was the granting of autonomous sections within its general 
20, (cont) clearly the attitude of the AWA of Q Executive to strikes. 
It lists a number of instances dating from the early years of the 
union in which "mistakes" were made by various branches in going 
on strike hastily before attempting to negotiate v/ith employers, 
21, loc cit 
22, Dalton in Murphy et al, op cit. p 21, 
23, Official Report of Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of 
the Amalgamated Workers' Association of January 1912 (Brisbane, 
1913), p 25. 
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centralised constitution for variotis skilled industries that amalgamated 
24 
with it after 1911. Later, as part of the new AWU, Theodore and 
McCormack borrowed the OBU nomenclature that was increasingly popular 
with workers to describe their attenpts to make the AWU a mass union 
including all workers in Australia but their use of such terminology 
certainly did not extend to a commitment to IWW doctrines or methods. 
In theory and organisation the AWA was in accord with Tom Maim's 
remedy for the failure of the labour movement at Broken Hill in 1908. 
25 
Mann advocated the foxmation of industrial unions as giant amalgamations 
of existing unions according to the industries they served, with power 
to determine strategy for all the workers involved in any way in an 
industrial dispute. This was the policy followed by the leaders of the 
AWA with the major modification that while its leaders advocated industrial 
tmionism as the desirable form of union organisation, the union was at all 
times a mass union based on the tmskilled and transient workers of the 
northern miners, sugar and railway construction industries but accepting 
into its ranks any union and any unionist that would join. The slogan 
used by Crampton and Theodore whilst attempting to organise Brisbane 
and the south-east comer for the AWA during 1911 was "everyone who is a 
26 
unionist should join our ranks". 
There was a minor IWW challenge to this basic direction of the AWA 
27 
soon after its inception, but then and later IWW influences were weak 
24. loe cit 
25. Mann op cit. p 241. 
26. Worker. 14 January 1911. 
27. Worker. 20 November 1909. Letter to the Editor by Alf Pain, 
AWA Secretary at Herberton. 
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in the AWA and were weakest within the areas where the union was 
strongest. It is significant that when the TM did gain sufficient 
support in the south after 1915 to establish locals in Brisbane and 
Mount Morgan, the only one established north of Rockhajnpton was at 
Cairns and this was a purely Russian local which expired when its 
founders returned to Russia in a body to participate in the fruits of 
28 
the Bolshevik victory. It was reported that there was a concentration 
29 
of IWW followers at Herberton with, as their leader, Alf Pain, AWA 
branch secretary for the region and unsuccessful Labor candidate in 
30 
1909 for the Woothakata electorate. Ironically, Pain was a vocal 
critic of the political involvement of the tmion, desiring the AWA to 
be, not only non-political but like the IWW anti-political and urging 
changes in the rules and constitution for the greater involvement of the 
rank and file. He attempted to become at various times, union organiser 
and general secretary but was defeated in both plebiscites. He dis-
appeared from prominence after he was censured by the 1910 Annual 
Conference of the AWA for making allegations of mismanagement against 
31 
general secretary McCormack, With his departure went any major IV/W 
28. Direct Action. Betv/een 1915 and 1917 Direct Action carried 
reports of activities of the IWW Locals in Queensland the first 
being established in 1915 in Brisbane. 
29. Worker. 29 January 1910. Letter to the Editor by A.E. Church of 
Chillagoe in reply to Alf Pain. (See ch 3 p 70 for further 
comments on Alf Pain and IWW influence in the AWA. 
30. Worker. 26 March 1910, 
31. Official Reports of Proceedings of Second and Third Annual Con-
ferences of the Amalgamated Workers Association of Queensland^ 
1912 and 1913, 
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influence within the structure of the AWA imtil after the establishment 
of the Brisbane branch in 1911 and the influence of theorists such as 
Ernie Lane, Their influences were resisted by the long-term AWA 
officials especially the leaders Theodore and McCormack, 
The AWA's success in confrontations with employers encouraged 
northern workers to become monbers. Of particular influence was the 
victory in the strike of the Etheridge Railway Construction navvies 
which lasted for three months during the latter part of 1908, The 
well-organised, disciplined and determined opposition initiated and 
sustained under Theodore's personal supervision impressed the whole 
of Queensland. Charles Collins, ALF organiser, sent north to assist 
in organising the new vinion and to give support during the strike highly 
praised the AWA and its officers: **rhis place ought to become the centre 
of tmionism in the North, and a better lot of executive officers it 
32 
would be hard to find anywhere", 
Collins showed his confidence and admiration for the MA by urging 
other unions in the north to amalgamate with it and by advising other 
mining centres to oi^anise on the same lines as the northern union. The 
ALF gave further help in the Etheridge strike by assisting Theodore in his 
33 
negotiation of a settlenent with the government. From this time on, 
tmtil 1913, co-operation of the two bodies was to be very close as they 
both guided the Queaxsland industrial movement towards developing a union 
of unions which had the aim of makii^ every worker a unionist, every union 
a member of the larger all encompassing ALF organisation and every union-
32, Worker. 19 September 1908, 
33. ibid. 3 October 1908. 
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ist a Labor voter. 
It soon became clear that the two organisations had agreed that the 
AWA was to become the central organising structure within which northern 
Quesisland and the coastal areas would be onbraced by the adoption of 
a form of organisation which would include all branches of labour in 
one mass union on lines that would be in accord with the broad spirit 
of industrial unionism. 
Northern unions welcomed the initiative of the Brisbane Trades 
and Labotir Council in organising a Trade Union Congress for the pro-
motion of closer industrial unity in the state. In accord with his 
strong belief in the need for this development, Theodore, newly 
elected as the parliamoitary member for Woothakata and vice-president 
of the Queensland provincial council of the ALF supported the Brisbane 
move by proposing that all affiliates of the ALF should send delegates 
to the proposed State Trade Union Congress to be held at Brisbane in 
34 
Ax^ust 1910, There was widespread support within the federation for 
a closer union of unions to be initiated as soon as possible. 
The AWA Executive, without waiting for the August Congress to take 
place, iimnedlately moved to bring this ideal into actuality at least 
35 
in northern Queensland, After consulting with officials of the 
Western Workers* Association, the ASWU, Townsville Associated Workers* 
Union, the AWA Executive divised a scheme for "amalgamating all 
Industrial Unions now operating in the Northern Queensland", and 
34, ALF Executive Minutes, 5 Jtily 1910, 
35, Worker. 19 February 1910, 
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authorised secretary McCoirmack to circularise all northern unions 
36 
giving them the opportimity to take part in the amalgamation. 
The px>oposed organisation was to have the AWA structure of 
branches established in the various centres of industry, each having 
control of local matters, but being subject to the control of an 
executive council. Each branch was to pay a percentage of its gross 
revenue to the general fund. The executive was to have full control 
of the gaxeral fund, to have complete control of organisers and organ-
ising work, to pay all salaries and managonent expenses of the head 
office and to keep in close touch with all the districts in which the 
37 
union operated. 
Devised to give the union the full advantage of the nomadic 
workers* membership, the plan enabled the transient workers of the 
north to retain year round membership of a union without the necessity 
of paying more than one membership fee per year. Other incentives 
to prospective members of the amalgamation were offered by the obvious 
savings in expenses of a smaller number of union officials and the 
employment of permanent organisers able to concentrate their efforts 
in the various centres during the most op:|>ortune time for enrolling 
38 
members and organising blanches. 
At the Trade Union Congress in Brisbane, Theodore pledged the 
AWA*s support for closer unity and for the ALF, which "they found 
36. ibid. 14 May 1910, 
37. ibid. 23 Jtily 1910, 
38. loc cit 
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equal to every esaen^ency'*, as the organising body and its structure 
39 
as a suitable means of unifying the states industrial movement. As 
a result of the Congress's aidorsement of the constitution and rules 
40 
of the ALF as the best means of '•consolidating the unions", the ALF 
sent its newly appointed organiser A.J. Fraser to assist McCormack in 
41 
his efforts to achieve an amalgamation of northern unions. Together, 
they devised a more ambitious scheme to amalgamate not only northern 
tmions but also a number of existing unions in southern coastal areas, 
Queensland was to be divided into three districts: 
District No. 1 to comprise Chillagoe and all places 
at present operating under the MA, 
Nelson, Mossman, Geraldton and 
Herbert River sugar districts. 
District No. 2 Townsville, Ayr, Ravenswood, Charters 
Towers, Cloncurry, Mackay 
District No. 3 Bundaberg, Childers, Mount Morgan, 
Many Peaks, and all other industrial 
centres south of Rockhampton, 
Once again the centralised structure of the AWA was to be the basis of 
42 
organisation, 
In anticipation of the MA amalgamation scheme being accepted, the 
ALF and AWA leaders initiated a campaign of including within the new body 
as many as possible of the unorganised workers and those organised in 
39, Official Report of the Proceedings of the First Queensland Trade and 
Labour Congress 1910 op cit. p 6, 
40, ibid, p 9. 
41, ALF Exectitive Minutes, 15 SeptCTiber 1910, The inaugural conference 
of the AWA of Q at Townsville between 5 and 12 December 1910 approved 
the appointment of the General Organiser of the ALF as honorary 
organiser to the AWA of Q, See Official Report of Proceedings of 
First Annual Conference AWA of Q 1910. op cit. p 7. 
42, Worker. 8 October 1910, 
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small unions. ALF organiser Fraser and AWA secretary McCormack con-
centrated on ensuring that members of the northern ASWU branches, the 
Townsville and Charters Towers Amalgamated Workers Unions, the Western 
43 
Workers Unions of Chillagoe and Longreach voted for the amalgamation, 
Theodore aided by supporters of the scheme such as George Ryland, Labor 
44 
MLA, concentrated on the southera areas. They were able to persuade 
the Bundaberg ASWU branch that its fears that amalgamation with the AWA 
would prevent it from submittir^ a case to the Federal Arbitration 
45 
Court, were groundless whilst Fraser and McCormack allayed similar 
46 
fears expressed by the Mackay branch of the same union. Further 
recruiting for the AWA was carried out amongst the miners and railway 
construction workers of the central coastal districts. 
Support and enthusiasm for the new amalgama.ted union was so great 
throtighout coastal Queensland that the amalgamation conference of 5 
December 1910 extended the districts to be covered by the oi^anisation 
to include Brisbane so that there were five districts - Far Northern, 
Northern, Central, South Coitral and Southern to be administered from 
Chillagoe, Townsville, Mount Morgan, Btmdaberg and Brisbane respectively 
with the chief executive and financial power to be held by the central 
47 
executive body. The general objectives of the amalgamation showed the 
48 
dual industrial and political motives of the scheme. 
43. ibid. September to November. 
44. ibid. 10 September 1910. 
45. ibid. 29 October 1910, 
46. ibid, 24 September 1910. 
47. ibid. 10 Decanber 1910, 
48. loc cit 
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(1) To protect the interests of the workers in the 
regulation and condition of workers and the 
regulation and conditions of labour. 
(2) To assist its members in the event of a lock-
out or strike, 
(3) To provide legal assistance in defence of members 
when deemed necessary. 
(4) To assist in a movement for the Socialisation of 
the means of production, distribution and ex-
change . 
(5) To secure direct representation of Labor in 
Parliament. 
(6) To establish and assist in maintenance of Labor 
journals, 
(7) By federation and otheiwise to assist kindred 
organisations. 
Provision was made in the constitution for the issue of political 
tickets to "those not competing for a living as wage earners in the 
49 
labour markets". These tickets were to give their holders the 
right to vote in any plebiscite for the election of Labor candidates, 
or for the appointment of delegates to Labor Conventions, Clause 7 
indicates the union's dual organisational intentions of acting within 
the ALF structure while leaving its option open to other forms of union 
structure. 
Capitalising on the wave of enthusiasm for the new amalgamation, the 
AWA quickly began a vigorotis organising campaign. The idea began to 
emerge of the AWA as the organisation that could become the basis for 
49, loc cit 
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achieving closer unity in Queensland within the structure of the ALF 
by giving the smaller tmions the alternative of amalgamating with the 
AWA instead of affiliating with the ALF thereby overcoming the in-
ability and reluctance of the small unions to pay the relatively 
high ALF affiliation dues. 
During 1911 and 1912, there was a major effort to extend the 
AWA organisation wherever tmionism was weak in Queensland. Once again 
all elenents of the labour movement which embraced political unionism, 
industrial unionism and the ideal of closer unity combined to assist 
the spread of strong unionism based on industrial unionism and closer 
industrial unity. At various times AWA organisers and officials were 
supported by members of the CPE, the PLP, the ALF, the AWU and the 
Brisbane Trades and Labour Cotmcil, Jack Crampton temporarily left his 
post as organiser for the AFBEU to take up a similar position with the 
newly constituted Southern District Branch of the AWA centred in 
50 
Brisbane, Jack Moir, official organiser of the Brisbane Trades and 
51 
Labour Council also became temporary chairman and later a committee 
52 
member of the Brisbane Branch, 
When the AWA moved over the dividing range to the Darling Downs, 
Longreach and Barcaldine districts, the AWU organisers in those areas 
gave enthusiastic support to the representatives of the new union 
attempting to organise western workers previously unattracted by the 
50, ibid. 7 January 1911, 
51, AWA of Queensland Brisbane Branch and District Committee Minutes, 
19 January 1911. 
52, ibid, 14 March 1911. After the resignation of Jack Crampton to 
return to the meatworkers union, Moir became the branch secretary 
on 16 January 1911, 
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AWU, New branches of the AWA were established at Longreach, Barcaldine 
Toowoomba,west of the divide and at Gympie, Brisbane, Cairns and other 
areas on the coast. Many small craft unions such as the Brisbane 
Brickmakers Union and the Candlemakers Union joined and workers on 
construction jobs around Brisbane were also organised into its ranks. 
The Toowoomba General Workers Union converted itself into a branch 
of the AWA and plans were laid to embrace all general unattached workers 
at foundaries, sawmills, brickyards, excavation works as well as rail-
53 
way workers. The Engine Drivers Association at Zillmanton decided 
to wind up its affairs and hand over all the balance of funds to the 
AWA on the grounds that it was useless rurming two bodies with pract-
54 
ically the same object, C,A, Hough, secretary of the AWA at Rock-
hampton reported the vinion there was fulfilling its mission of bringing 
under its bazmer "the small useless sectional unions" because the 
bakers, grocers, painters, tinsmiths, plumbers, and gas fitters unions 
55 
of that town had amalgamated with the AWA, The Worker began to devote 
a half-page section to reporting AWA matters to educate workers and union 
officials to embrace the new, powerful union. 
So the movement spread throughout Queaisland in an attempt to 
achieve the closer unity that evaded the 1910 and 1911 TUC schemes. 
In doing so the AWA grew to be the largest and most powerful single 
union in Queensland, As the mass union idea of the AWA was broadcast, 
53. Worker. 21 January 1911, 
54. ibid. 18 February 1911, 
55. ibid. 22 July 1911. 
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its advocates stressed the necessity for (1) the abolition of sectional 
unionism and (2) industrial unionism ccsning into line politically with 
56 
the PLP. 
Industrial tmionism in the Queensland context became confirmed as 
"political tmionism" and the movement for closer industrial unity 
became integrated with the resurgaice of the political wing of the 
Queensland labour movement. The move of the AWA into the south-eastern 
corner establishing branches in Brisbane and on the Darling Downs was 
not only an attack on traditionally weak union areas but was intended to 
spread Labor's political influence into these usually anti-Labor elect-
orates. Greater industrial unity along the lines advocated by the 1910 and 
1911 TUC's meant not only increased industrial strength but also greater 
support for the PLP. For, even though being a member of a union did 
not necessarily mean a unionist would vote for a Labor candidate, it 
did increase the likelihood that he would have his name on the electoral 
roll and exercise his vote in favour of the candidate supported by his 
union especially if the union had played an important role in selecting 
that candidate and framing the policies advocated by the party he 
represented. 
Great efforts were made by the enthusiasts of the new union 
movement to enrol the many n<»i-unionists in the work force in 
*political* unions and to educate them and those unionists already 
tmions not committed to the PLP. Wherever the AWA went it attempted 
56. ibid. 24 Decanber 1910. 
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to establish union halls which became not only centres for recreation but 
also educational centres with the establishment of debating societies 
of classes in various topics including socialistic doctrines. Typical 
of the activities was the debate staged by the AWA against the Mount 
Morgan Mines company union, the Non-Political Mine and Works Employees 
Association, Jack Moir for the AWA and Ewan Clemson for the NPHWEA 
57 
debated the tqpic **Craft Unionism v Political Unionism", 
The combined affect of a sexles of decisions by the CPE and 
Labour-in-Politics conventions ensured a greater say for the union 
movenent in both of these bodies so that unions took their place beside 
WPOs in the grass roots organisation as important components of an 
expanding political base for the PLP, Electoral successes by union 
officials brought a greater percentage of able unionists into the Labor 
eameus at a time when these Labor politicians who had links with the era 
of the nineties were reaching the end of their political careers. 
Nevertheless^the few remaining. Bowman, Hamilton, Hardacre, Ryland, 
ByottHSac^han, Hinchcliffe, who could remanber the aspirations of the 
nineties were still in control of the party. They were joined by a new 
generation of union-politicians i^ose immediate and long-term aspirations 
for the labour movement matched those of their leaders. Manbers such as 
William Lennon and T,J, Ryan who though they were not of traditional 
labour origins were in full sympathy with Labor objectives. 
Out of the conflict of the previous few years oneirged a completely 
57. ibid. 1 April 1911, 
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united Labor party which regarded its links with the industrial 
labour movement as vital to its success. It was not supported 
by all unions or even the majority of unions but the largest and 
most militant unions in the state were linked with it and gave it 
their active support and participation in its electoral campaigns. 
In return for their support, the PLP and the CPE aicouraged the 
union revival, the moves for closer unity and co-operated in the efforts 
of the industrial unions to secure recognition of their rights and 
obtain improvements in the economic condition of their monbers. This 
co-operation was evident in the concerted effort to strengthen organ-
isation both political and industrial: it was Bianifest in the support 
the leaders of the parliamentary party gave to the radical action of the 
emerging militant unions. As early as 1908, the ALF, AWA and the PLP 
had combined to n^otiate a favourable result from the Etheridge 
construction workers strike setting the pattern for actions by the 
58 
alliance. The Etheridge stilke was the first major contest between 
the AWA of north Queensland and the employers. The new amalgamation, 
attempting to extend its activities beyond the concerns of the miners, 
had to win in this confrontation if it was to be a powerful influence 
in the north. After three months of disciplined opposition, organised 
by the AWA, the ALF executive arranged a meeting between A.S. Frew, the 
constnaction company representative and Theodore. Also at the meeting were 
Hinchcliffe for the ALF and Bowman for the PLP. It is indicative of the 
58. ibid, 3 October 1908, 
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close eo-eperation of these leaders of the labour movement that 
Theodore, Bowman and Hinchcliffe all signed the agreements on 
59 
behalf of the AWA. 
In subsequent major strikes (the 1910 Brisbane Gas strike, the 
sugar strike of 1911, the trajnmy strike of 1912), the leaders and 
many meabers of the PLP worked very closely with the militant 
trade union leaders to present a common front against the anti-
labor govenament, the trusts and employers. The increased militancy 
of the industrial wing, especially the successes of the AWA, the 
prospect of unity not only in the industrial movanent but also 
between the industrial and political wii^s increased the support for 
the PZiP so that the strong representation lest throui^ the Kidston 
split was being regained. Therefore the leaders of the PLP, Bowman 
and later Ryan and Theodore encouraged the moves towards greater 
industrial unity as long as the new centralised union structures were 
eommitted to **politieal unionism**. Later, Theodore especially was a 
bitter opponent of the OBU scheme of the Workers Industrial Union of 
Australia (WIUA) because of its alleged anti-political IWW orien-
tation. 
While the non-Labor Denham government was aware of the potential 
political and industrial threat that the growth of the AffA posed for 
their future, they did not at first envisage for it the role that some 
Laborites such as Charles Collins, now member for Gympie predicted: 
50. loc cit 
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In four or five years it [the AWAJ may dominate 
not only the industrial but the political life 
of the State. It will represent the organised 
workers of this State in one grand union with one 
grand object, the emancipation of man from man,^^ 
Such a vision was inspired by the MA becoming within a few months the 
largest union in the state and leading the sugar workers to a victory 
in what was, the largest and most successful strike held in Queens-
land up to the end of World War 1. It is clear that the government 
came to fear the growth of this new union giant and attempted to 
stifle it. Hence its refusal to register it in 1911. 
As Collins suggested, the effects of the events of 1911 changed 
the course of the movement for closer union unity. The failure of 
the ALF federation schemes to attract nothing more than token support 
from Queensland unionists was in sharp contrast to growth of the AWA. 
While the ALF played an important role in the success of the 1911 
sugar strike, it was the AWA with its strong, central organisation 
that received most credit for succeeding where the ASWU with ALF 
assistance had failed the previous year in a similar strike. How-
ever, though it is evident from the remarks of Collins and the praise 
heaped on the AWA after the 1911 victory, that some groups were be-
ginning to look to the AWA for industrial leadership, it does not seem 
that there was a conscious rivalry between the ALF and AWA at this 
time. 
Nevertheless Sullivan has claimed that: 
60. .QPD, CVIII, 7 September 1911, p 848. 
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The 1911 success of the AWA in the sugar field 
gave renewed impetus to Theodore and McCormack*s 
campaign to replace the loosely structured ALF 
with the OBU.^1 
Aside from the fact that at no time up until the end of 1913 did 
Theodore and McCormack express any claim for the AWA to become 
the "OBU" (these claims came afterwards in 1914 for the AWU-AWA 
amalgamation), this view would seem to misinterpret the relationship 
between the two organisations at this time. Sullivan relies heavily 
for his interpretation on two main points, the ALF*s censure of its 
organiser Fraser for his part in publicly announcing at Melbourne 
in January 1911 that there would be a strike in the sugar industry 
62 
that year and the failure of the AWA to inform the ALF of its in-
tention to strike and to consult with it on planning for the strike. 
The ALF*s censure of Fraser seems more directed at him than at the 
AWA for his public announcement of an intention to strike well before 
the AWA had attempted to negotiate with the sugar interests. Fraser*s 
public statements surprised and concerned many unionists. As E.J. 
Kavanagh secretary of the Sydney Labour Council commented in asking 
the ALF Executive if it approved of Fraser*s request to hold a public 
meeting to lecture on the topic "The Sugar Slaves of Queensland" in 
which Fraser intended to announce the intention of the AWA to initiate 
a strike in the sugar industry: 
61. Sullivan op cit, pp 402-403. See also Chapter 4 p 94 of this theSis, 
62. ALF Executive Minutes, 20 February 1911. 
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... I am not prepared to arrange public meetings 
for the purpose of taking the public into our 
confidence in matters of this kind. It is to my 
mind a new "method'* and one that I certainly do 
not approve of. We have always found it to our 
advantage to take the enemy unav/ares. 
Fraser*s actions do seem to be ill-advised. Later, when he was asked 
for a full explanation of the published reports of his lecture in 
Melbourne and to publish a denial of the reports if they v/ere not 
true, he failed either to provide an explanation or make a public 
denial of the claims. This was not the first time he had come into 
conflict with the Executive. Towards the end of 1910, the Executive 
had found it necessary to instimct the Worker*s editor to examine the 
organiser*s reports before publication and omit from them " ... any-
64 
thing calculated in his [the editor*s] opinion to cause dissension". 
When his first term of service v/as ended, the ALF executive refused to 
65 
renew his contra.ct. It does seen that he had proved unsatisfactory 
as a servant of the ALF. If, as Sullivan claims, he had proved of 
such worth to the leaders of the AWA, it does seem m.ost ungrateful 
of them not to have sought his retention as an organiser or at least 
provided onployment for him in the AWA. Instead, Fraser disappeared 
from the Queensland union scene, 
Sullivan*s second point that the AWA officials kept the AIF 
in the dark about their preparations for a strike in the sugar industry 
in 1911. does seem to have some substance. However, his claim that; 
63. loc cit 
64. ibid, 2 Decanber 1910, 
65. ibid, 5 July 1911. 
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The AWA General Secretary*s Letter Book for the 
period 24 March 1911 to the termination of the 
sugar strike in August indicates the absence 
of any significant ALF role in the planning and 
management and control of the strike.^^ 
ignores the communications between McCormack and Hinchcliffe dating 
from 4 April 1911 until the ALF engineered the conference of inter-
state transport unions that broke the deadlock between the sugar 
interests and the ASm. During April and August 1911, the ALF 
assisted the AS'/A by raising funds, sending "Harry** Coyne to the 
southern states to gain financial assistance for the strikers and to 
67 
prevent southern workers from being induced to act as scabs, and by 
advising McCormack, at his request, on the advantages and disadvantages 
of Wages Boards and the possible success of bringing the strike within 
federal jurisdiction by involving sugar workers on the New South Wales 
Northern Rivers fields. 
There is no official report in existence of any dispute betv/een the 
ALF and the AWA during the 1911 sugar strike. Both organisations 
seemed to have co-operated fully in the management, if not the planning, 
of the strike. The ALF admittedly played a secondary role to the AWA 
in both these areas but that was not an abnormal occurrence as the MA 
usually conducted its own strikes and only sought the assistance of the 
ALF if it was necessary. After the strike was successfully resolved, 
66. Sullivan op cit, p 4(X), 
67. Official Reports of the Proceedings of the Second Queensland Trade 
and Labour Congress 1911 op cit. p 5. Coyne reported to the 
Congress news of his trip to the south while seconding Hinch-
clif fe's resolution that the Congress endorse the AWA's 
actions and pledge T;heir unions' support for the strikers. 
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the ALF and the AWA received the admiration of the rest of the 
Australian industrial movement and both organisations embarked on 
programmes of expansion but with the AWA acknowledging at least 
until 1912 the unifyii^ role of the ALF. 
At the beginning of January, the 1912 Annual Conference declared 
its satisfaction at the progress which the ALF had made during 1911. 
There was no dissatisfaction expressed in anyway with the relationship 
68 
between the two organisations. However by the next year this 
satisfaction was to be replaced by the belief that the ALF had out-
69 
lived its usefulness. During the intervening months, industrial 
conditions were to worsen so drastically that even the new giant of 
Queensland unionism was to look beyond the ALF structure for the 
strength and security it sought in closer industrial organisation to 
ensure that its "broader spirit of unionism" would bring the desired 
unity to the Queensland laboui' movement. 
68. Official Report of the Proceedings of the First Annual Conference 
of the Amalgamated Workers' Association of Queensland 1912 
op cit. p 14. 
69. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Second Annual 
Conference of the Amalgamated Workers' Association of 
Queensland 1913 op cit. p 44. 
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Chapter Six 
THE END OF AN ERA. 
During the period immediately before World War 1, industrial 
militancy increased throughout the major union-organised countries 
of the world. Pairallel to the increased militancy, but not equalling 
its extensiveness or even its success, was the movement for closer 
unity and a more centralised structure for trade unionism. 
In Great Britain, the gaieral increase in militancy expressed 
itself in the major strikes by seamen and dockers and the first 
national railway strike in 1911, The following year saw an even 
greater loss of days by stoppages with major industrial upheavals 
1 
in the coal mining industry and on the London docks. The, at least 
partial, success of some of these conflicts in substantially improvii:^  
the position of unions was matched by only limited success for the 
advocates of closer vmity during this period. The 'amalgamation* 
movement along the lines of industrial unionism that Tcan Mann had 
latmched on his return from Australia and France did not achieve 
much success in these years. It had only one noteworthy success. 
In 1913, the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants united with the 
1, Henry Polling A History of British Trade Unionism (London 1963), 
P 137, 
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General Railway Workers Union and a smaller body, the United Points-
men and Signalmen's Society to form the National Union of Railwaymen 
but like the Australian Railways Union amalgamation it failed to 
attract all grades of labour in the railway industry into its 
ranks so it could not be said that an *industrial* union of railway 
2 
workers had been achieved in either country. The National Transport 
Workers Federation formed in 1910 promised for a time to be the 
nucletis of closer unity in Great Britain but the failure of its 
call for a national strike in 1912 showed its inadequacy and the 
3 
closer unity movemoit foundered for a time in Great Britain. 
Similar failure was experienced in the United States of America, 
The emergence and success of the American Federation of Labor with 
its loose structure allowing for craft autonomy replaced the one-
big-union type of organisation of the Knights of Labor. Attempts 
by the Industrial Workers of the World movement who rejected the 
Knights* regional stiructure for one based on industrial grouping, to 
reorganise the ideas of the Knights of Labor into a more scientific 
organisation of industry, the One Big Union scheme, w^ re initially 
successful as in 1912 the influaice of the IWW movement spread from 
amongst the unskilled workers of the west and middle west to the 
eastern states especially among the foreign-born, low-wage textile 
workers and evaitually to a number of other countries notably Canada 
and Australia. The period of the growth of the IWW in the United 
2. ibid, p 136. 
3. loc cit 
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States of America was marked by major strikes and industrial up-
heavals in the eastern states especially amongst the textile workers 
4 
and miners. 
The developments in British and American unionism occurred in an 
environment of social unrest and resulted in a greater polarisation 
of the industrial sector of the community into the opposii^ camps 
of capital and labour and the intensification of the belief amongst 
workers that they were engaged in a class war against the evils of 
a societal system that could be summed up in one word "capitalism". 
While union militancy and the movements for changes in union 
structure in Great Britain and the United States of America sub-
stantially failed, they provided an influential and often inspir-
ational background to the same movements in New Zealand, Canada and 
Australia encouraging many unionists and union leaders in the last 
country in their own attempts to find the answers to their industrial 
problems if not in industrial unionism and the OBU structure, at 
least in closer associations with those in their craft or industry 
on a national scale and in local manifestations of overseas militant 
movements such as industrial unionism, syndicalism, and other tjrpes of 
workers* control of industry intended to re-construct society to 
provide a greater share of wealth and control of wealth and industry 
for the working man. 
There was a similar background of social unrest and conflict in 
4. Paul F. Brissenden The IWW A Study of American Syndicalism (New York 
1957) Part III, p 210 et passim. 
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Australia and growing belief in the existence of a class war that 
provided a fertile environment for propagandists who were spreading 
militant and sometimes revolutionary ideas. As well as industrial 
conflicts, the society was disturbed by the controversies surround-
ing the Fisher Labor government's imposition of conscription in time 
of peace, the attenpts by variotis state governments to prevent the 
advocacy of socialistic and syndicalist doctrines in public meetings 
and the arrests which followed the exploitation of governmental 
opposition by socialist and syndicalist groups which used the con-
troversy aroused by these "free speech fights" to gain sympathy and 
supporters for their beliefs. The turmoil amongst Que«island workers 
fermented by the events of the 1911 Sugar Strike and the 1912 General 
Strike, the subsequent defeat of the PLP in an election in which it 
had had hopes of defeating the government and a further legal attack 
on the rights of unions by the passage of the restrictive Industrial 
5 
Peace Act created an atmosphere of crisis amongst unionists. It 
was as a result of this combination of events that the demise of the 
ailing AIF finally occurred, 
Childe has claimed that the failure of the 1912 Tramway Strike 
6 
broke the ALF and possibly it was the final stitch that completed its 
shroud but the cloth was cut once the 1910 Trade Union Congress plan 
for a federation along ALF lines was ignored by the majority of unions. 
The federation plan approved by the next year*s Trade Union Congress 
5. gSSi, CXIII, 5 December 1912, p 2997, 
6, Childe OP cit. p 123, 
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was forgotten in the depths of the disillusionment that followed the 
1912 failure. The combined circumstances of the strike and the events 
that followed turned the movement for closer unity towards amalgamation 
of its forces to obtain the strength it needed to achieve its ob-
jectives. At the same time they created the ferment in the industrial 
movement that would allow the revolutionary doctrines of the IWW's 
One Big Union scheme to take root and flourish sufficiently to blight 
the AWU-AWA plans for a One Big Union based on a mass union committed 
to political unionism. 
It is probable that the 1912 general strike would not have occurred 
if it had not been for the success of the 1911 sugar strike and the 
way it was finally resolved. The 1911 sugar strike that hastened the 
development of the influences which were to topple the faltering ALF 
provided a great impetus to the closer unity movement within Queensland. 
Not since the strikes of the 1890s was there greater co-operation 
between unions within the state and also from inter-state unions. In 
support of the sugar workers, Queensland waterside workers, the seamen, 
carters and draymen unions refused to handle non-union sugar and a 
number of craft unions with menbers working in the mills pledged their 
support. Interstate support was given when the acting prime minister, 
7 
William Morris Hughes as presidait of the Waterside Workers Federation, 
and the executive of the Seamen's Union made it known that their members 
8 
would not handle non-tmion sugar after Tuesday 18 July. The federal 
7. Worker. 22 July 1911. 
8. loc cit 
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Labor government made clear its support for the Queensland tmions* 
stand by refusing to accede to requests from sugar ccmpanies for 
9 
migrant labour to be brought in for work in the industry and by 
setting up a commission to enquire into the sugar industry after 
the strike was over. 
Once again manbers of the PLP gave valuable assistance in 
organising the workers. Some travelled inter-state to rally support 
for the strikes and to gain the assistance of southern unions in 
preventing strike-breaking labour being employed in their states. 
George Ryland, Labor member for Gympie, even picketed the Queensland 
Tourist Bureau in Sydney which was being used by the sugar companies 
as a recruiting agency for labour to replace strikers. In a partly 
10 
successful attempt to dissuade them from going north, Ryland put 
the case of the strikers before those who came to sign on. 
The strike became a major confrontation between union forces and 
capital supported by a sympathetic Queensland government over two 
basic tmion and Labor principles, recognition of the rights of unions 
to negotiate on behalf of workers (the Australian Sugar Producers 
Association and the Colonial Sugar Refining Company ignored all 
attempts by the AWA to arrange a conference before and during the 
strike) and the eight hour day. This was endorsed by the Queensland 
CPE when it declared its svqjport for the MA and called on all Labor 
9, ibid, 3 June 1911, 
10, ibid. 12 August 1911, 
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organisations to give every possible assistance to the sugar workers, 
because: 
A foundation principle of the Labor movement is 
involved and it is the duty of all who believe 
in the platfoirra and principles of the Labor 
party to lend a hand to their brothers ,,, 
Despite the s t rength and excellence of the AWA-ALF organisat ion of the 
strikers and the loyalty of the sugar workers and many other unionists, 
the cane growers and sugar companies with the assistance of the 
Queensland government were able to withstand the demands of the 
strikers for several weeks. 
To bring an end to the conflict and to prevoxt it widening in 
12 
extent, the ALF was forced to call an interstate conference of all 
transport workers which was attended by representatives of the Federated 
Seamen*s Union, Federated Waterside Workers Union, Australian Institute 
of Marine Ihgineers, Merchant Service Guild, Federated Lorrymen and 
Carriers Union, Brisbane Coal Lumpers Union, United Storemen and 
Packers Union, Brisbane Carters and Draymen and Trolleymen Union, 
Queensland Railway Baployees Association and the Seamen*s Union as well 
13 
as the ALF and the MA» Several other transport unions unable to send 
representatives pledged their support for any decisions of the con-
ference. This array of unions included industries vital to the live-
lihood of the sugar industry. The CSR and the ASPA were already 
having troubles within their ranks from the canegrowers, many of whom 
11. ibid. 29 July 1911. 
12. ALF Executive Minutes, 7 August 1911, 
13. Worker. 12 August 1911. 
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were sympathetic to the demands of the strikers. The threat of a 
combined national union confrontation convinced sugar interests 
that it was time to confer with representatives of the strikers. 
Eventually they conceded an eight hour day and a basic wage of 
£2 and found for mill hands. By obtaining these concessions, the 
AWA achieved its greatest victory, recognition by the ASPA. 
The concessions by the ASPA and the government were hailed as 
a birilliant victory for industrial unity. It seemed that the tra-
ditional methods of strike-breaking; scab labour; establishment of 
opposing "Free Labour Unions"; government assistance in recruiting 
and transporting such labotir; accusations of lawlessness and des-
truction of property to arouse public opposition to the strikers; and 
opposition by the non-Labor press, successful since the 1890s had 
failed because of concerted union action. The Worker declared en-
thusiastically: 
A wonderful thing is the Unity of Labour*. Of all 
powers of good on earth there is none to equal it. 
Of all the powers of evil there is none that can 
stand against it, if only we perfect it as we 
shotild,-*-'* 
H.E. Boote, its editor called for: 
... a federation of labour extending from ocean to 
ocean throughout Australia so that the multi-
plicity of unions would be merged into one Great 
Union, no longer divided by sectional interests, 
no longer weakened by petty jealousies and mis-
erable craft distinctions ... The result of this 
14. ibid. 19 August 1911, 
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great strike is a triumph for the solidarity 
of Labor.^5 
A number of poans were inspired by the victory amongst which 
16 
was the following from the Mackay labour newspaper, the Pioneerr 
Our Greatest Weapon: 
UNITY 
By T.W. Leeson Writtai for the Pioneer 
Our banner floats on every breeze wherever workers 
may be found 
The colours on the distant seas and worn by miners 
undergroimd 
And soon our flag shall be unfurled o'er lordly 
homes and mansions great 
When wealthy tyranny is hurled from place and power 
and high estate. 
When workers fully recognise that Unity*s our only 
hope 
*Twill not take long to win our prize: Our might 
will have a wider scope 
In Unity we place our trust; divided we cannot 
prevail; 
An amalgamation we surely must to staa the slack 
when foes assail. 
This gospel should be widely spread 'Otir foes could 
not withstand our might 
With all the Unions* neath one head none but ourselves 
could win the fight. 
Let each be prompt at duty*s call; Let each one give 
his utmost aid; 
Our first great leader gave his all; Then forward, 
comrades, undismayed -
Our proudest boast is that we trade to him the move-
ment, our great cause. 
Shall monied lords his work efface, and set at nought 
his righteous laws? 
OhI May the workers all embrace this chance to combat 
for the Right 
With hearts ennerved for this great fight. 
15. loc cit 
16. Pioneer. 19 Septonber 1911, 
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If there be need we*11 give our blood. 
We do but seek what*s just and right 
To realize our Brotherhood. 
It has been claimed or at least intimated that the AWA deliberately 
provoked the 1911 sugar strike to enlarge its manbership and to in-
17 
crease its power in Queensland at the expense of the ALF. On the 
contrary, the 1911 strike was forced upon an AWA Executive unsure of 
its ability to win but committed to embark on a course that it knew 
must involve it in a strike that would be a life or death struggle 
for the newly formed amalgamated union. 
At the inaugural conference of the MA of Queensland, a resolution 
was passed that the new union adopt a policy of obtaining an eight 
18 
hour day and improved wages for its members in the sugar industry. 
The Executive Council was instructed to arrange a conference with the 
employers in the sugar industry to achieve an agreement embodying the 
above conditions. Although it was not discussed at the Conference, 
it was tacitly understood by all involved including the ALF that the 
sugar employers would refuse to negotiate and would fight any moves to 
force an agreonent as they had done the previous year, when similar 
claims had been made by the i^WU. The combination of the ASPA, the 
CSR and government support with the aid of scab labour recruited from 
the unemployed in the state and in New South Wales and Tasmania, had 
then defeated the striking sugar workers. The conference was aware 
17. Sullivan op cit, pp 391-403, 
18. Minutes of Inaugural Convention of AWA of Q 1910 op cit, p 8, 
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also that the sugar interests would be supported by the government 
as they were in the 1910 strike. 
Officials from the former sugar union now serving the MA 
expected it to fight their case and win as the MA of north Queens-
land had done for other groups before the amalgamation. If the AWA 
failed them, there was a distinct possibility that some branches of 
the old ASWU notably Bundaberg and Mackay, would withdraw from the 
amalgamation and return to their original resolve to seek awards 
with the Federal Arbitration Court. This would have meant the dis-
integration of the AWA before it had got tinder way. 
Before the stirike and during its early days, McCormack re-
peatedly expressed his deeply felt fears that the sugar workers 
would repeat their disunity of the previous year and defeat the aim 
of the strike by their lack of loyalty and lack of determination. 
In a letter to Patil Barton district secretary of the far northern 
district of the AlA, he expressed his fears thus: 
... Each district will have to put up a 
scrap on their own. I think we will be able 
to give some places a bad time although others 
will be terrible hard to do an^ rthing with. 
In fact I am quite satisfied that we will want 
a clear year amoi^ the sugar workers to do such 
good with. It is not the employer we will have 
to fight, it will be our own men ...19 
19. McCormack to Barton (Secretary Townsville Branch AWA) 25 Aprtl 1911, 
Secretary's Outv/ard Letter Book, AWA Records, ANU Archives, In 
a letter to Hinchcliffe, 2 June 1911, McCormack was even more 
pessimistic " .,. We are fighting a forlorn hope but we must 
go this year for eight hours as the immigration policy of the 
present government would settle our chance by next year". 
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In his reply to Hinchcliffe's warning of the dangers to the 
AWA of a general strike, McCormack assured Hinchcliffe that there 
was no intention to take that step because: 
We could not possibly handle a general strike 
at present and even if we covtld it is doubtftil 
if it is the best way in the sugar industry. 
We will try and hit in the weakest spot, i.e. 
our strongly organised places and if we cannot 
be successful there wovild have little hope in 
the weaker districts. 
That McCormack regarded the 1911 strike as a doubtful enterprise 
is manifest in his statement that: 
Personally, the situation has worried me a good 
deal as I am quite conversant with the impossibility 
of the do or die methods in this instance, but on the 
other hand all our members expect something done and 
will be disappointed if we stand by and let things 
slide. The rank and file are not aware of the almost 
20 impossible things that they expect of their officers ... 
Stung by the bitter memory of the previous years' failure, the sugar 
workers responded gallantly to the determined leadership of McCormack 
and Theodore, but especially that of McCormack, so that the 1911 strike 
succeeded where the 1910 attempt had failed. 
However before its successful conclusion was reached, the rock-
like refusal of the sugar interests, especially the CSR, to come to 
terms forced McCormack to seek other means of ending the strike. At 
one time he seriously considered an appeal to the Federal Arbitration 
Court, Before this could be done, the sugar workers in the Northern 
Rivers district would have had to be enrolled in the AWA and the strike 
20, McCormack to Hinchcliffe, 2 June 1911, ibid. 
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extended into New South Wales. On this matter, he sought AIF 
assistance and advice. However, he finally was forced to reject that 
course of action because he became aware that the New South Wales 
industrial laws precluded any attempt by the AWA enrolling the 
21 
Northern Rivers sugar workers in the Queensland union. 
The ALF's resolution of the strike by calling together a 
conferQice of inter-state transport tmions not only gave the employers 
the opportunity to resolve the strike without actually havii^ surr-
endered to the AWA but also gave the AWA a chance to end the strike 
when it appeared to have reached a deadlock that would have extended 
the conflict beyond its expectations. In winning the strike, the 
AWA maintained its militant reputation but at the same time after the 
strike was content to achieve improvements in the sugar industry 
chiefly by negotiating agreements and later by appeal to the Federal 
Arbitration Court, 
The ALF encouraged by their success in the sugar strike attempted 
to initiate the formation of a central union body which would gather 
into one organisation the various schemes for closer unity being pre-
pared and discussed throughout Australia. Its proposal to the Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council of a Commonwealth Union Congress to establish a 
Federal Council with a Federal Executive thoroughly representative of 
22 
the industrial movement was rejected by the Melbourne organisation. 
21. McCormack to Barsby (Secretary Ayr branch AWA), 8 August 1911, 
ibid, 
22, Worker. 21 October 1911. Report of the 12th Session Queensland 
Provincial Council of the ALF. 
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Subsequently, Theodore failed in his attempt to convince the ALF 
Provincial Council that it should go it alone and convene the con-
ference itself. The problem of financing the new Worker building 
was taxing the financial resources of the ALF and influenced its 
rejection of Theodore*s proposal. Instead,the cotmcil decided to 
23 
communicate again with the Melbourne body to again ask them to 
convene the conference. 
Nothing concrete restated from the ALF*s attanpt to foim a 
national federation as the southern organisations were too involved 
with their own schemes for closer tmity within their own borders. 
It was a bitter blow to Theodore*s hopes for a national industrial 
body. A setback of even greater proportions was soon to follow. 
Encouraged by the success of the 1911 sugar strike and the new 
found unity of the industrial movement, the Brisbane unions determined 
to meet a new challenge to Queensland unionism by calling upon the 
combined strength of the industrial movanent through the use of what 
had long been thought of in many quarters as the ultimate industrial 
24 
weapon, the general strike. At a meeting of the Brisbane branch of 
the Federated Tramway Bnployees, Theodore himself had urged the tram-
25 
waymen to emulate the sugar workers if they wanted industrial justice. 
23. loc cit 
24. For more detailed accounts of the 1912 General Strike see Glenda 
Stirachan The Brisbane General Strike of 1912, unpublished B A 
honours (history) thesis 1973, Queensland University; A,A. 
Morrison *'The Brisbane General Strike of 1912", HSANZ. 4, 
14 May 1950, 
25. Worker. 18 November 1911. 
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The immediate cause of the strike was the refusal of the 
American-bom manager of the Brisbane Tramway Company, H.S. Badger, 
to agree to the company*s employees to be members of the Brisbane 
Tramway Employees* Union. Such an action was interpreted by 
Brisbane unions as a direct attack on a fundamental industrial 
prtnciple. Therefore, they rallied to the aid of the locked-out 
tramway employees. On the 22 January 1912, J.A, Moir, secretary 
of the Brisbane District Council of the ALF convened a meeting of 
forty-three Brisbane unions to consider the Tramway Strike then in 
26 
operation. The meeting, chaired by Harry Co^ne, new president 
of the Queensland Provisional Council of the ALF, decided on **a 
27 
general cessation of work" unless a settlement was arrived at 
before 31 January. From that time on, the Combined Unions Strike 
Committee, with Coyne as its presidaat, attempted to manage the strike 
as a general call-out of workers throughout the whole state. This 
was never achieved althou^ a number of unions in various caitres, 
most notably Townsville, answered the call. There the AWA suspended 
its annual conference to respond to the appeal for support from their 
Brisbane comrades. Immediately, they formed a Combined Union Committee 
to organise northern unions. 
The 1912 general strike, marked by some of the worst scenes of 
violence in Queensland industrial history, exhibited the ingenuous-
26. Childe op cit. p 120. 
2 7 . Worker. 29 January 1912. 
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ness and inexperience of the Brisbane tmion leaders. The leaders 
from the past, Hinchcliffe and Bowman, were not able to give the 
strikers the benefit of their experience. Hinchcliffe was in the 
south working for the federal government on its Commonwealth Royal 
Commission into the sugar strike and Bowman was too sick to make 
more than a few brief appearances at public rallies. The new 
breed of successftil leaders, Theodore and McCormack, were occupied 
in Townsville at the AWA annual conference and remained on the per-
28 
iphery of the strike. McCormack pinpointed the basic reasons for 
the failure of the 1912 strike and at the same time expressed his and 
the MA's disappointment with the way the strike was conducted when 
he stated; 
Badger appears to have had the support of the 
Government in the fight arid this was sufficient 
because we are unable to fight the powers that 
be unless v/e do a bit of revoluse, in fact I think 
the crowd should not have been restrained at all 
in Brisbane on Friday. If something extraordinary 
had been done then and followed up the next day I 
really believe v/e could have heard a different tale 
from Denham. The want of a real leader who was 
prepared to sacrifice himself and some followers 
was felt at the riot as I believe a start would 
have been followed up by the mob and then good-bye 
to the specials. However, it is over and we will 
have to face the effects ,,. and continue the 
battie,2^ 
Without consultation or pre-planning, the CUC had called out the 
unions of the state almost as if they believed by invoking the general 
28. McCormack to Moir (Secretary Brisbane Branch AWA), no date. 
Secretary's Outward Letter Book, AWA Records, ANU Archives. 
29. loc cit 
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Strike they would be assured of victory. Their faith was not re-
warded. Not long after the general call-out, tmions outside 
Brisbane began to drift back to work. It is clear that support 
from country unions was affected by the poor conditions and the 
ntimber of miral workers out of work. The number of tmemployed had 
been increased by the growth in immigrants who came to the state 
despite the already large number of unemployed. Appeals by the CUC 
for northern unions to boycott trade to Brisbane could not be 
successfully implemented. To save face, the Brisbane Ccfflibined Union 
Committee instructed country unionists to return to work. The 
general strike had failed. Although the Brisbane unions held out 
for a few more weeks, it was a foregone conclusion that they would 
have to capitulate. This they did by offering to confer with the 
30 
employers and though the tramwaymen were awarded by Justice Higgins 
absolute preference of employment and the right to wear the union 
badge, their union collapsed in the face of Badger's refusal to employ 
them . 
While the failure of the strikers to achieve the re-instatement 
of tramwaymen by industrial action was considered a setback for 
vinionism in the state, the strike's political affects and its in-
fluaice on the closer unity movement were more significant. The 
Daaham government accurately sizing up the political situation called 
a snap election a few months after the strike. Even though the PLP 
30. Childe op cit. p 123, 
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polled only 10,000 votes fewer than the Denhamites, the government 
won handsomely, setting back the political aspirations of the PLP 
and the industrial movement's hopes of reforms for a further three 
years. Returned to office with increased power,the Denham govern-
ment took steps to stifle the militant unions by legislating to 
outlaw strikes and impose heavy penalties on unions which trans-
gressed its Industrial Peace Act of 1912. 
31 
The Industrial Peace Act with its penal provisions for strikes 
and its restrictions on the activities of unions was viewjed with alarm 
by Queensland unionists who linking it with the powers already accrued 
to the government from the British decisions of the Taff Vale case 
and the Osborne judgement considered their position perilous indeed. 
Those union leaders who placed their hopes for a way out of their pre-
dicament in the federal Labor government's referendum to obtain greater 
jurisdiction over industrial relations in the state sphere were forced 
to look elsewhere when that referendum, despite Queensland's favour-
able vote, was defeated nationally. It is little wcmder that many of 
than heeded the Worker's advice that: 
Labor's way out lies along the road of Federal 
Action - the welding together of the unions in 
inter-state federations, the widening of dis-
putes to Federal dimensions ... 
31, QGG. 162, 9 December 1912, p 1607 et passim. The IPA made lock-
outs and strikes unlawful unless permission for them was obtained 
from the Registrar of Friendly Societies, Provision was made for 
severe penalties of up to £500 for an association or employer 
breaking an award and up to £1,000 if strikes and lock-outs 
occurred illegally, 
32, Worker. 8 August 1912, 
148 
In an effort to forestall the influence of southern controlled 
executives of the federal associations that prevented many Queens-
land unions from joining the ALF, the Provincial Council had made 
it possible for district branches of Queensland unions linked with 
33 
inter-state federations to affiliate with the ALF, S<»ne district 
branches in Queaisland e,g, the Rockhampton district branch of the 
Waterside Workers Federation did affiliate with the ALF but most 
heeded the urging from federal executives, loath to cede more of 
their funds to the Queensland federation, to end their association 
with the ALF, Despite the ALF*s inducement, an increasing number of 
Queensland tmions sought links with nation-wide craft associations 
not only to share in the more liberal awards of wages and conditions 
handed down by the Federal Arbitration Court but more importantly 
to avoid the jurisdiction of the stringent Industrial Peace Act passed 
by the Queensland government to give it greater power over the trade 
vinion sector of the community. 
Once the implications of the Industrial Peace Act were under-
stood by union officials, there was an acceleration in the already 
present movement to find the protection of inter-state federations 
and amal^mations, thereby bringing many Queensland unions into 
direct contact,for, in some cases, the first time, with closer unity 
moves in southern states. In October 1912,a Brisbane conference of 
Carters Unions from Maryborough, Rockhampton, Bundaberg, Gympie, 
33, ibid. 21 October 1911. 
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34 
Ipswich and Toowoeraba agreed unanimously the time had arrived for 
all local carters* organisations to amalgamate with the Queensland 
branch of the Federated Garters* Union. The conference carried 
resolutions condemning the Industrial Peace Act and protested against 
it as a deliberate attempt to undermine genuine industrial union-
ism, as being out of harmony with industrial legislation in ether 
states and as being "coercive and tyrannical in character and opposed 
to the principles of industrial freedom and the laws of natural 
35 
justice", 
Other federationist moves at that time included the Queensland 
Operative Bakers* Union's bee^ siing the Queensland branch of the 
36 
Federated Operative Bakers* Union of Australia, the strong move 
to create a federation of transport workers throughout Australia 
with representatives from the Queensland branches of the tmions 
including waterside workers, marine engineers, seamen, marine officers, 
37 
carters and drivers in its membership; the building trades unions* 
opening negotiations to form either a federation or an amalgamation 
of trades in the industry in Queensland (already many of than had 
38 
interstate affiliations); the Coachmakers and Whedwrights* Society's 
deciding to send a delegate to attend a conf eraice of the trade in 
34. ibid. 17 October 1912. 
35. loc cit 
36. ibid. 24 October 1912, 
37. ibid. 7 November 1912, 
38. ibid. 17 October 1912, 
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Melbourne later that year; the Queensland clerks* forming a bzunch 
40 
of the Federated Clerks Union of Australia; the Furnishing Trades 
Society's, in a plebiscite, approving affiliation with the Federated 
41 
Fuimishing Trade Societies of Australasia, A number of other 
Queensland unions attempted to avoid the jurisdiction of the Indust-
rial Peace Act either by establishing links with international craft 
federations or by amalgamating with the new AWU, 
The Queensland branch of the Australian Boot Trade Bnployees* 
Federation that had been a loyal supporter of the ALF, the Federation 
schemes of the 1910 and 1911 Trade Union Congresses and previotisly 
had resisted attempts by the federal council of its union to force 
it to withdraw from the ALF, finally broke away from the Queensland 
body during 1913, By that time it was ebviotis that the AIF was a 
spent force because of the wholesale disaffiliations of menber unions 
during that year after the announc^nent of the increased levy, the 
amalgamation of the AWU and AWA and the dismal failure of its attempts 
to arrange a further Trade Union Congress for 1913. Out of seventy-
one invitations to attend the proposed Congress only thirty-one unions 
responded - fourteen favourable, seirente^ i against - with one tinion 
42 
seeking fuirther information. 
That the lack of support for the ALF and what it stood for was 
not confined to the officials of the tinions but had spread to the rank 
39. ibid. 19 November 1912, 
40. ibid. 27 February 1913. 
41. ibid, 21 August 1913, 
42. A U Executive Minutes, 21 July 1913; Worker. 24 July 1913, 
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and file is manifest in the 211 to 77 defeat for continuing affil-
iation with the ALF in the Boot Trade Union's plebiscite of its 
43 
members. The rank and file*s opposition was chiefly due to the 
fees increase. Henceforth, the Queensland branch of the ABTEF held 
aloof from all closer unity schemes and local affiliations, com-
pletely involving itself in the aspirations of the national feder-
ation to which it belonged. 
Once linked inter-state and receiving the improved benefits of 
nationwide organisation and the more liberal awards of the Federal 
Arbitration Court, while at the same time enjoying a large amotmt of 
autonomy, many tmions were not to be enticed into state-wide feder-
ations such as the ALF or amalgamations with the AWU or other centrally 
controlled unions. In a few cases, such as the Queensland Railway 
Union, and the Queensland branch of the Federated Bakers Union, an 
attempt was made to organise their industry along lines of industrial 
unionism and even to form what was loosely termed an "OBU" within 
their industries. 
Most, however, continued to exist as craft unions with all their 
traditional exclusiveness and conservatism but with the development 
that their structure was on federal lines of organisation instead of 
within the traditional local district or state-wide limitations of the 
former small craft unions. There still existed a number of the trad-
itional style craft unions resisting attempts to federate or amalgamate 
43. ABTBF Minutes, 18 August 1913. 
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them so that in 1915 there were 713 unions in existence in the 
44 
Commonwealth » 
45 
Irving Berstein*s inter-relationship of union growth in 
membership, number of tmions and conditions of crisis would seen 
to apply strongly to the Queensland circumstances in the period 
during 1912 and 1913. In 1912, the number of unions jumped to 
sixty-seven from twenty-nine in 1911 and membership rose from 
46 
approximately 20,000 in 1911 to 44,768 in 1912. The trend con-
tinued during 1913 so that there were ninety-four unions with 
47 
51,683 members, Berstein*s further argument that crisis growth 
of union manbership is closely related to structural change in the 
trade union: 
The characteristic forms taken by the ,,, labor 
movemoit (the national federations, the federal 
bodies of lesser scope, the international 
unions ,..) have tended to emerge and proliferate 
in those brief time spans when the number of unions 
was mushrooming,48 
would seem to hold true to events in Queensland in this period and 
that which followed except with regard to affiliation with inter-
national tmions. It is significant that the number of inter-state 
tmions in the Commonwealth with branches in six states rose from 
44. Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report op cit, 6, p 17. 
45. Berstein op cit. pp 73-84, 
46. Annual Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies for 1912, 
QPP. 3, 1913, pp 41-43. 
47. ibid 1913, QPP. 
48. Berstein op cit. p 84, 
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49 50 
ten in 1912 to twenty-three in 1915 and that •'inter-state and 
federated organisations contained 71,9 per cent of the total member-
51 
ship of all unions". 
Though the ALF enjoyed a brief resui^ence during the rest of 
1912, its demise was assured by the success of the amalgamation con-
ferences held in 1912 and 1913 between the AWU and the AWA and other 
rural unions, 
Wh^i in 1914 the ALF was dissolved, it was the end of an era 
that had been of incalenable value to the Queensland industrial move-
ment, Sullivan aptly sums up the worth of the ALF with these words; 
Many policies formulated by the ALF have be^i 
vindicated by the passage of time. ... common 
sense and history were on the side of the 
Federation,^^ 
With the passing of the ALF from the Queensland industrial arena, 
the closer unity movement in Queensland of the vertical type was 
left mainly to the advocates of one big union who were divided between 
the mass unionism of the M U and the industrial grouping schemes 
heavily influenced by the pzlnciples of industrial unionism. 
49, Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report. 6, p 17, 
50. loc cit 
51. lee cit 
52, Sullivan op cit, pp 426-27, 
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Chapter Seven 
ABIALGAMATION 
The refusal of the bulk of craft unions who, clinging to their 
autonomy, were content to limit their structural changes to inclusion 
in tightly-knit or loosely organised federations placed the burdea 
for the vertical t3rpe of closer unity on the shoulders of a com-
paratively few large unions, mostly catering for the unskilled. In 
Queensland, it was from the more flexible and more radical rural unions 
that the main initiative to change the course of the closer unity 
movement came at this time. 
In the years immediately before World War 1 and during its early 
years, they attaspted to form, at least in Queensland, a large amal-
gamated union that would include all unions. Their aspirations ex-
tended to the expansion of the amalgamation to include all unions 
throughout Australia, First amongst their objectives was the estab-
lishmait of one great union at least within the borders of Queensland 
not a federation and not the OBU or the IWW but a union that would re-
move all sectional boundaries between industries to allow the transient 
workers who comprised most of their m@nbership to purchase one annual 
union ticket that would give them union protection throughout the year 
whatever occupation they were in dtiring their seasonal wanderings. 
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They aimed to brii^ the "closed shop" ideal closer to fruition by 
removing one of the major obstacles that persuaded seasonal workers 
not to join a union and thereby produce greater strength, greater 
unity in an industrial movement that at that time allowed one tmion 
to scab on another in time of strikes. 
The main pressures in Queensland for such a mass union came from 
the Amalgamated Workers* Association, The other great amalgamated 
union in the state, the AWU, after its absorption of the Amalgamated 
Workers* Union in 1904-05 attempted no further expansion by this 
method until changes in the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
1 
Act of 1904-10 made it possible. Resolutions passed at the AWU's 
1911 Annual Conference authorising its officials to give their assist-
ance to the organising efforts of the South Australian United Laborers* 
Union, the AWA and the Rtiral Workers* Unions of New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia and its approval of, without actually 
agreeing to the expressed wish of the^RWU of New South Wales that 
" ,.. in future the two organisations would be able to draw more 
2 
closely together ,..** indicated changing attitudes towards closer 
1, Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates. IX, 20 September 
1911, p 671, Section 3 of the amending Commonwealth Act of 1911 
repealed the original definition of "industrsr" and enacted that 
"industry" included "inter alia" (b) any calling, service, em-
plojrment,. handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of 
employees on land or water and (c) a branch of an industry and 
a group of industries. This entitled the AWU to register as an 
association embracing a group ®f industries, 
2, Official Report of the Twenty-fifth Convention of the AWU 
January 1911 op cit. p 24, 
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associations with at least other mral tinions. However, the legal 
prohibitions of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
did not allow it to play a central role in the amalgamation movement 
at this stage. 
While the southern rural unions listed above were seeking a 
consolidation of unskilled workers throughout Australia, the AWA 
continued to concentrate on establishing one great union on the 
broad principle of mass unionism that would include all classes of 
labour within the boundaries of Queensland. That there were m^ibers, 
skilled and unskilled, who were more ambitious than this is manifest 
3 
in the attempts at the 1910 inaugural conference of the amalgamation 
* 
and at its first annual conference in 1912 to change its name to give 
it a national application; Amalgamation Workers' Association of Aust-
ralia and Australian Workers* Association were both suggested but re-
jected. Theodore had remarked at the beginning of 1912 that "there 
5 
were a good two years of work ahead of them in Queensland ..." be-
fore such alterations in policy as implied by the above changes in 
name could be made. A resolution to approach the United Labourers* 
Union and the Rural Workers* Union to arrange an amalgamation was met 
with great caution from members present with Ernie Lane commenting: 
We must safeguard the fundamental principle 
[the broad spirit of AWA unionism}. Let 
3. Official Report of Inaugural Conference of the AWA of Q op cit. p 2. 
4. Official Report of the First Annual Conference of the Amalgamated 
Workers* Association of Queensland 1912 (Brisbane,1913), p 3. 
5. loc cit 
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us get in touch with other unions but 
don't be in too great a hurry to join 
them.^ 
The confer^ice compromised by authorising the general secretary, 
McCormack,and Theodore with others to be elected, to represent the 
union if any conference to consider an interstate ^ nalgamation was 
arranged. 
Accordingly, when he was approached by the United Labourers* 
Union of New South Wales with a proposed scheme for amalgamation 
of all unions of rural labourers, McCormack rejected the offer on 
the grounds that the AWA could not enter into any amalgamation that 
did not have for its object the complete organisation of all labour-
ers under one union. The reftisal was not complete as McCormack in-
dicated that the AWA was prepared to attend a conference that would 
consider the whole question of finding a basis for an amalgamation of 
7 
all rural unions. 
While the southern rural tmions sought to arrange a suitable 
amalgamation conference, the AWA pressed on with its main concern, 
the total acceptance of its 'broad principle of unionism' as the 
basis for union organisation in Queensland, Although it was having 
success in attracting small sectional unions into amalgamations es-
pecially in the coastal and inland provincial towns, the AWA was 
determined to attract the larger rural unions on the coast especially 
6, i b i d , p 16 , 
7 , McCormack to Thomas Slade (Secretary United Laborers ' Society Sydney) 
20 February 1912, Sec re ta ry ' s Outward Le t te r Book, AWA Records, 
(ANU Archives) , 
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the Queensland branches of the AFBEU and the Timber Workers* Union, 
To achieve this, a special scheme of industrial autonomy within 
8 
the central AWA organisation was devised. This scheme allowed for 
the preservation of the individtiality of each important section, the 
retention of its own officials and the autonomous administration of 
matters within the industry but d^nanded acceptance of the Central 
Executive as having supreme control of all matters within the 
amalgamated union. It was considered that if the Butchers* Union 
agreed to amalgamate it would give an ^lormous impetus to the AHA, 
Neither the timber workers nor the meat workers agreed to the scheme. 
The inability of the AWA to achieve this much-desired amalgamation 
occurred at a time when the failure of the 1912 general strike, the 
threat of the Industrial Peace Act, the obdurate attitude of the 
government towards unionists and Labor's loss of the state election 
were causing many unions to look beyond the state borders for pro-
tection and better trealment industrially, 
McCormack writing to George Stedman AWA Bundaberg branch secretary, 
in March, expressing his fears about the future, showed how much many 
unions had believed depended on Labor's winning the 1912 state election: 
... They have landed about 800 immigrants 
during the last few days and the result will 
be felt now that things are not too prosper-
ous in the country. I honestly expect a move 
will be made to reduce wages in all industries 
8. Official Report of the First Annual Conferaace of the Amalgamated 
Workers' Association of Queensland 1912 op cit. pp 20-21, 
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if the election goes against us. The 
new arrivals must take work or starve 
and a good doing is coming if we do not 
hustle ... ^  
The AWA now threw off the caution of the beginning of the year and 
agreed to the offer of a conference with the southern unions. 
At the June 1912 amalgamation conference in Sydney, convened by 
the AWU, the AWA representatives exhibited a changed attitude to 
affiliations with southern unions. Their concept of 'broad unionism* 
was not accepted and they were forced to compromise on matters of 
principle in order to be allowed to be a party to the proposed 
amalgamation. Their now "great hurry to join" the southern unions 
indicated a major policy reversal for AWA leaders. 
In the space of time betweoi Theodore*s cautious statement at 
the AWA annual conference and the amalgamation conference, the con-
fid«ice of the AWA leaders that they could achieve their objectives 
alone, had been shaken by the Queensland labour movement*s disastrous 
defeats industrially and politically and the realisation of McCormack*s 
fears of a *doing*. Before the Industrial Peace Bill was made public, 
there was sufficient evidence of the government*s attitude in its 
suspension of all railway construction during and after the general 
strike to make AWA officials fear for the future. Unemployment in the 
sugar areas where employers at the instigation of the Employer's • 
Federation were effectively administering a lesson to the strikers 
9. McCormack to George Stedman (Secretary Bundaberg Branch AWA of Q), 
5 March 1912, Secretary's Outward Letter Book, AWA Records, 
(ANU Archives), 
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10 
by refusing them work, increased the alarm of AWA leaders. An 
amalgamation giving the AWA new allies and new alliances could have 
appealed to its leaders as the way out of the Queensland union 
movement's predicament. It seems that the AWA officials went to 
Sydney with this in their minds. Theodore verbalised his new 
determination to consummate an amalgamation with the AWU when he 
said at the amalgamation conference; 
We do not desire to stick at any set terms, 
so long as the workers as a whole can get 
the benefits that arise from an amalgamated 
organisation.^^ 
The conference was initiated by the AWU in response to the in-
sistent urgings of southern rural unions. Cognisant of the growing 
favour for closer tmity within the Australian industrial movement, 
the AWU took advantage of the change made in 1911 to the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act by the Fisher government to gather 
together representatives of interested rural unions to achieve the 
original purpose of the first amalgamation in 1894, the inclt^ion of 
all country workers in one union. 
As early as 1909 Arthux* Rae (later Senator Rae) had moved a 
resolution at the AWU's annual convention for the union to seek an 
amendm^it of the Commonwealth Arbitration Act in such a way as to 
12 
al low a vinion anbrac ing d i f f e r e n t occupa t ions t o r e g i s t e r . Desp i t e 
1 0 . McCormack t o Moir op c i t , 
1 1 . O f f i c i a l Report of t h e Amalgamation Conference 1912 (Sydney, 1913) , 
p 1 3 . 
1 2 . Worker. 13 March 1909. 
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expressions of caution by the g&ieral secretary about the ability of 
officials to do justice to a number of industries within <Mie union, 
the geneiral desire of the assembled delegates for an expansion of the 
AWU was declared in the fourteen to ten vote In favour of Rae*s 
13 
motion, 
Childe writing with a bias towards the Mairxist doctrine that it 
is the more militant unions that force change, asserts that the Queens-
land tinion, the AWA, by its "wildfire spread" after 1910 forced the 
AWU officials to consider amalgamation by threatening "the older 
pastoral union with the absorption of the Queensland biranches of the 
14 
AWU", There seems little evidence to support such a view. 
Without doubt, the spread of the AWA after its formation in 1910 
was spectactilar. Its m^sbership grew from approximately 5,000 at its 
15 
inauguration to over 11,000 by the end of Jtine 1912, More im-
portantly, it had spread its sphere of influence not only southwards 
along the coast to Brisbane and northwards to Cairns but also west-
wards over the range to Toowocmiba, Longreach, Barcaldine and over to 
Darwin where local tmionists after the refusal by the general secretary, 
McCoimaek, to s@ad an oz'ganiser formed a branch and advised the AWA 
of their action after the event. 
13. loc cit 
14. Childe op cit. p 119, 
15. Official Report of the Second Annual Conference of the Amalgamated 
Workers* Association of Queensland 1913 (Brisbane, 1914), p 5. 
16. McCormack to WJ9.J. Pannell (Secretary Darwin Branch AWA) 25 June 
1912, Secretary*s Outward Letter Book, AWA Records, (ANU Archives), 
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The movement westward into what was traditionally AWU country 
would seem to have posed a threat to that union. However, it is 
doubtful if local AWU officials viewed it as such. In fact, 
they aided and encouraged the AWA organisers who concentrated 
chiefly on enrolling unattached workers and craft unionists in 
provincial towns and on railway construction sites, workers and women, 
mainly shop assistants and domestics whom the AWU could not normally 
enrol because of the restriction of the provisions of the existing 
Federal Arbitration Act, AWA officials had always held the AWU in 
high regard with many AWA officials and members obviously cherishing 
the hope of a future amalgamation between the two unions. There 
seems no evidence of any attempt by the AWA to enrol pastoral workers 
or any other men who were eligible for enrolment in the AWU, 
Soon after the formation of the AWA, Theodore*s successful 
attempts to persuade Darling Downs* workers to convert their newly 
formed Darling Downs Workers* Union into a branch of the union were 
supported not only by *'Harry" Coyne, MLA and ex-secretary of the 
Charleville branch of the AWU, but also by John McLean the then 
17 
AWU organiser for the Charleville branch. Approaches to the AWA 
for formation of branches in other western towns were treated with 
caution because as general secretary, McCoarmack replied to such a 
request from a Mount Cornish blacksmith, Alex Parker; 
We have no desire to encroach upon the AWU 
17, Worker. 24 December 1910, 
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grotinds and I think that it would be advisable 
for you to get the secretary of the Central 
Branch (Mr, Bow) to write us a line on the 
matter.l^ 
Later in Decanber of the same year, McCorraack at the instruction of 
the Executive Council approached John McNeill, secretary of the 
Charleville branch of the AWU to request pearaiission for the AWA 
to organise the railway construction workers in western districts. 
About this time the AWA did move into these western areas to 
19 
organise workers into branches of the union. There is no record 
of McNeill's reply but at the same time there is no evidence of 
any conflict over this issue in either the Worker, the AWA executive 
minutes or the official reports of AWU annual delegate conferences, 
so it is presumed that peimission was given. 
At the AWU's 1912 anntial conference, in the face of opposition 
by southern delegates to inclusion of the AWA in the list of unions 
to be invited to the June amalgamation conference, the Queensland 
AWU delegates showed their good-will towards the AWA by urging its 
inclusion. J. Laracy, a Queensland AWU delegate believed that the 
AWA would be glad of the opportunity to amalgamate with the AWU as: 
... a few years ago an effort was made 
to bring that about. It was well received 
and we were only prevented in accomplishing 
this by reason of the then limitations of 
the Arbitration Act.20 
18. McCormack to A l ^ Parker, 10 May 1911, Secretary's Outward 
Letterbook, AWA Records, (ANU Archives). 
19. McCormack to John McNeill (Secretary Charleville Branch AWU), 
4 December 1911, ibid, 
20. Worker. 9 March 1912. Report of Proceedings of the 1912 Annual 
Conference of the AWU in Sydney, 
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Later that year, after the results of the June amalgamation 
conference promised to achieve the long sought uniting of the two 
largest rural unions in Queensland but before its actual achieve-
ment, AWU officials enthusiastically assisted AWA organisers in 
establishing AWA branches in Longreach and Barcaldine amongst 
town workers, such as domestic servants, carters, shop assistants 
and craftanen. In Longreach, local AWU members and officials organ-
ised a dance and social to celebrate and welcome the introduction 
21 
of the AWA into western Queensland. Childe's claim that the AWU's 
initiative in convening the 1912 amalgamation conference was a re-
action to AWA pressure, seesn^  to have little credence but at the same 
time there is a lot of truth in his assertion that it was the AWA 
22 
that launched the AWU on a course of "practical One Big Unionism", 
At the June 1912 amalgamation conference between the ASVU, Rural 
Workers' Union of New South Wales, Australian Carriers' Union, the 
Amalgamated Rabbit Trappers' Union and the AWA, it was quickly 
obvious that the officials of the MIV and the rural unions had not 
come to the meeting with the same broad concept of amalgamation as 
had the AWA representatives, Theodore and McCormack. As soon as the 
formality of putting the motion agreeing to the amalgamation of the 
"organisations operating among persons engaged in the work as laid 
23 
down in the business sheet of Conference ..." had been made, Tlxeo-
21. ibid. 10 October 1912. 
22. Childe op cit. p 127, 
23. Official Report of the Amalgamation Conference 1912 op cit. p 7. 
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dore attempted to extend the scope of the amalgamation to coincide 
with his concept of big unionism that allowed the AWA to have within 
its ranks members with a variety of occupations ranging from mining 
to brickmaking. To achieve this, he moved: 
That the Australian Workers' Union be asked 
to amend its constitution so as to admit all 
persons engaged in agricultural, horticultural, 
viticultural, fruit-growing, dairying, sugar-
growing and refining pursuits, and also carriers, 
cane-cutters, timber-getters, rabbiters, meat 
industry workers, mining and brick-Etaking 
workers.24 
Immediately afterwards, he and McCormack circulated their carefully 
prepared plan describing the AWA scheme for the structure of the 
proposed tmion and the accommodation of industrial sections such as 
the one previously proposed by the AWA to the meat workers. 
Opposition to the AWA's move hinged on the reluctance of most of 
the officials present to extend the membership of the amalgamation 
beyond the limitations set in the motion of E. Grayndler, Australian 
Carriers' Union representative: 
That it is desirable that all unions associated 
with country and other kindred industries through-
out the Commonwealth should becrane one organisation. 
Fearing trouble with registering the new amalgamation with the 
Federal Arbitration Court, the conference was partictilarly opposed to 
the inclusion of brickmaking workers, mining and meat industry workers 
in the list of occupations eligible for membership and were adamant 
24. loc cit 
25. ibid, p 6, 
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that there would be no extoision of membership to workers or craft 
tmions in metropolitan areas. In reply to the last point, McCormack 
surprisingly stated what appears to be an outright misrepresentation 
of the existing and future policies of the AWA: 
,., speaking on behalf of the Amalgamated Workers' 
Association, I can state that we have no ambition 
to get into the cities. 
The AWA already had established a strong branch in Brisbane which 
was attanpting to organise workers there on the basis of "everyone 
,27 
who is a unionist should be in our ranks" and was already well ; 
established in a number of provincial towns. Then and later, no 
attempt was made to disband these branches and strenuous efforts 
were made to convince many of the small craft unions to amalgamate 
with first the AWA and later with the AWU, once the AWU-AWA amal-
gamation was achieved. 
It is difficult to know for certain just why McCorraack should 
attonpt to deceive the conference but it would seem to be an in-
dication of the extent to which he and Theodore were prepared to 
go to ensure that the AWA was included in the proposed amalgamation. 
This is also supported by their capitulation to the opponents of 
including meatworkers, brickmakers and miners in their list of 
occupations to be named as members of the new union despite their 
presence or expected presence in AWA membership. While the AWA's 
membership of brickmakers was not large and there were very few if 
26. loc c i t 
27 . Worker. 14 January 1911, 
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any meat workers in the union, miners comprised almost fifty per cent 
of its membership. 
At the 1913 AWA annual conference, in the debate concerning the 
inclusion of miners by name in the drafted constitution of the pro-
posed amalgamation, McCormack but not Theodore rejected arbitration 
and the possibility that the mining membership would prove an em-
barrassment to the AWU by seelcing an award under the Federal Arbit-
ration Act which might cat^e the de-registering of the union, if unions 
already registered with the court to cater for miners objected to the 
28 
AWU's application. McCormack*s remarks during the amalgamation con-
ference and at the subsequent AWA conference in January 1913 at which 
the amalgamation scheme was ratified, have been used to propound the 
view of the AWA as a 'direct actionist* union which shunned arbit-
ration and was betrayed after the amalgamation by its officials who, 
made decadent by their association with the AWU, became tame-cat 
dupes of the politician leaders of the new amalgamation and forever 
more adopted non-militant policies dominated by subservience to the 
arbitration system. 
Space does not allow a detailed discussion of the AWU*s militancy 
in Queensland after the amalgamation. It is true that it took part 
in no wide-spread strikes and its officials attacked the direct 
actionist policies of the IWW, However, while its policy was against 
28, Official Report of the Second Annual Conference of the 
Amalgamated Woi-kers* Association of Queensland 1913 op cit, 
pp 11-15, 
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general strikes, a study of its records shows a number of industrial 
disputes and small strikes in the period that followed the amalgamation. 
The proposition that the amalgamation diverted the AWA from a 
direct actionist course to one of arbitration is something of a myth 
b^un by militant socialists such as Ernie Lane and perpetuated by 
Childe and those who accepted their thinly supported arguments and 
29 30 
implications. As Childe asserts, McCoimaek, general secretary of 
the AWA, did on at least two occasions deny publicly any support by 
the AWA for arbitration; 
Whilst arbitration might be good it was not entirely 
great, and that position would be considered ,,, 
He was not decrying arbitration or wages boards for 
that matter ,,, The Arbitration Act had not done 
such a vast amount of good that they should block 
the organisation of certain workers because on 
accotint of technicalities, these workers could not 
come within the limits of the Act, With the ex-
ception of the sugar-workers, he did not know any 
section of the AWA that contemplated an appeal 
to the Court,^ -'' 
Sullivan in support of the theory quotes references to arbitration 
McCormack made at the 1913 AWA annual confer^ice that he did not believe 
32 
in arbitration because it was "fictitious** that the general feelii^ of 
the AWA was against arbitration "and he had never known a resolution 
33 
passed favouring the principle of arbitration and conciliation". These 
29, Childe op cit. p 125, et passim. 
30, loc cit 
31, loc d t ; Official Report of the Amalgamation CGater&ace 1912 op c i t . 
pp 12-13, 
32, ib id , p 14. Sullivan op c i t , p 392, 
33, Official Report of the SecCTid Anntial Conference of the Amalgamated 
Workers* Association of Queaisland 1913 op c i t . p 14, 
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claims by McCormack directly contradict his denial of being against 
arbitration made at the 1912 amalgamation conference in answer to 
Grajmdler's implication that his opposition to arbitration was 
because of IWW tendencies. In his denial McCormack stated that he 
believed "we can improve the Arbitration Act if a strong industrial 
34 
organisation is formed." McCormack had a propensity to tailor his 
attitudes to his audience and what he desired out of them. 
It is important to remember that the remarks made at the 1913 
AWA conference were in answer to a strong attack by miners* re-
presentative Fred Martyn because the miners were not mentioned in 
the new AWU draft constitution and thereby were excluded from appeals 
to the Federal Arbitration Court. The mood of the meeting was against 
Martyn but if Martyn had been successful in persuading the conferoice 
to reject the draft constitution because of omission of the miners, 
it is doubtful whether the AWA could have persuaded the other unions 
in the amalgamation to accept it as a monber. 
The AWA*s failure to use arbitration is partly explained by its 
ineligibility to make appeals to the Federal Arbitration Court for 
most of its members except the sugar workers because other unions 
were already registered with the court for miners, railway workers, 
labourers and most of their other members, their lack of faith in the 
Queensland Wages Board System to provide industrial justice and of 
course, the union*s success in obtaining recognition from employers 
34, Official Report of the Amalgamation Conferaxce 1912 op cit. p 14. 
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of the advantages of negotiating with it rather than confronting it. 
However when an Industrial Court was established tmder the conditions 
35 
of the Industrial Peace Act of 1912 the AWA took part in a number of 
cases in that court relating to disputes involving its members. 
The acceptance by the former AWA mranbers and officials after the 
1913 amalgamation of arbitration rather than direct action was not 
therefore a major departure from former policies and certainly was 
not the betrayal of militant unionism that some writers have inter-
preted it to be. Eventually, despite the accusations of a few of 
its extrene left-wing members of betrayal, most of its monbers welcomed 
the predominant use of arbitration and political influence in re-
solving industrial disputes, but at the same time reserved the right 
to use more direct methods if the circumstances warranted them. There-
fore, despite McCormack*s protestations at the amalgamation conferences 
and later at the subsequent AWA conferences, arbitration was not a major 
issue in the decision to amalgamate with the AWU. It certainly was not 
for its mCTibers who overwhelmingly voted in favour of the amalgamation. 
The major points of concern for Theodore and McCormack were that their 
imion should be part of the amalgamation and that it should infuse 
into the amalgamation its "broad concept of unionism" that would allow 
the amalgamation to encompass all workers. 
For the Queensland union, one of the most important issues was 
the structure of the proposed amalgamation and how its finances were 
35, ^gG, 162, op cit, p 1612, 
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to be controlled. While Theodore and McCormack, faced with the 
prospect of exclusion frcan the amalgamation, conceded all their 
claims and proposals which conflicted with the arbitration plans 
except the retention of miners in its ranks, they fotight strongly 
for and achieved special consideration for their ideas of how the 
new amalgamated union should be organised in Queensland. The AWA 
delegates presented to the 1912 conference a well prepared and 
carefully thought-out scheme of organisation for the new union which 
36 
was an extended version of that union's own structure. Major de-
partures from the existing AWU structure were less district autonomy, 
a greater concentration of control of union affairs, financial and 
industrial, granted to a general executive body over state boards of 
management and district branch committees, and the provision for the 
establishment of industrial branch committees that would allow tmions 
already catering almost exclusively for one industry to amalgamate 
with the new MTJ but allowing them a measure of control over their 
37 
own affairs as an industrial section of the AWU. The diagram for 
the organisation of Queensland which accompanied the draft scheme 
showed clearly the AWA officials were heavily influenced in the pro-
posed schenes by their plans to arrange for amalgamations with the 
Queensland branches of the AFBEU, the Timber Workers' Union and the 
Carters'and Carriers'Unions. 
The 1912 conference summarily dismissed Theodore and McCormack's 
36. Official Report of the Amalgamation Conference 1912 op cit. pp 9-12, 
37. See Appendix A. 
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scheme as not providing sufficiently for district autonomy and for 
its attempt to introduce industrial sections. Organisation on the 
basis of geographical districts allowing for the maximum autonomy 
possible as already in vogue in the ASVU was the majority choice 
38 
of the conference. The issue was thought by all at the 1912 
conference, except the Queensland union delegates, to have been 
resolved at that juncture. 
At the 1913 conference, Theodore and McCormack, now accompanied 
by John Mullan, while conceding the wish of the previous conference 
for a geographical organisation of the national union, pressed for a 
39 
more coitralised stiructure for Queensland. This was achieved by 
the conference's granting Queensland the status of a branch, giving 
most power in the state over the actions and finances of the new tmion, 
to the branch executive and an annual delegates conference comprised 
of representations from the five districts. South Western, Western, 
Southern, Northern and Far Northern into which Queensland was to be 
divided. The 1913 conference had granted to Queensland the structure 
of Theodore and McCormack's 1912 draft scheme, except for the right 
to establish industrial sections that had been refused for the Aust-
ralian organisation at the 1912 conference. Further concessions were 
made, the most important of which was the right to have the AWA 
constitution and rules included in the by-laws of the Queensland branch 
38. Official Report of the Amalgamation Conference 1912 op cit. 
pp 10-12, 
39. Official Report of the Amalgamation Conference 1913 op cit. 
P 21. 
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of the AWU constitution and the right of the Queensland branch to 
include the sugar districts of New South Wales in its southern 
district region and Papua and the Northern Territory in the far 
41 
northern district. 
At the 1912 and 1913 conferences, the Queensland representatives 
of the AWU branches already in operation in Queensland expressed no 
opposition to what amounted virtually to absorption into the AWA. 
However, the 1915 annual AWU conference on the motion of R. Bow, 
the former secretary of the Longreach branch of the old AWU, agreed 
42 
to divide Queensland into two branches. In the period between the 
two conferences the AWA's successftil extension of its operations into 
AWU territory seems to have been welcomed by the Queensland AWU 
officials. Theodore's 1912 threat of possible conflict between the 
two unions in the western areas if the amalgamation was not arranged, 
may have influenced both Queensland and inter-state officials to 
assist the AWA's western extensions and forced them to give Theodore 
and McCormack their way in the stmcture of the new Queensland branch 
of the AWU. Hov/ever, it is more likely the threat was a bluff in-
tended for southern ears especially as the Queensland AWU officials 
did not oppose Theodore and McCormack's proposals in either amal-
gamation conference or overtly react to Theodore's statement. 
From the b^inning of the AWU's movement towards the formation 
40. loc cit 
41* ibid, p 25. 
42, Daily Standard. 4 February 1915, 
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of an amalgamation of rural tmions, the Queensland AWU officials were 
in favour of including the AWA, Lack of open conflict or evidence 
of a behind the scenes strv^gle between the two groups in the various 
stages leading up to the amalgamation supports this view. Both 
unions appeared to agree on the basic advantages to be gained from 
the amalgamation for both unions, Queaisland rural unionists, espec-
ially the transient workers, and Queensland tmionism in general. 
Except for the possible conflict over the secretaryship of the new 
43 
Queensland branch of the ASVU which resulted in the invitation to 
W,J, Dunstan of South Australia to take the position, the amalgamation 
of the AWU and the AWA of Queensland was managed very amicably and 
with little confusion and disturbance. The new AWU administration 
in Queensland comprising officials of both the former unions quickly 
reached unanimity on its future course of action, the foimation of one 
big union of all workers by absorption of all unions into the AWU if 
not throughout Australia at least within the borders of Queensland, 
From the time of the amalgamation, the union's policies in 
Queensland were chiefly an extension of those developed by the AWA, 
improvanent of wages and working conditions of all members, the 
socialisation of the means of production, the achievement of both the 
two previous objectives by both industrial and political means, the 
making of the AWU into one big union including all workers to break 
down the barriers of sectionalism created by the existence of craft 
43, Childe op cit. p 128, 
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unionism, the achievement of unity within the industrial movement, 
the provision of a base for the political aspirations of the working 
class, preference for unionists, having all workers unionists and 
achieving eeoncmiic justice for all unionists. The new AWU officials 
were not much ccsicerned with a radical re-construction of society 
or the achievement of their aims by revolutionary violent means, 
44 45 46 
Lane, Childe and Morrison have interpreted this aversion 
to direct actionist policies as makiz^ the AWU into a reactionary 
tool of the politicians. This view is perpetuated by Terence 
Cutler's claim in his airticle on the 1918-1919 AMIEU strike at 
Townsville that after its mergii^ with the MU in 1913, it became 
**,,, more subseirvient to the political machinery of the Labor 
47 
Pairfcy ,,,**, It is true the AWU-AWA did become more closely 
linked with the Queensland Political Labor Party especially after 
the party came to power in 1915, However, to sv^gest this relation-
ship was one of "subservience" is to misunderstand completely its 
position in the Queensland FLP's structure and the aim of the leaders 
of the union who took it into the amalgamation with the AWU, 
In the previous chapters, the almost total commitment of the 
leaders of the militant unions, and many of their rank and file 
44, Lane op cit. pp 118-161, 
45, Childe op cit. p 125, 
46, A.A, Morrison "Militant Labour in Queensland 1912-1927" Journal 
of the Roval Australian Historical Society November 1952, 
47, Terence Cutler "Sunday Bloody Sunday", John Iremtmger, John 
Merritt and (Jraeme Osborne (eds) Strikes. Strikes in Twentieth 
Australian Social History (Sydney, 1973), p 82, 
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members, to the achievement of the unions' objectives by both in-
dustrial and political action has been emphasised. Ihere was a 
significant group of officials and rank and file members of whcm the 
Brisbane branch executive especially Ernie Lane, W.R. "Jack" Crampton 
and George Martens (also an Australian Socialist Party member) were 
the leaders, who were, towards the end of its separate existence 
and later as part of the AWU, not as committed to support for the 
PLP or to the use of political means to achieve their objectives. 
While important, this group had not sufficient support to direct the 
AWA's policies to their ends, 
A strong attack at the 1913 AWA's annual conference on the 
Worker's editorial policy placing "overwhelming promtn&ice ... on 
48 
the politii&al phase of the movement as against the indtistrial" because 
it was allegedly causing serious dissatisfaction amongst AWA members 
and was "detrimental" to the best interests of the workers, was turned 
aside by Theodore who stepping down frcxn the president's chair per-
suaded the meeting to pass a motion expressing its pleasure at the 
progress made by the Labour journal during the year. Despite Theodore's 
influence the anti-political group was powerful enough to succeed in 
having an amendment carried instructing the tinion's delegates to the 
coming ALF conference to press for greater prcmiin^ ice in the Worker 
49 
for the industrial side of the movement, 
48, Official Report of the Second Annual C<mferaice of the 
Amalgamated Workers' Association of Queensland 1913 op cit. 
P 43, 
49. loc cit 
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The Worker responded strongly to news of the attempted censure 
by wamir^ of "mischievous" groups in the labotir movement who "think 
50 
tmions could overthrow Capitalism by industrial action alone". In 
protest against criticism of their policies at the AWA conference, 
the editor and manager of the Worker handed in their resignations 
51 
to the ALF executive. They were not accepted. 
Theodore's actions at the conference and McCormack*s later 
statements indicate that they agreed with the Worker's pragmatic 
philosophy that the industrial democracy of rule by the workers was 
an ideal to be striven for, but that, under the existing industrial 
conditions in Queensland and Australia, government by parliament was 
destined for many years to be the accepted medium for declaring the 
will of the people and for deciding what should and what should not be, 
If it was agreed that the workers should capture the instruments of 
power, then it had to follow that parliament as the suprene instrument 
of powers in the society had to be seized to upset the sanction of law 
that was being given to the economic injustice perpetrated by a cap-
italist system; As the Worker stated: 
Whatever may be the future basis of society, 
the law of Parliament so completely permeates 
the present basis and modifies the present 
basis, that if the working class would bring 
about fundamental changes it is not easy to 
conceive how they are going to do it without 
getting control of Parliamentary Law. 
50. Worker. 6 Febmiary 1913. 
51. ALF Queensland Provincial Council Executive Minutes, 18 
February 1913, 
52. Worker. 6 February 1913. 
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Therefore the leaders of the AWA and later of the AWU strove 
to establish the influence of the industrial movement and especially 
the AWU in the political party. This was finally achieved at the 
1916 Labour in Politics convention vAien the basis for election of 
delegates to the convention, the supreme policy making body of the 
Labor Party was altered to give the unions increased direct re-
53 
presentation at the convention. Even greater changes were made 
to the composition of the chief administrative body, the Central 
Pblitical Executive, giving greater influence to the unions by 
granting them for the first time direct representation on the ex-
54 
ecutive body on the basis of membership. The unions already had the 
right to nominate candidates for elections and on McCormack's estim-
ation in 1916 at least half of the Labor parliamentarians were 'direct 
nominees* of the AWU. As he further remarked, this was "the way to 
55 
gain industrial control of the political machine'*. Therefore, far 
from being *subservient' to the Labor politicians, the AWU, as the most 
powerful union in Queensland, was in a strong position to influence the 
53. Official Report of Proceedings of the Labour in Politics Convention 
1916 (Brisbane, 1916) p 27. Union representation on Convention 
was on the basis of one delegate for unions having l,0O0 members 
and fewer than 3,000; two delegates for 3,000 to 6,000 members; 
three delegates, 6,000 to 10,000 members; a maximum of four 
delegates for unions over 10,000. 
54. ibid.p 28. Union representation on the CPE was to be "2,000 
members and over, one delegate; 5,000 and over two delegates; 
10,000 and over three delegates together with two members elected 
by the other affiliated unions having less than 2,000 members". 
Prior to this time union representation on the CPE was granted 
to the largest unions, 
55. Turner op cit. p 96, 
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State Labor Party and the policies it introduced in the long period 
of power after its 1915 electoral victory. 
The 1913 amalgamation did not bring a change in AWA policies 
but rather increased opportunities to achieve policies already 
directing AWA actions long before that date. As Muxphy has stated 
from 1916 ",., the political party was tied to the unions and not 
56 
vice-versa", 
Though the AWU supported the political party especially against 
the attacks of the left-wing union and non-union groups, it acted 
indepoidently of the party many times and openly criticised it on 
a number of occasions. An important example of the differences 
between the two groc^ js was their differing attitudes to the social-
ization objective adopted at the 1921 fnter-^tate Labor conference in 
Brisbane, In the vote, the Que^island delegation was split with W,J, 
Riordan of the AWU voting for it and Theodore and McCormack for the PLP 
57 
voting against. 
The new amalgamation achieved in 1913 hastened the demise of the 
AIiF leaving a void in the closer unity movement that the AWU un-
successfully tried to fill. For a time, its attempt to achieve what 
the Alf had failed to do - create one large industrial organisation 
to regulate industrial and political action in Queensland - seemed 
likely to succeed. Rural workers assured of protection by the largest 
56, Murphy et al op cit. p 106, 
57, Morrison "Militant Labotir in Queensland 1912-1927" OP cit . . 
p 218, 
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union ever to exist in Queensland and of having to buy (mly one 
ticket valid for the whole year for most of the industries in ndiich 
they would seek employment, enrolled in large numbers in the new 
union. The greatest prize for the AWU was control of the Worker 
^i^eh it achieved in partnership with the AMIEU when the ALF 
Queensland Provincial Council was finally dissolved in January 1914, 
Though it shared control of the new Board of Manag&nent for Australia's 
oldest and Queensland's most influential Labor newspaper with the 
AMIEU, the AWU's influence <m. the policies of the newspaper after 
1914 was tantamount to its having full control. 
The Worker henceforth forcefully supported the AWU's efforts 
to became the OBU, It is possibly a commentary on the degree of 
influence that the Worker exerted on the industrial movonent and the 
working class that, though at times it seemed a distinct possibility 
for the future, the AW^ did not really c<»iie close to achieving its 
aim, 
NcDAbers of small unions and some larger ones avowed their in-
tention of amalgamating with the AWU, tlie most important tinion as 
far as Que^island was concerned, to declare its intention to follow 
this course was the Queensland branch of the AMIED whose 1914 annual 
conference resolved; 
That the federation through the Federal Council 
be asked to take a vote of the whole of the 
members of the AMIEU throi^out Australia re 
amalgamation with the AWU, Should the southern 
States vote *no' to Queensland's 'yes' then the 
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next State Conference approach the MV with the 
object of Queensland joining the amalgamation 
provided we be allowed to retain our national 
federation until such time as the southern 
states decide to enter the compact.58 
The federal council and the subsequent federal conference of the 
AMIEU did agree to hold a plebiscite of its members which resulted 
finally in all states except South Australia voting in favour of the 
59 
amalgamation. Despite its brave protestation of 1914, the Queensland 
branch did not amalgamate with the AWU, 
It is possible that the linking of the two unions would have 
been achieved if delegates at the 1916 annual conference, once again 
fearing arbitration complications, had not insisted that it could only 
accept the whole of a federated union and would not countenance allow-
ing one or a number of branches to break-away from its parent body to 
link with the AWU especially if the parent body was reluctant to grant 
60 
the state branch's request for release. However it is probable that 
the Queensland branch of the Queensland meatworkers* union officials 
when faced with the final choice of going alone into the AWU in Queens-
land decided they would lose the ftill measure of autonomy they had in the 
AMIEU federation and turned against becoming the meatv/orkers* industrial 
section of the AWU Queensland branch. However, it is possible that the 
Queensland meatworkers were influenced in making their decision not to 
58. Worker. 9 March 1914, Report of Adelaide AMIEU National Con-
ference by Jack Crampton Queensland Branch Secretary AMIEU, 
59. Daily Standard. 15 April 1915. 
60. Official Report AWU Annual Delegate Conference 1916 (Sydney, 
1916), p 47, 
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join the AWU by the Daily Standard report of the decision of the 
Federal Arbitration Court in 1915 in a test case brought before it 
by the Federated Furnishing Trades Union that "a branch cannot with-
draw from the federation, the only provision being for individual 
61 
resignation from the society". Such a decision threw doubt on 
the ability of a branch to secede from a federation as the Queensland 
meatv/orkers* were contemplating. 
Whatever their reason, their final decision not to amalgamate 
with the AWU was a severe set-back for the Queensland branch officials. 
The failure of the Queensland Railway Union to amalgamate further weak-
ened the AWU*s chances of achieving its objectives of one big union in 
Queensland. 
No major union, apart from the Queensland branch of the Operative 
Bakers* Union which became the Foodstuffs section of the Queensland branch, 
accepted the AWU offer to amalgamate. The euphoria created by the 1913 
amalgamation, the extension of the AWU Queensland branch into the North-
ern Rivers districts of the New South Wales, the gain of the Worker 
and the absolution of a few small unions, was soon dissipated by the 
reactions of the craft unions which clung to their autonomy and 
sectionalism as did the major non-craft tinions, 
"Ev&a. in 1913, there were indications that the AWU*s one big union 
scheme wotild not be achieved. In response to a motion by the Brisbane 
District Council of the ALF (the BDC was heavily influenced by AWA 
61, Daily Standard. 13 December 1915, 
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ideas), the executive of that body agreed to summon yet another 
trade union congress to be held as usual during Ai^ u^st, on the 
62 
question of closer unity. It is not certain if the pitiful 
63 
response to the ALF's appeal was because of its own lack of 
popularity or if it should be attributed to the ALF's suggestion 
that the basic plan it espoused for closer unity was amalgamation 
with the AWU, Subsequent reactions to the AWU's OBU scheme would 
suggest that the latter reas<m was an important cause of the ALF's 
failure to persuade Queensland unions to attend the proposed 1913 
trade union congress. 
Certainly, the poor response to the call for a ccMiference to 
achieve closer unity of the AWU type, does not indicate a lack of 
interest in the concept of closer unity in the industrial movement. 
On the contrary, in the subsequent period, the doctrine of closer 
industrial unity became more widespread, more accepted and more widely 
discussed. The AWU's advocacy of the one big union idea supported by 
unions such as the AMI^, Timber Workers' Union, Queensland Railway 
Union, Bs^ers' Union and the influential Labour journal, the Worker 
and the more recently established labour daily, the Daily Standard 
provided a means for discussion and promotion of arguments for and 
against big unionism. 
Further support and propaganda were supplied by the small, but 
62, ALF Queensland Provincial Council Executive Minutes, 14 June 
1913, 
63, ibid, 21 July 1913, Thirty-two replies were received, fourteen 
in favour, seventeen against and one sought more information. 
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active Brisbane branch of the Australian Socialist Party (ASP) 
established after the 1912 general strike. Their lively meetings 
especially their Sunday evening street corner "lectures" attracted 
great interest. It is probable that most of the crowds that began to 
gather to witness the latter were there to see the "fun and games" 
as the speakers attempted to foil the police enforcing the law that 
no non-religiotis meeting could be held without a permit on the 
sabbath. Police Commissioner Cahlll strenuously resisted the attempts 
by the ASP members and a few IWW supporters to preach socialism and 
one big unionism at these meetings. The novel methods of the speakers, 
climbing trees in Market Square and refusing to come down until they 
had finished, chaining themselves to lamp posts, riding through the 
streets on horseback, hiring hotel rooms so that speeches could be 
delivered from balconies, walking down the street discussing out loud 
a piece of socialist doctrine and the efforts of the unfortunate police 
to outwit these imaginative law-breakers made the Stmday evening meet-
ing almost festive occasions. The "Free Speech Fights" as they came 
to be called, gained sympathy for the cause of the ASP, the IWW and 
big unionism and attracted more than one new follower to the militants' 
64 
cause, 
Though the conservative press tended to lump all of the one big 
65 
union activists into the group and call them all syndicalists, it was 
64. Dick Surplus alleged that he as v/ell as some of his friends was 
attracted to the IWW's cause by the efforts of the 'Free Speech' 
advocates, 
65. Brisbane Courier. 10 February 1915, 
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evident even at that early stage that though they were all trying 
to achieve the same basic objective, the emancipation of the worker, 
their quite separate, conflicting ideologies and methodologies for 
attaining the "Co-operative Commonwealth" would undermine the fotmdations 
of the closer vmity movement before the framework of the hoped-for 
monolithic stinieture could be erected. 
However, in the period before the war and later, the ASP and the 
IWW in Queensland were still comparatively weak. Their attacks on the 
Political Labor Party and the AWU for supporting it were ignored by 
most unionists and Laborites. The closer unity movement was still 
committed to achieving industrial democracy by uniting the scattered 
forces of unionism so that the industrial wing of the la,bour movement 
could better assist in the attainment of political power throtigh the 
parliamentary party and have sufficient influence within the Political 
Labor Party when control of the parliament was achieved to ensure that 
the politicians implemented legislation to ameliorate the conditions 
of the working man. 
Despite the greater interest and activity, the possibility of 
achieving a successful form of unified tmion structure for the whole 
of Australia or even for the state became more remote. Confusion was 
created by the multiplicity of schemes that were developed. All 
promised to solve the needs of Austx^lian and Queensland unionism 
for unity and strength to combat the growing organisations of cap-
italist forces into one big union type organisations, the trusts 
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and employers' associations and federations and to meet the even more 
disturbed social and economic conditions that resulted from the approach 
of war and its overall impact when it arrived. None were able to meet 
the challenge adequately. 
At the time of the 1913 AWU amalgamation triumph, the main 
opposition came from the federationists. An attonpt by members of the 
New South Wales labour movCTient led by William Morris "Billy" Hughes 
of the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation to fom a national 
66 
federation similar to the American Federation of Labour was com-
paratively short-lived. The Australian Union Federation as it came 
to be called was regarded by most militants as an attranpt to suppress 
67 
militancy and was therefore shunned by most closer unity advocates. 
It was further criticised as a vehicle for maintaining the craft 
68 
sectionalism that industrial unionists and one big union supporters 
were attempting to eliminate from Australian unionism. Even more 
damaging to its prospects of gaining Queensland support was the failure 
to invite Queensland representation at its inaugural conference. 
Attempts to involve Queensland unions in the federation were 
mostly unsuccessful but its presence indicated the divided loyalties 
66. Official Report Twenty-eighth Conference AWU 1914 (Sydney, 1915), 
pp 30-32, 
67. Worker. 18 June 1914. 
68. Throughout 1914 the Daily Standard and Worker featured whole page 
articles which presented the arguments for amalgamation and high-
lighted the "weakness" of federation to achieve closer unity. 
Prominent Queensland Labor leaders such as E.G. Theodore, W.R. 
(Jack) Crampton, J.A. Fihelly, J.T. Gilday, W.J, Dunstan con-
tributed to the tirade against federation. 
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of the closer unity supporters and remained a threat, while it existed, 
to the advocates of a more centralised type of industrial unity and 
especially of industrial unionism. A greater problsn was the number 
of inter-state federations which while they broadened the administrative 
structure of many unions permanently consolidated the craft divisions 
in industries. The craft unions sought further protection in the Labor 
Cotmcils which existed in most capital cities and many towns and which 
provided a measure of closer unity while allowing a great amount of 
autonomy. 
The thrust of the AWU to establish itself as the one big union 
in Australia was further blunted by divisions within the ranks of 
amalgamationists. The doctrines of industrial unionism and the so-
called "scientific" One Big Union of the IWW with its emphasis on the 
amalgamating of tmions into "industrial groups" gained many supporters 
and multiplied the divisive forces that split the closer unity movement 
producing a confusion of methods which created in turn a fragmentation 
of the industrial movement into what amounted to sects each promoting 
its own structure for the one great union. Ironically, the interfaction 
struggle for ascendancy amongst the closer unity advocates created a 
dis-unity in the industrial movement that was as destructive as that 
brought about by the continuation of craft unionism. 
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Chapter Eight 
THE BRISBANE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
AND 
THE ONE BIG UNION MOVEMENT 
The crisis of the 1914-1918 World War period became the crucible 
in which the battle for control of the closer unity movement reached 
its climax in Queensland, with highly centralized, vertical 
closer unionism emerging from the clouds of battle as the vanquished 
party. Australian society entered the war in a wave of nationalism 
that was epitomised by Labor leader Fisher*s election assurance that 
Australia would support Britain in its war "to the last man and the 
last shilling". The only dissident voices in the industrial movement 
were those of the IV/W group and a small band of socialists whose anti-
war and anti-nationalism declarations were made through their 111-
attended public meetings and their newspapers such as the International 
Socialist. 
Labor politicians and unionists were mostly in accord with the 
"patriotic view" of the majority of the Australian people. However 
this was to be an opinion that did not last with the same unanimity 
throughout the war period. By 1916, the commtmity was deeply divided 
on many matters connected with the war. A number of these divisions 
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lasted to the end of the war and afteirwards. In the unsettled and 
uncertain wartime conditions the conflict between, on the one hand, 
authoritarian ideas in the form of prime minister Hughes* wartime 
restrictions and abuses of federal powers and on the other, the 
extreme leftHving syndicalism of the IWW, unleashed explosive forces 
that erupted violently in civil disruptions over the conscription 
issue. This split not only the society but also the labour movenent 
as did the industrial unrest that continued in the eastern states 
between 1916-1919, 
These political, social and industrial dislocations produced an 
intensification of the belief in the doctrine of class warfare. The 
working class feeling of being betrayed by its leaders and the capitalist 
society began to grow with the effects of wide-spread unemployment caused 
firstly by employers retrenching their staff in panic as they feared 
the war*s effect on world trade and later when wartime restrictions 
on world trade did actually create a decline in Australia*s export-
dependent economy. The success of the Russian revolution in this 
period further intensified working-class interest in left-wing doctrines 
and encouraged the extreme left-wing groups in their efforts to dis-
rupt the existing society. 
The Australian class confrontation was only a pale reflection 
of the violent forces that caused a re-appraisal of liberal thought 
in aigland, Europe and North America. Despite the conflict that did 
occur, labour radicalism in Australia never became dcsainated by rev-
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1 
olutionary socialism but maintained its strong liberal traditions. 
Nevertheless, European and American revolutionary doctrines of class 
2 
conflict became more accepted, more widely espoused in the labour 
movement than at any previous time. But, as before 1900, labour*s 
socialism had little in common with the Etiropean varities of the 
creed. The Queensland labour movement*s socialism was a practical 
and sometimes opportunist mixture of ideas from Bellamy, George, 
Marx, liberal doctrine and the needs of practical politics and trade 
unionism. 
Quite prepared at first, albeit grudgingly, to answer the calls 
to loyalty and sacrifice, entailing cuts in wages and worsened work-
ing conditions, the worker compared unfavourably his reduced economic 
condition with the increased prosperity of many capitalists which came 
as a direct result of the war. A further aggravation of class division 
during the war which caused increased resentment in labour circles was 
due to the ntimber of prosecutions for industrial offences between 1917 
and 1919 which workers perceived to stem from a decided political and 
class bias. Under the Unlawful Associations Act, many members of the 
IWW were imprisoned for six months; three of the Sydney strike leaders 
were prosecuted for conspiracy, thov^h they were not convicted owing 
to a disagreanent of the jury. Many persons were also put in gaol 
1. Gordon Greenwood"National Development and Social Experimentation" 
1901-14 in Gordon Greenwood (ed) Australia. A Social and Political 
History (Sydney, 1955), pp 213-224. 
2. L.G. Churchward "The American Influence on the Australian Labour 
Movement" op cit. p 266. 
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merely for carrsring the Red Flag. 
Furthermore, the use of the censorship to suppress criticism 
of the Hughes federal government, culminating in the confiscation 
of the Queensland Hansard and the seizure of the correspondence of 
the Sydney Trades Hall during the Sydney strike, caused many a rank 
and file tmionist and many union officials to believe the only hope 
for the futtire lay in an intensification of the moves for closer 
unity.«f the industrial movement. The ctimulative influence of the 
variotis causes of pblitical, social and industrial unrest in the union 
movesuent was an increased interest in the achievement of solidarity and 
a closer form of tmionism, national in scope. During 1918 and 1919, 
a much more strenuous and co-ordinated effort was made by many of the 
leaders of the Australian movement to establish what is generally known 
as the One Big Union, the OBU. 
3 
The ideas of Trautman from which the concept of the OBU ©nanated, 
had been known to Australian tmionists long before the outbreak of the 
war. However, though its emphasis on industrial unionism had exerted 
some influence in the developing move for closer unity, the central idea 
had been rejected in favotir of the more moderate forais of union organ-
isation discussed in the previous chapters. 
In the milieu of ideas, very different from that existing four 
years previously, the OBU type of organisation seemed to assume pre-
dominance, though in reality the conflict between the different closer 
unity theories became more violent than ever. The "unprecedented in-
3. W.E. Trautman One Great Union (Melbourne, 1912). 
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4 
dustrial and political turmoil" of the closing years of the war 
convinced even some moderate craft federations of the need for a 
more centralized structure with greater power in the hands of the 
executive committees to ensure more cohesion and solidarity. The 
call by the federal council of the Australian Boot Trade Employees* 
Federation for just such a re-organization of the union*s adminis-
trative structure was a typical response to the crises of the war 
5 
years. Other unions such as the Australian Postal Workers' Union 
initiated similar moves at this time for similar reasons. 
It is understandable therefore that significant numbers of union-
ists became advocates of the OBU ccmcept which reqtiired absolute and 
complete amalgamation of all unions in Australia, involving the ab-
olition of craft demarcations in favour of one comprehensive industrial 
union, divided for administrative purposes into trade departments but 
governed by one council for all Australia. Its structure, constit-
ution and objectives as expressed by its preamble were a radical de-
parture from the outlook and policy which had hitherto characterised 
Australian trade unionism. Especially under violent attacks from its 
opponents were its foreign origins, relationship with the revolutionary 
group, the IWW, which had been the original and chief propagandising 
agent for its implementation and the extreme radical ideas of some of 
its initiators in the period 1918-1920, 
4. Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation Federal Council 
Minutes, May 1918, p 204, 
5, loc cit 
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Before the grand sch^ne of a national OBU was launched, the war 
conditions forced various trade union groups to att^apt localised 
schemes impl^ientio^ at least soae of the organisational ideas mapped 
out in greater detail in IWW propaganda. 
In the years before the war, the ideas of industrial unionism 
basic to the OBU concept were kept alive not only by the propaganda 
of the rival IWW organisations and the theorising of the socialist 
sects but also by a significant ntimber of unionists who were convinced 
that the first step to solidarity and industrial unity was to break 
down the craft barriers and the demarcations between occupations in 
any industry. Their ideas received little more than lip-service 
amongst most unions and their members. The realities of the early 
years of the war and the failure of Labor parties, mainly in southern 
states, forced most union officials to re-appraise union structures 
in a search for a means to combat the unemploj^ent, reduced wages and 
inflation of the war years. 
Direct action was tried and found insufficient by itself. In 
1916, especially in New South Wales, there were moves within the 
Labour Councils to endorse industrial unionism as the mode of organ-
isation to form "a union of unions, based on industrial and allied 
6 
trade lines". Out of these early discussions and the conflict of the 
1917 strike in New South Wales was to come the strong move for the 
OBU. Victorian trade unions also began moves for industrial grouping 
6. Turner op cit. p 183. 
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7 
of unions early in the war. 
The earliest moves in this direction occurred in Queensland in 
1914 where through the initiative of the recently formed Brisbane 
Industrial Cotmcil, the metropolitan unions brought together by the 
problems of increasing unemployment sotight to rid themselves of the 
divisions of craft unionism by introducing a scheme of industrial 
grouping of unions in various industries. The Brisbane Industrial 
Cotmcil was formed in July 1914 to overcome the lack of a central 
organising body after the Brisbane District Cotmcil of the AU" 
8 
disintegrated because of the disaffiliation of unions in 1913. The 
fourteen unions affiliated at its inception soon grew to twenty by the 
9 
end of 1914, As early as February 1914, the presidsits and secretaries 
of twenty-eight Brisbane tmions had met to forra a body "which would 
serve to initiate and carry out any project that would have for its 
10 
object the securing of uniform action by the metropolitan unions". 
Certain sections of the metropolitan union movement, especially the 
building trades' unions and the metal trades' unions desired the closer 
organisation of industrial tmionism with the eventual aim of the 
11 
'kmalgamating of all workers into one union". Their arguments to 
persuade the others that a Trades and Labour Cotmcil would foster 
sectional unionism decided the meeting to appoint a committee to frame 
7. Daily Standard, 3 June 1915 and 7 June 1915. 
8. ibid. 4 July 1914. 
9. ibid« 30 January 1915. (Names of tmions tmavailable). 
10. ibid. 23 February 1914. (Names of unions unavailable), 
11. loc cit 
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a closer vmity scheme for submission to a later meeting. The 
leadership of the building and metal trades unions in the move towards 
industrial unionism is evident in the presence of four members from 
12 
those unions on the steering committee of five. 
By 26 February 1914, a scheme had been devised for the formation 
13 
of what was to be named the "Brisbane Industrial Council of Workers". 
The title is indicative of the trend to avoid the sectionalism of 
trades or craft divisions and the pervasiveness of the ideas of 
industrial unionism. Many unionists agreed with W.M. McCosker that 
success in forming the industrial council was the first step to a 
complete amalgamation of "the whole of the industrial workers into 
14 
One Big Union" but it was clear that this view was far from universal. 
In answer to a letter inviting affiliation and including the draft con-
stitution, thirteen unions expressed their willingness to join, six 
desired more time to consider the proposition while four rejected it 
15 
outright. The generally favourable restilt encouraged the fotmders 
to proceed with establishing the new central body. No attempt was made 
to fulfil the promise of its title by encouraging its affiliates to 
organise in industrial unions. Despite Its title, the Industrial 
Council was at its inception and until after the outbreak of war, 
little more than the Trades and Labour Council which had existed 
before 1912, However, the conditions that followed the outbreak of 
12, loc cit 
13, ibid. 26 February 1914, 
14, ibid. 28 May 1914. 
15, ibid. 21 April 1914, (Names of unions unavailable). 
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war brought an attempt to take the second step towards founding the 
OBU in Queensland. 
Queensland was amongst the worst affected states in the early 
months of the war. The drought of 1914 had already slowed the economic 
growth and created some industrial problems. War brought greater 
ecpnomic hardship for the population. The percsitage of unemployed 
unionists rose from 4,3 in the April to June quarter to 14.3 in the 
first months of the war (July to September) and then to an alarming 
16 
17.7 in the final quarter of 1914. After rising to 17,9, it began 
17 
to drop below about 10% after the end of 1915. The effective value 
of wages dropped rapidly but of more immediate significance to employees 
was the ominous warning of industrial court Judge ffecNaughton that the 
terms of industrial awards did not necessarily apply in times of sudden 
18 
and violent change. Unionists drew the obvious conclusion, that the 
Queensland government would follow the example of the New South Wales 
government in suspending all awards, thus opening the way for wage 
reductions. 
These conditions gave the AWU the opportunity of challsiging the 
power and position of leadership in the metropolitan area that the 
Industrial Council had achieved in its short existence up to August 
1914. Under the guise of offsetting the effects of the war on em-
plo3^ent, Theodore reporting hundreds of workers out of work in al-
16. Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour and Industrial 
Branch Report op cit. 6, p 17, 
17. loc c i t 
1 8 . Worker . 13 Av^ust 1914 . 
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most all occupations and in almost all areas of the state, en-
couraged unionists to form the Combined Unions Committee (CUC) to 
19 
co-operate with the PLP in meeting the emergency. Rivalry soon 
grew between the Industrial Council and the CUC as Dunstan and Theo-
dore attempted to use the committee with which a number of non-
industrial Council tmions were affiliated, to encourage amalgamation 
with the AWU and to formulate tmion policies on a wide range of sub-
20 
jects outside of the unemployment problem. A call by the Industrial 
21 
Council secretary for the disbanding of the CUC was at first evaded. 
Using the new emergency of the suspension of a number of awards by 
the Industrial Court, the CUC rejected the Industrial Council's call 
to disband claiming that, as it represented affiliates of the cotmcil 
and other unions not affiliated, it cotild provide a more united effort 
to protect the remaining awards. 
The Industrial Council, correctly interpreting the trends of the 
time, seized the initiative by immediately instigating a plan to 
convene a special meeting of metropolitan unions to discuss the 
22 
"amalgamation of all unions and the general interchange of tickets". 
Again the building trades, amongst the worst hit of the unions by the 
decline of the economy, gave leadership to its fellow unions by giving 
notice of its intention to emulate their brothers in Melbourne, who had 
23 
recently formed a Building Trades Federation, by linking all the build-
19, Daily Standard. 22 August 1914, 
20, Combined Unions* Ccmmiittee Minutes, 19 Septanber 1914, 
21, ibid, 24 October 1914, 
22, Daily Standard. 18 November 1914, 
23, ibid, 12 November 1914, 
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24 
ing trades* unions in one sub-committee of the Industrial Council, 
Already, four sections of the building trades. Progressive Carpenters, 
Federated House Painters, Plumbers and Builders* Labourers, were 
represented on the council. 
The response of Brisbane unions was generally enthusiastic, with 
several unions, tmaffiliated with the council, agreeing to be present 
at the conference. Consequently, at the special meeting on 21 November 
1914 there were representatives from a wide range of occupations, 
skilled, unskilled, blue collar and white collar viz ship painters and 
dockers, musicians,printers, house painters and decorators, engineers, 
hairdressers, sheet metal workers, boot trade employees, shop assistants, 
master engineers, signwriters, iron workers assistants, confectioners, 
life assurance agents, ship wrights, builders labourers, plumbers and 
25 
gas fitters, carpenters, coopers, engine drivers and firemen. The 
AWU was also present being represented by its secretary, Dunstan, Not-
able absentees were the AMIEU, the Operative Bakers' Union and the QRU, 
The first two affiliated with the Industrial Council in 1915 after 
attempts to amalgamate with the AWU failed. 
After the opening address by Alec Skirving, president of the BIC, 
in which he expressed the hope that the discussion would assist in 
bringing about a closer combination of industrial workers not only in 
the metropolitan area but throughout the length and breadth of Queais-
24. ibid. 18 November 1914. 
25. ibid. 28 November 1914. See Appendix C. 
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land, J. Hildreth (Amalgamated Engineers) and W. Wright (Progressive 
Carpenters) immediately proposed the resolution "that this conference 
recommends the various unions to take immediate steps to group the 
26 
unions within an industry into industrial unions". Hildretli, in 
moving the above resolution,pointed out the increased strength the 
unions in an industry would gain through being brought into closer 
touch and the greater likelihood of successful results for any in-
dustrial actions for the combined unions. 
Not all representatives at the meeting supported the resol-
ution. The most intense opposition came from the AWU representative, 
Dunstan. He claimed the grouping system would only delay the achieve-
ment of the OBU. However, the other unionists present generally 
favoured the grouping scheme as a step towards educating workers to 
the idea of the One Big Union. The opposition of the AWU was suffi-
cient to delay the foimation of the proposed grouping scheme but at 
the subsequent meeting on 6 January 1915, the representatives present 
unanimously approved the resolution first proposed the previous Nov-
ember. The way was therefore clear for the planning of a scheme to 
group Brisbane unions along'fecientifid*industrial lines with the aim 
of preparing the way for the formation of one big union throtighout 
Brisbane and eventually it was hoped throughout Queensland and finally 
all Australia, 
In the discussions subsequent to that on 25 November, consider-
able opposition was expressed by the smaller unions to the MV and 
26. loc cit 
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its systen of forming one big union. The general feeling was that 
small unions would be swallowed by the "somewhat autocratic" method 
of control within the AWU. H. McMinn of the Storemen and Packers' 
Union articulated the thot^hts of the unions which favoured the 
BIC scheme of a grouping system. The BIC's scheme, he said, would 
give them more say in the building of the constitution of the big 
27 
union than they would possibly have in the AWU, Furthermore, the 
grouping scheme was attractive to the smaller unions as it gave them 
the chance of first organising themselves into closely knit combin-
ations which would give them a strengthened position when the final 
amalgamation for a one big union eventually came. 
In fact, it was argued that, if they were successftil in organising 
the grouping scheme, they would be strong enough to induce the AWU 
to approach them instead of the reverse which was the usual situation 
in their divided state. The organisers of the OBU later made the same 
impatient mistake as the AWU of organising downwards; of beginning with 
the establishment of the top floor of the bureaucratic structure and 
then attempting to lay the foundations and build the floors in between. 
Such a scheme for constructing an edifice is bound for destruction. 
There was no thought of promoting a conflict with the AWU or 
attenpting to oppose it. When the question of a probable clash with 
the AWU was raised, the newly organised unions resolved to avoid such 
conflicts as it wotild damage the group's plans for eventually achieving 
27, ibid. 18 Decoaber 1914, 
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28 
their long-terra aim of forming one big union. The AWU did not openly 
oppose this new amalgamation scheme but it is evident that it did not 
welcome the expansion of the BIC and the creation of an alternate 
focus for the amalgamation desires of Queensland unions. The first 
significant indication of this was the failure of the Worker to report 
the formation of the BIC's industrial grouping scheme and its imple-
mentation. 
Other major newspapers. Labour and otherwise, saw great sig-
nificance in the initiation of industrial grouping in Brisbane. For 
the Daily Standard it was "surely an encouragonent to the advocates 
29 
of the OBU" and as such the most important step totvards "the abolition 
of sectional tmionism and the construction of modern industrial organ-
30 
isation". The Courier bitterly denounced the whole One Big Union 
movement and especially branded the actions of the BIC as "dangerous 
31 
syndicalism". However, as so often happens with appraisements of the 
reasons and implications of industrial actions in Australia, there *as 
a wide gap between the extreme of Utopian revolutionaries and the "mock-
horror" predictions of calamity: of conservatives and the actual in-
[ 
tentions of pragmatic unionists. 
The Industrial Council movement owed little, if anything, to 
syndicalism. There was no revolutionary intent in their use of in-
dustrial union principles as the basis for their organisation of tmions, 
28, ibid. 23 January 1914. 
29, ibid, 11 February 1915, 
30, loc cit 
31, Brisbane Courier, 10 February 1915, 
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There was no attempt to adopt any form of the IWW preamble, and its 
objectives appear to be those of pragmatic, defensive unionism. While 
no actual copy of its objectives and constitution now exists, Labotir 
newspaper reports of discussions concerning its inception and those 
minutes of its fortnightly meetings still retained by the present 
Queensland Trades and Labour Council show a major concern for the 
"bread and butter" issues. Nevertheless the BIC gave militant leader-
ship to Brisbane and the rest of the state in the great political, 
social and economic causes that affected Australian society during 
the war, the conscription issue, the 1917 New South Wales strike, the 
release of the "Twelve" and opposition to the repressive measures of 
the Hughes' federal government. 
If the objectives and constitution of the two industrial groups 
that were formed under the BIC's auspices can be taken as an indication 
of the prevailing attitude of the Council's general policies, it wotild 
seen that it was a defensive organisation concerned "to prevent and 
adjust disputes existing or threatening by every reasonable means 
betweai employee and enployers, employee and employee and between 
32 
affiliated unions". It aimed to unify the industrial movement 
to match the feared bogey of **bosses organisation" such as the American 
Meat Trust, Swifts, which then was building a meatworks at the mouth 
of the Brtsbane river and to obtain a consensus of opinion on and the 
power to influence decisions concerning important economic matters that 
32, Daily Standard. 25 May 1915, 
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affected members of its affiliated unions. 
The BIC's proposed plan for "industrial" grouping of unions showed 
a distinct craft orientation with twelve groups - building trade and 
woodworking industry, iron trade, food and drink, clothing and textile, 
printing and paper industry, leather industry, commercial industry, 
transport, mining industry, public utility, miscellaneous, pastoral 
and agriculture - in contrast to the simpler "classic six** of the IV/W 
model - Department of Lands, Fisheries and Water products; Mining 
Transport and Communications; Manufacture and General production; 
33 
Building and Construction; and Civil Service and Public Convenience. 
There was no attempt to repudiate links with the Labor party. 
On the contrary, the meeting of 15 Novonber 1915 carried almost un-
animously recoimTaendations to all affiliated unions to become affiliates 
of the CPE and to the CPE to give the Industrial Council representation 
on that body on the same terms as was formerly granted to the ALF 
34 
Queoisland Provisional Council, The move was not inspired by complete 
support for Labor politicians but rather by the industrialists' realis-
ation that with the Labor party then in power it was necessary to have 
a greater say in the framing of its policies. There was no attempt at 
this time to form an "Industrial Section" within the PLP similar to that 
created by militant unionists in New South Wales. In the discussion for 
the above motions, it was agreed that unionists should wherever possible 
33. One Big Union (Brisbane, 1918), no author shown. Held in Queensland 
Trades and Labour Council Files, Trades Hall, Brisbane. 
34. Brisbane Industrial Council Minutes, 15 Novanber 1915. 
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avoid the use of the strike weapon but at the same time should be pre-
pared to use any means at their disposal, political, industrial or 
35 
whatever to achieve their objectives. 
The AWU did not affiliate with the Brisbane Industrial Council 
even though at the constant instigation of Ernie Lane and Dunstan, the 
Brisbane section of the AWU decided to join the new metropolitan body. 
The matter was raised by Lane at a number of AWU annual delegate meet-
36 
ings in Brisbane and though approved by the vote of the meeting in 1916 
was continually delayed by the state executive who gave various reasons 
including "constitutional difficulties" for not carrying out the will 
of the Brisbane section or the 1916 annual delegate meeting. Lane 
pointed out that AWU branches were affilia.ted with local Labour Councils 
in other states and with Indtistrial Councils in a number of Queensland 
provincial centres but even this logical argument failed to convince the 
AWU hierarchy to swallow their bitter resentment of the BIC's more 
37 
radical policies and its rivalry as a focus for closer unity. 
While the Industrial Council movement did not set out to stop the 
AWU's attempt to make itself the 'one big union' in Queensland, it did 
have the effect of blunting the fine edge of its success, and even-
tually proved to be the most permanent and most successful agency of 
closer unity to emerge from this period. Initially, the Industrial 
35. loc cit 
36. Official Report Fourth Annual Delegate Meeting Queensland Branch 
AWU 1917. (Brisbane, 1917), p 38. 
37. Official Report Fifth Anntial Delegate Meeting Quegisland Branch 
AWU 1918. (Brisbane, 1918), p 35. 
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Councils provided an alternate route by which the smaller sectional 
unions and some of the larger unions such as the AMIEU and QRU could 
travel to the Utopia of *One Big Union*, Later, it was to provide the 
basis for the Trades and Labour Council which eventually became the 
central organ in the Queensland trades* union anatomy. 
Unions such as the Stor^neQ and Packers, the Shop Assistants and 
the Bakers Union opened negotiations with the AWU but later affiliated 
with the BIC, The Operative Bakers Union which in 1914 had eagerly 
sot^ht amalgamation with the AWU later in 1915 affiliated with the 
BIC and during that year became an ardent pr^ioter of the industrial 
grouping scheme formulated by that body. 
Ilie bakers set about organising the various craft unions in their 
own industry into an industrial union which would be the basis for the 
formation of the "Food and Drink^ group of the original grouping scheme. 
With the sponsorship of the BIC, they were successful in amalgamating 
with the Flour Blillers* Union and Confectioners* Union and even enticed 
the Cooks, Hotel, Restaurant, Cafe and Club Workers* Unions to join 
with them in forming one larger tmion - the Milling, Baking, Confect-
ioners and Restaurant Employees* Union. The new union*s secretary, 
BJi., Axelson, the real driving force behind the Bsikers* Union*s amal-
gamation moves, spread the gospel of industrial unionism throughout the 
many cotintry c^atres he visited. In most, he was able to organise at 
least the bakers into branches of the new union. 
A further example is provided by the actions of the Brisbane branch 
206 
of the Federated Carters* Union. This union decided to affiliate with 
the BIC on the 29 November 1915 and advised Its Rockhampton sub-branch 
to affiliate with the Rockhampton Industrial Council. At the same 
meeting, it was also decided to hold a ballot of its Queensland member-
ship on the question of amalgajnation with the AWU. The ballot re-
38 
suited in an overwhelming three to one vote against amalgamation. 
While this is not necessarily typical of the action of all Queensland 
unions and unionists, it is indicative of the changed attitude tov/ards 
amalgamation with the AWU after the establishment of the Industrial 
Council in Brisbane and the development of that tjrpe of organisation 
in other areas of the state. 
By 1916, there were four industrial councils in Queensland with 
39 
sixty-seven affiliated unions. Though there was no central organisation 
to which all were affiliated, they became the basis for the state-wide 
organisation that exists today as the Trades and Labour Council of Queens-
land. The initial success of the industrial grouping schemes inspired 
the Eight Hour Day Committee to initiate a similar scheme for organising 
40 
the 1916 Eight Hour Day procession. Some provincial committees 
adopted a similar industria.1 grouping organisation of their process-
ions. The leadership of Queensland tmionism was beginning to shift 
from the rural areas to the metropolitan unions. 
At the same time, the AWU continued its active campaign through-
38. Daily Standard. 30 Deceaber 1915. 
39. ibid. 24 March 1916. 
40. loc cit 
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out Queensland and the rest of Australia to create a one big union 
through the processes of absorbing smaller unions or amalgamating 
with them on the basis of their retaining autonomy within the overall 
structure of the AWU organisation. The AWU continued to grow in 
strength and membership as it attracted unions to amalgamate with 
it especially in the southern states. However, in Queensland it 
never again had the same success it had enjoyed before 1915. Never-
theless it remained a powerful and influential force in the industrial 
movement, the one big union movement and the Queensland political labour 
movement, throughout the whole period during which the idea of big 
unionism was entertained as feasible and desirable by unionists. 
In Queensland, the initiative was taken from the ASVU by the BIC 
whose scheme in turn was thwarted by the extremists who "grabbed" the 
Australian Building Industry Employees* Union (ABIEU) from the Council*s 
Building Trade Group, 
For some years a number of building trade unions had been seeking 
some form of closer unity within the building industry. After a number 
of abortive attempts to create a national organisation similar to that 
which existed in Brttain, the enthusiastists for closer unity in the 
building trade in Queensland turned to the newly formed Brisbane 
Industrial Cotmcil and became active advocates of industrial grouping 
within that organisation. At first, they were content to form a Build-
ing Trades Sub-Committee of the BIC. Later, the building trades en-
41, AP&GU Minutes, 10 December 1914, 
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thusiastically embraced the industrial grouping scheme adopted by the 
BIC for the organising of the metropolitan unions alor^ industrial lines. 
The accord within the building trades' members of the BIC quickly pro-
duced the Building Trades Group with a constitution and rules designed 
42 
to better organise the building industry. Soon the support within the 
industry for the new organisation encouraged another attempt to form 
an industrial union that would unite all unions in the trade. At a 
mass meeting of building trade unionists, it was decided to fom the 
Australian Building Industry Employees Union which would achieve this 
43 
purpose. 
At this stage, the promising growth of unity within the building 
industry was brought to a complete standstill by the action of extran-
44 
ists. Instead of the new organisation acting as a platform from which 
a programme for the education of uncommitted building workers and build-
ing industry union officials could be launched so that favourable re-
sults could be obtained in union plebiscites on the question of amal-
gamating with the new union, some of its officials began immediately to 
enrol workers already in other craft unions and non-unionists into a 
new union. At the same time, they demanded that the existing craft 
unions immediately wind up their affairs and hand over their members and 
45 
their funds to the ABIEU. The new officials moved too far, too quickly 
and were too radical for the craft union officials who retaliated with 
42. Daily Standard. 26 May 1915, 
43. ibid. 20 September 1915, 
44. ibid, 15 November 1915 
45. ibid. 10 Novonber 1915. 
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charges that the union had been grabbed from them by a group of ex-
tremists a.nd members of the IWW. The evidence does seem to support 
the craft union officials' claims. 
Amongst the leaders of the group that tried to direct the new 
union on a course that would destroy the craft unions were members of 
46 
the first Queensland IWW Local formed in Brisbane in early 1915, 
Claude Anlezark, the brothers T. and J. Dwyer, Percy Mandeno, Gordon 
47 
Brown, A.E. Williams, George Bright, W.E. Sydes and Gordon Major. 
Some like Brown, Sydes and Major were at that time also members of the 
Brisbane branch of the Australian Socialist Party. Claude Anlezark 
is interesting as he had been a member of the 'physical force' group 
that had taken over the IWV7 movement in Sydney in 1913 and steered it 
48 
into the direct actionist course of the Chicago IWW. Others in the 
group that created the ABIEU were also craft tmion officials eager to 
achieve tmity in the building trades' union. Most of those like W. 
Wallace, E.J. Hanson and W, Gavin left when it became obvious that the 
46. No definite list of members of the IWW in Queensland is available 
but reports in the local labour papers Worker and Daily Standard 
and accounts of the activities of the Brisbane IWW Local in the 
IWW paper Direct Action indicate the involvement of these in IWW 
work. See TM Minutes and Correspondence 1903-1916, Mitchell 
Library, Sydney, 
47. While Gordon Brown has been named as a member of the IWW it is more 
likely that he was never a ticketholder of that organisation. Dick 
Surplus avows he was not, and Brovm. himself omits mention of it in 
his own autobiography. It is most probable that he was a "fellow-
traveller" rather tha,n an accredited member of the Brisbane Local. 
Gordon Brown My Descent from Soapbox to Senate (Brisbane, 1953). 
48. P.J. Rushton The IWW in NSIV, unpublished M A (history) thesis, 1972 
University of Sydney, p 61, 
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union was to adopt the "white-anting" policies of the IWW and was out, 
not to amalgamate but to destroy the craft tinions. The ABIW was de-
49 50 
dared a 'bogus union' by the BIC but it survived until the 1930s, 
Though the Building Trades Group continued as part of the BIC, it 
made no further att^ipts to amalgamate the building trade unions but 
rather continued as a loose federation of craft unions. The ke^i edge 
of enthnsiasm of the once ardent advooates of industrial unionism and 
closer unity in the building industry had been blunted by the "Bludgeon-
ing" methods of the IWW direct actionists and extreme socialists. 
The grouping systen never did achieve much, with onlj one other 
group (the Metal Trades Group) than the Builders Trades Groups being 
formed. Dick Surplus, a delegate on the Metal Trades Group and only 
51 
known susrvlving member of the Brisbane IWW Local, claims that no real 
amalgamation of the crafts in his group could be formed because of the 
conservatism of the craft officials fr<^ the various compcment unions. 
He asserts that almost all tradesmen came tr&m ^^and and that their 
conservatism steamed fr^i their origins in small English country towns 
where the tradesmen, away from the main militant movement of the larger 
centres, were steeped in the exclusive "autocrats of labour" traditions 
of nineteenth c^itury craft unionism. Whether this is correct or not is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to ascertain. The influence of English 
migrant labour, skilled and unskilled, on the Australian labour movement 
4B, Brisbane Industrial Council Minutes, 24 November 1916. 
50, Proctor op cit, p 87, 
51. Mr. Surplus's views are quoted from the tape of an interview the 
author had with him on 22 May 1973, Tapes held by the author. 
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warrants a deep investigation in its own right. It is only possible 
here to speculate that the consistent rejection by the craft tinions 
of amalgamation schemes and the favouring of the looser structure 
of federations and Labour Cotmcils does toad to suggest a stroE^ 
desire to retain their exclusiveness and to maintain their autonomy. 
This was especially evident in their attitude to the more revolutionary 
schemes of union structure especially the OBU and its association with 
revolutionary socialism. While Dick Surplus's opinion is interesting 
and supports the views of contemporaries such as Jack Crampton and 
William Wallace, there are other factors which ccntributed to the 
strength of craft opposition to such movements. 
Apart from their desire to maintain the status of craft unionism, 
the Biajority of craft unionists had a strong vested interest in the 
stability of their unions and their country. Many aspired to be small 
business men in their own right and had property of their own especially 
52 
their own house. Therefore as "petty capitalists" they rejected any 
ideology which would endanger the capitalist system. They and their 
unions had well-established funds in Friendly Societies, Insurance Com-
panies, Building Societies, Funeral Benefit Funds and co-operative trad-
ing ^iteirprises. While such workers may on occasion, be persuaded to 
enter upon a strike, or take part in a general industrial upheaval, it 
52, cf Humphrey McQueen A New Britannia (Ringwood, 1970). H<^ 5ueen 
propounds a similar view tising the piano as the S3^bol of Atist-
ralian working-class acquisitiveness. Chapter 9 pp 117-119. See 
John Playford Neo-Capitalism in Australia (Melbourne. 1969). 
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is highly unlikely that they would lend support to such a social and 
economic revolution as that contemplated by many advocates of the OBU. 
Nevertheless in the turbulent years of the latter half of the war, 
extreme radicalism became more acceptable to a wider section of the 
populace. Many organisations such as the Industrial Councils confined 
their radicalism to opposing the many injustices and illiberal acts 
perpetuated by the federal and state non-Labor governments and on 
occasions Labor govemm^ats in their attempts to impose conscription 
for overseas seirvice and efforts to suppress what they liked to brand 
'•foreign-motivated mov^fients" such as the IWW that violently opposed 
them. Neverth^ess, the Councils gave financial and propaganda support 
to the campaigns to free "The Twelve" (IWW members imprisoned by the 
New South Wales government) and gave propaganda support to international 
appeals to obtain the release of American IWW-ites such as Ettor and 
Giovanitti imprisoned for their industrial activities in the United 
States of America. The conditions of wartime society and the sympathy 
of unionists for those victimised by governments provided an environ-
ment in which the IWW was able to finally establish itself in Queensland. 
The first local was established in Brisbane in 1915, By the next 
year, there were three in Queensland with new locals being established 
54 55 
at Mount Morgan and Cairns. In the absence of records, it is dlffi-
eult to establish the size of their membership. None of them seems to have 
53, Bireet Action. 15 January 1915, 
54, ibid. 15 January 1916, 
55, loc cit 
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been very large or to be very influential. It is estimated by Dick 
Surplus that the Brisbane Local never had a membership above twenty 
56 
and was mostly below that figure. The small number of Queensland 
addresses in the membership lists held by the Sydney I?rw Local support 
W¥ 
the belief of a small Queoisland membership. Reports in Direct Action 
by Tom Barker and William Jackson who, at various times, toured Queens-
land raising funds for various IWW causes always referred to a large 
IWW following in the far northern and western areas of the state. Both 
reported the imminence of the establishment of locals in those areas 
but none except for the almost wholly Russian local of Cairns eventuated. 
It would seem that most of the IWW ticketholders and many of the sympath-
isers could have been transient workers. Barker and Jackson always 
visited the north and western areas during the peak of the seasonal work-
ing period. Jim Courtauld refers to visits of IWW transients to his mine 
58 
in North Queensland. They would stay a short time, "stir-up militancjr" 
and then move on. This wotild seem to fit the image of many IWIV men 
59 
provided by Bill Beattie in his reminiscences of the IWW and Rushton 
60 
in his work on the activities of the Sydney IWW Local, 
At least two industrial disturbances can be directly attributed 
to their influence. The *grabbing' of the ABIEU in Brisbane in 1916 
56, Surplus op cit 
57, IWW Minutes and Correspondence, 1903-1916, held by Mitchell 
Library, 
58, Jim Courtatild Alias Jimmy unpublished manuscript Slitchell 
Library, pp 375-76, 
59, Bill Beattie "Memories of the IWW" Labour History. 13 November 
1967, pp 33-39, 
60, Rushton op cit, ch 1, 
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and the 'wild cat* strikes for above awards shearing rates by a number 
of AWU sheds in central and western Queensland. This strike activity 
spread with the shearing season into New South Wales causing great 
concern to the MV hierarchy, Dunstan,in reporting his investigations 
into the disturbances, identified activities by known IWW members in the 
61 
area, T.J, Ryan, on the other hand in a reply to a query by W,M, 
62 
Hughes, disclaimed any major IWW influence in the strikes. Both 
Dunstan and Ryan had vested interests in respectively exaggerating or 
minimising the IWW presence; the first to explain away anti-AWU activity 
by recalcitrant shearers and the second to allay the persistent and ex-
aggerated fears of the prime minister who was pressing Ryan to take a 
tougher line with the IWW whom Hughes claimed were flocking northwards 
to escape the stiffer attitudes of non-Labor governments in the south, 
Hughes* claims of a flooding of the north of fleeing Wobblies 
seemed more directed at the Ryan government than at the IWW and seems 
63 
to have little basis in fact, Terence Cutler indicates in his account 
of the 1918-1919 meatworkers strike in Townsville that IWW influence was 
strong in that area but it would seem to be mainly amongst the seasonal 
workers and was npt permanent enough to enable an IWW organisation to be 
64 
established, George Rjraier, secretary of the Townsville branch of the 
61, AWU Executive Minutes, 1 May 1916, 
62, D.J. Murphy T.J. Ryan; A Political Biography, unpublished PhD 
(history) thesis 1972, Queensland University, p 434. 
63. Cutler op cit. pp85, 86. 
64. This and subsequent statements by George Rymer were made in several 
taped interviews with the author. Copies of the tapes are held at 
the Main Library, Queensland University, and by the author. 
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QRU and secretary of the Townsville Industrial Council at the time of 
the strike disclaims any strong IWW influence in that area. He does, 
however, admit the presence of IWW sympathisers amongst the striking 
meatworkers and still graphically recalls an attempt to assassinate 
him when he, as secretary of the Strike Committee, told a crowd 
assembled under the Tree of Knowledge (the favourite spot for open-
air meetings in Townsville) that the Committee would not forcibly re-
sist the Queensland government but would try to negotiate the end of 
the strike. 
Such IWW activity as there was in Queensland had little positive 
and constructive effects. If anything the IWW was believed by important 
sections of the Queensland labour movement to have a chiefly negative 
influence on the movements for closer unity. Their influence in the take-
over of the ABIEU was long remembered for its slowing down and division 
of the enthusiastic movement towards industrial grouping in Brisbane, 
It is doubtful if the BIC*s scheme could have been fully implemented but 
its early truncation can be attributed to the actions of the extremist 
65 66 
group. Charges by Theodore and other politicians that the IWW tactics 
of *'boring from within" were anarchistic and irresponsible were generally 
supported by local unionists. Subsequent to one such attack on the 
IWW, the Progressive Carpenters, a militant tmion,endorsed Theodore's 
repudiation by protesting strongly to the Trades Hall Board against the 
IWW's use of the Trades Hall for meetings and as a centre for distrib-
65. Daily Standard. 9 May 1917. 
66. ibid. 18 July 1917. 
216 
67 
ution of literature. 
An awareness of the strength of this anti-IWW feeling and its 
ability to deter many Queensland unionists and union officials from 
the OBU movement is manifest in the frantic assurances of no IWW 
influence by the group that Introduced the New South Wales Trades 
Union Congress's OBU scheme, the Workers Industrial Union of Aust-
68 
ralia (WIUA) to the 1918 Queaisland Trade Union Congress, Hostility 
and suspicions allayed, the congress accepted the southern scheme for 
closer unity in place of their own but subsequent actions of prominent 
union leaders and socialists associated with the WIUA once again aroused 
the antipathy and deterred many Que^sland unions from fulfilling 
their endors^nent of the scheme. 
Fear that the syndicalist associations of the (BU scheme would 
create the aversion described above, inspired the editor of the Daily 
Standard to attempt to minimise the amotmt of the influence of the IWW 
and syndicalism in the origins of OBU movement towards closer unity, 
69 
Under the editorial caption of "New Unionism**, the Daily Standard 
editor was at pains to trace the evolution of the OBU movement back 
to its British origins in Robert Owens' Grand National Consolidated 
Trades Union and the British, rather than American or French, era-
phasis on industrial unionism linked to the political movgnent, 
67. ibid. 25 July 1917, 
68. ibid. 20 August 1918, 
69. ibid. 24 August 1918: the editorial of 21 August 1918 "Unified 
Unionism" also emphasised the British-Australian origins of 
the one big union idea. 
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For the scheme to succeed in Queensland, it had to comply with 
the philosophy of the industrial movement which v/as still pre-
dominantly in favour of "political unionism". Unfortunately for 
the success of the OBU scheme, this was where it was most vulnerable. 
Arising out of the quite different political and industrial climate 
of New South Wales and Victoria, its anti-political and anti-
arbitration bias repelled the majority of Queensland unionists and 
officials who valued their special position of having "the only 
70 
working-class government in the world" outside of Russia, which 
up to that time had shown a radical propensity to legislate and ad-
ministrate a definite policy designed to remove inequalities from the 
society. 
The Parliamentary Labor Party had crowned twenty years of stiruggle 
by winning with a large majority the 1915 state elections. In the last 
ten years of that period, the PLP had followed a radical policy closely 
attuned to the desires of Queensland unionists. The success was as much 
due to the support of the industrial wing of the labour movement as it was 
to Ryan's agricultural policies and the early effects of the v/ar-caused 
unemployment. Close relations between the two wings of the movement 
were maintained by the Labor Party's ready acceptance of union demands 
for increased membership at Labour-in-Politics conventions and on the 
CPE. The unionists noted with a mixture of pleasure and frustration 
the attempts by the Labor government to implement their election pro-
70. ibid, 26 August 1918. 
218 
raises only to have some rejected and others modified by a hostile 
Legislative Council, 
Sufficient radical reforms and policies were implemented to 
satisfy all but the extreme militants that the Labor politicians 
were not emulating their southern counterparts' betrayal of working 
class values. The quick passage of bills to establish a state 
arbitration systen with the emphasis on conciliation and providing 
an arbitration court to introduce laws providing greater protection 
for union funds and removing the worst features of the Industrial 
Peace Act concerning the control of tmion activities; the virtual 
preference to unionist initiated by government precept if not by 
legal enactment and the introduction of day labour to overcome un-
employment, almost complete support for the anti-conscription cam-
paign might have filled the non-Labor groups with alarm for the future 
but were active proof to tmionists of the sincerity of Ryan's government. 
71 
The Premier's ability to hold his party together whilst other Labor 
parties both federal and state split asunder over conscription and his 
consequent stand against the repressive measures of Hughes's National-
ist government were more evidence to Queensland workers that their 
Labor Party was worth supporting and returning to power. If further 
proof was required, it was evident in the absence of serious indus-
trial conflict in the state except for the 1917 rail strike and the 
71. Murphy T.J. Ryan op cit contains the most comprehensive analysis 
and account of Ryan's political career. 
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1918-19 meatworkers' strike due greatly to the satisfaction of the 
workers with their government and its treatment of tmionists. 
A major point of comparison was provided by the contrasting be-
haviour of the New South Wales government and the Queensland govern-
ment in handling strikes in 1917. In New South V/ales, the 1917 
Great Strike was a bitterly fought collision between government and 
employers on one side and unionists on the other with the government, 
including some former Labor parliamentarians, exerting all its advan-
tages of suppressive power to defeat the tmionists. In contrast, the 
quick action of the Queensland government to conciliate and settle with 
striking railway men in northern Queensland was appreciated by union-
ists throughout Australia as a prime example of the benefits of having 
a truly radical Labor party in power. Queensland tmionists listened 
joyfully to the envious praise of southern unionists in Queensland to 
seek aid for their beleagured comrades in New South Wales. The editor 
of the more radical Daily Standard v/hich at various times had criticised 
the Labor party suimned up the value of political control of the labour 
movement thus: 
,., This State's administration proved a big 
sttimbling-block in the way of the full success 
of the schemes of the Sydney strike-makers and 
strike-breakers. Not only was the Queensland 
Labor Government of great value to the workers 
and public of this State but tmquestionably it 
saved the situation very largely for the whole 
of Austral la, "^ 2 
72, Daily Standard. 12 October 1917, 
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The workers* faith in the Labor government and its arbitration 
system led to an increased ntimber of unions and a larger member-
ship. Union affiliations with the CPE increased rapidly so that by 
73 
1917 there were 52 labour unions affiliated. This was an increase 
of thirteen on the previous year's numbers. The greater involvement 
of unions with the Labor Party was inspired not only by approval of the 
party's record in government. Increasingly, unionists, appreciating 
the benefits already obtained by a sympathetic government, sought a 
greater voice in deciding policies. This led the BIC to request the 
govenunent's referral of all proposed legislation concerning industrial 
matters to the council for its prior approval, and made it urge all of 
74 
its m@nber unions to affiliate with the CPE, 
Confidence in the present performance of the government did not 
reaove the inher^it suspicion of politicians or the fear of disastrims 
industirial conditions after the war was over. Belief that the already 
high level of unemployment would be even higher once the armed forces 
75 
were demobilized increased the desire for closer unity. To realise 
this hope, the BIC, now the most influential central industrial organ-
isation in Queensland invited unions to attend the third Trade Union 
Congress to be held in August 1918, The response to the Council's in-
vitations premised to make the ccmgress the largest gatherii^ of organ-
isations ever held in Queensland. Nevertheless it represented less than 
73, Murphy et al OP cit. p 102, 
74, Birisbane Industrial Council Minutes, 15 November 1915, 
75, E, Lane Th^ One Big Union and Reconstruction in the Light of 
the War (Melbourne, 1918), 
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half of the unions in exist^ice in Queensland at that time. 
Before the congress met, the nation was greatly disturbed by the 
events of the 1917 Great Strike in New South Wales. Even though Queens-
land escaped the worst features of the conflict, its disastrous effects 
on the industrial movement and the workers of New South V/ales en-
couraged unionists to seek strength in unity. The congress quickly 
showed its radicalism by making one of its main objectives the abolition 
of the wages system and by voting for the amalgamation-type of organ-
isation of the OBU schone rather than for a federation and later by 
adopting the even more radical New South Wales Congress's scheme with 
its contentiously IWW-like preamble. The OBU committee which was formed 
comprising representatives of the major unions in Queensla,nd plus three 
representatives of the smaller unions, included W.J. Riordan (A?/U) chair-
man, T. Moroney (QRU) secretary, C, Kilpatrick (C&SE), A. McNeil (Water-
side Workers), C. Boulton (AMIEU), J.F. Gordon (ASE) and Axelson, A, 
76 
Harris and Wallace for the smaller organisations. 
Almost immediately the OBU committee experienced difficulties as 
a number of the tmions dallied over electing representatives to the 
committee. It was not until the end of the year that a ftill meeting 
could be convened. One of the first acts of the committee was to issue 
a warning against the activities of William Jackson organiser for the 
One Big Union Propaganda League, the organisation that replaced the IWW 
once it was banned by the Nationalist government in Canberra, Jackson 
76, Worker, 31 October 1918, 
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was accused of circulating pamphlets and subscription lists calling 
77 
for urgent financial assistance in the name of the OBU. These 
activities of the successor to the IWW helped to confuse the issue and 
gave greater credaice to the attacks of those who branded the OBU 
scheme, an IWW plot. Further confusion and delays were created by 
the hesitancy of the Queensland committee to initiate any scheme 
until a national scheme could be devised by the Ccsmnonwealth Congress 
to be held in Melbourne in January 1919, Widespread enthusiasm for 
the OBU was short-lived in Queensland. Moroney and Wallace represented 
78 
Queensland at the 1919 Melbourne Congress but no Queenslanders attend-
79 
ed the 1920 Congress, By that time the Commonv/ealth OBU scheme in the 
form of the WIUA was a dead issue for most Queensland unions, 
SO 81 
Both Lane and Childe blamed the AWU for sabotaging the \rtiole 
WIUA schene and accused it of deliberately frustrating attempts of the 
Queensland OBU committee from ftmctioning properly by not attending meet-
ings. In the absence of any records of the OBU committee, it is diffi-
cult to give an authoritative interpretation of their views. However,up 
to the beginning of 1919, AWU reports show that the union had attended 
82 
every meeting. The chief defaulters in attendance were the AMIBD 
which had not attended a meeting and the Watersiders who had attended 
7 7 . i b i d . 19 December 1918 . 
7 8 . OBU. 1 February 1919 . 
7 9 . i b i d . 1 November 1920. 
8 0 . Lane Dawn t o Dusk op c i t . pp 238-254. 
8 1 . Chi lde op c i t . pp 169-181 
8 2 . AWU Queensland Branch Annual De lega te Conference January 1919 
op c i t , p 2 9 . 
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only half of them. Lane himself excused such absenteeism by ex-
plaining that meetings were often held with only short notice given 
to delegates and that often OBU committee meetings clashed with 
84 
those of tmions. As late as April 1919, the M U Queensland Branch 
Executive approved Riordan's retention of his position on the OBU 
committee despite the animosity evident at that time between the 
85 
AWU and the WIUA. Riordan*s maintaining his position on the 
committee may have been for the purpose of sabotaging its activities 
but there is no mention of it in the MV Executive minutes and certain-
ly it seems unlikely. 
From the middle of 1919, supporters of the scheme began to become 
impatient at the lack of activity of the OBU committee. The Painters and 
Decorators* Union, the secretary of which, Wallace, was a smaller unions* 
representative on the OBU committee, passed a resolution protesting 
against the apathy displayed by the committee in the furtherance of the 
86 87 
scheme adopted by the January Interstate Congress, On the same date, 
the Daily Standard reported a statCTient by the AMIEU delegate on the 
committee that there had been no meeting since Jtme, By 1920, the 
88 
Trades Hall Council the successor to the Brisbane Industrial Council 
in reply to a query concerning what had happened to the OBU movement de-
83, loc cit 
84, loc cit 
8 5 , AWU Queensland Branch Execut ive Minu te s , 28 Apr i l 1919, 
8 6 , Dtaily S t anda rd . 16 August 1919. 
87, loc c i t 
88, See Chapter 9 for a discussion of this transition. 
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clared that it was dead. It is significant that the same body in 
November 1919 had resolved that one of the objects of the newly foimed 
Council should be to bring about by the amalgamation of existing unions 
or, by some other means, a reduction of the number of unions and the 
discouragen^it of the formation of any union which catered for any 
workers already provided for by any bona fide union affiliated with 
90 
the Cotmcil, This aim was a far cry frc»a the rhetorie of the OBU 
movement and illustrated the lack of interest in the bureaucratic 
structure of the WIUA, There was a hint of industrial unionism in 
the desire to reduce the number of unions but g^ierally, it showed the 
craft union ori^itation of the central industrial body of Brisbane and 
in turn reflected the lack of ideological commitment to the complicated 
and theoretical OBU doctrine, 
Ihe strength of the craft unions, secure in their federations and 
labour councils and committed to arbitration, c^itributed more to defeat 
the OBU movement in Qtieensland than did any alleged MU sabotage or ab-
senteeism from the OBU c^mnittee. Of course MU opposition to the WIUA 
was strong and the AWU was a powerful union in Queoisland. However, its 
own plan to become the OBU had foundered and was to contlntie to fotmder 
on the rock of the desire of tinions SSB&H and large, craft or indtistrial 
to retain their separate identity and autonomy. The bonds of craft fed-
erations were too strong to break even when s<»ne Queensland branches 
89, Trades Hall CouncU Minutes, 21 Jtay 1920, 
^0, ibid, 21 November 1919, 
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desired to sever their links with the southern unions and join the 
WIUA, The attaapt by the Queensland branch of the Waterside Workers* 
Federation was frustrated by its federal executive's insistence on 
maintaining control of the Queensland union. Examination of the rules 
finally convinced the Queensland waterside workers that if they per-
sisted in their move to join the WIUA, the WWF would expel them and 
set up an opposition branch of their union. Not wishing to divide the 
workers in the industry into two hostile camps, the Que^island branch 
91 
reluctantly bowed to the dictates of their Federal Executive, 
AWU opposition and the craft unions' desire to avoid losing their 
identify by amalgamation were only two of the important obstacles 
blocking aehievonaat of the scheme. The "boring from within" tactics 
adopted by the prop<ments of the scheme, the anti-arbitration and anti-
political involvement attitudes associated with the ptirposes of the 
sch^ne, the advocacy of direct action as the main means of achieving 
success, the opposition of tinion officials and politicians who per-
ceived success for the scheme as robbing than of their prcMninent pos-
itions in the labour movanent and the existence of the strong Labour 
Council movem^it all contributed to makii^ the OBU schane and its ob-
jectives out of step with the industrial movemeat in Que^island, 
The basic philosophy of the OBU movenent aimed to produce drastic 
changes in the social structure, to replace parliamentary government 
with industrial geveKuaent and to create opporttinities for worker con-
91, Daily Standard. 11 November 1920, 
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trol of industry. It was an aggressive philosophy designed to 
drastically re-organise society on an industrial basis. In short, 
it was fundamentally a revolutionary ideology. The main tradition 
of unionism in Queensland and, in fact, Australia was and has been 
evolutionary with unionists working to improve the already existing 
. 92 
framework of society without quick drastic changes. The basic ethos 
of Australian society is capitalist with each person claiming the right 
to own property, a piece of land, his own home, his own business. The 
pressure on all parties. Labor and anti-Labor to make land more attain-
able to all has been a fundamental theme of Australian history. As a 
totally migrant society, white Australia has attracted mainly those who 
have sought material improvement and so the original free enterprise 
inspiration that turned the communal, subsistence prison society of 
the first settlement into a profit seeking and property-owning society 
has been maintained and strengthened. 
Unions in Australia were established originally as def eisive or-
ganisations designed to combat the worst effects of capitalism and to 
obtain for their members a greater share of the wealth believed to be 
so abundant in this "land of opportunity". Though social and economic 
ideologies such as socialism and syndicalism have obtained their follow-
ers and have influenced societal expectations and modes of achieving 
those expectations, the most powerful economic force in our society has 
been the free enterprise doctrine of acquisition of property and accumu-
lation of material wealth. Therefore, Australian unions have been 
92, ibid. 30 October 1919, 
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mainly concerned with improving the material condition of their 
members and maintaining the gains they have achieved. 
To fulfil these basic aims, they have followed policies at 
various times aggressive or defensive and even both at the same time 
being defensive in some areas in which gains have been made and 
aggressive in others where improvonents are required. Whether 
aggressive or defensive, they have been mainly forces seeking reform 
of existing society not its replacement with a totally new structure 
and ideology. Therefore, the OBU ideology with its emphasis on re-
structuring society and its system of government and administration 
was bound to fail in Australia, 
It had ev&i less chance of success within the Queensland in-
dustrial movement which was much more conservative than it had been 
ten years, even five years before, Queensland tmions were deeply con-
cerned to maintain the status quo in which for the first time for over 
sixty years, the powers of government, which had beoi so often used to 
suppress them, were being used in their favour. It was evident that the 
1918 Queensland Trade Union Congress that approved the use of the WIUA 
organisation as the basis for their OBU had not the same purposes as 
those which had inspired the New South Wales congress to initiate the 
scheme. In closing the congress, members were unanimous in their 
praise of the Queensland Labor government "the best they had had in 
Australia at any time in their history ,,, the only workir^-class 
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Government outside of Russia in the world todasr". 
Even during the years after 1920, when there was less reason to 
be content with the performance of the Labor government and the ar-
bitration system, the memory of what conditions had been like in the 
previous twenty years under non-Labor governments maintained much 
union support for its manbers. Unions were more concerned with de-
vising means of giving the industrial movement more control over the 
parliamentary wing than with destroying the structure of society so 
that it was an industrial state. 
Accordingly, the Industrial Council movement continued to flourish 
in the state with councils being formed in provincial centres such as 
Ipswich, Toowoomba, Gympie, Btmdaberg, Rockhampton, Cairns and Towns-
ville, after the success of the Brisbane Industrial Council became 
evidoit. As no complete set of records of the industrial councils 
exists, it is difficult to know to tdiat extent unions affiliated with 
m 
them. The Bundaberg Industrial Cotmcil reported in 1917 that only two 
unions in that town were not affiliated with it. The Brisbane Industrial 
Cotmcil records that do remain contain the council's minutes from 9 
June 1915 to 13 September 1916 but give no clear indication which 
unions were affiliated. Reports in the Daily Standard indicate that 
most metropolitan tmions were affiliated with the BIC at one time or 
another. In July 1919, when the Brisbane Industrial Council was dis-
93, ibid, 26 Augtist 1918, 
94, ibid. 24 February 1917, 
95, Brisbane Industrial Council Minutes, 9 June 1915 to 13 September 
1916, 
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solved so that the Trades Hall Council cotild be formed, thirty-
96 
nine unions affiliated with the new body. However, by 1918 some 
metropolitan unions, deterred by the BIC's c«Bplete anti-war stance 
in opposition to the Queensland Labor Party's st^port for recruiting 
for the war and camnitment to the war effort, withdrew their affil-
97 
iatioa. 
Differing attitudes to the war indicated a division between the 
BIC and the political wing of the labotir movement that was to grow in 
later years to a confrontation between c« one side the radical elemaats 
of the industrial movCTwnt and on the other, the political wing supp-
orted by more moderate unions. Despite the division <HI this issue, the 
BIC generally supported the Labor Party though at times the relation-
ship became rather shaky as they differed during the war chiefly on 
the deg3*ee of radicalism to be espotised. This division based on rad-
ical and moderate attitudes was to have a disastrous effect on the 
closer unity movem^t and in effect delayed until 1922 the achievement 
of the moves initiated in Brisbane in 1918 as it divided the industrial 
movement into two hostile groui»* 
96, Daily Standard. 5 July 1919, 
97, Murray Parks Fereign and Defence Policies and Policy Making in 
the Australian Labor Parties 1916-1930, unpublished M A (history) 
thesis 1974, ANU, p 74, This thesis gives an excellent analysis 
of the increasingly radical policies of the Brisbane Industrial 
Council durtng the years 1916-1918, 
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Chapter Nine 
PATTERN FOR THE FUTURE. 
While the southern states argued over whether the OBU scheme 
should be the Workers International Industrial Union or the Workers 
1 
Industrial Union of Australia or whether there should be federation 
or amalgamation, the industrial movement in Queensland reverted to 
the looser organisation of the coitral Labour Cotmcil. This type 
of vertical structure provided limited cohesion and central control 
of industrial matters within the ambit of a labotir movement that 
favoured close linlcs between the political and industrial wings with 
arbitration and conciliation as the main means of settling industrial 
problems. 
Industrial unionism was still favoured by a ntiraber of unions who 
attempted to absorb all unions in an industry into their ranks to make 
them the coitre of a larger more powerful union that would have control 
1. See Ian Bedford "The One Big Union 1918-1923", Ian Bedford and Ross 
Curnow (eds) Initiative and Orpcanisation (Melbourne, 1963), for an 
account of the OBU movement and the various rival organisations 
that were created by the various warring groups of the Australian 
Industrial movement. 
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of industrial matters within that industry. Some, e.g. the QRU, 
tised all the rhetoric and arguments of the OBU propaganda but 
seoned to descend to the level of a few powerful officials attempting 
to accrue even more power to their positions as leaders of the in-
2 
dustrial movement. At times, it became a matter of personalities as 
men like Tim Moroney, George Rymer of the QRU and W.J. Riordan of 
the AWU, arrogant, abrasive and contemptuous of craft union officials 
created hostility within their own unions a,nd between them and the 
craft unions by their sneering ridicule of each other and of the 
craft union officials. 
The QRU and the AWU both with members in the railv/ay industry 
had a running battle over demarcations concerning in which union 
railwaymen shotild enrol. The AWU was especially bitter over the 
role of the ARU (of which the QRU was, after 1920, the Queensland 
Branch) in the Commonv/ealth Arbitration Court's rejection of the 
AWU's attempt to register an OBU, the Australasian Workers' Union. 
It was with a great degree of spiteful pleasure therefore that the 
AWU rejected overtures by Moroney as secretary of the Queensland branch 
of the ARU to discuss closer organisa.tion in the state because the 
attitude of his union in opposing the registration of the Atistralasian 
Workers* Union was "still fresh in the minds of the members of the 
3 
Executive". The struggle to become the initiating agent for the 
2. See the ^ U's newspaper The Militant held in its offices in the 
Brisbane Trades Hall for examples of the QRU's OBU propaganda. 
3. Official Report Twelfth Annual Delegate Meeting Queensland 
Branch A\^'U 1925 (Sydney, 1926), p 41. 
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founding of the OBU in Queensland was fought out as part of the bitter 
feud between these two larger unions, but for most of the rest of the 
state, closer tmity meant the establishment of an open forum in which 
a eonsenstis of €>pinion could be ascertained on matters of vital JUB-
portance to all Queensland unionists and the establishm^st of a 
controlling agency which would carry out the instructions of the 
assembled unions, provide a central organisation that woold loosely 
l ink the unions and be the vehicle for c<Micerted industrial action i f 
the need arose. While the Industrial Council structure was suitable 
for localized control, the needs of concerted action by, and control 
of, the whole state's industrial movenent called for a body with wider 
powers and a farther-reaching influence and control. Out of such needs 
was created the Trades and Labour Council of Brisbane which became the 
basis for the creation of the broader-based organisation, the Trades 
and Labour Council of Que^island, 
The same war-time conditions that produced the OBU movement 
spawned the embryo of the Trades and Labotir Council, Possibly, it was 
"poetic justice" or just one of the ironies of fate that this movement 
shotad be initiated by the nostalgia of the farewell dinner in 1917 
to Albert Hinchcliffe whose dream of making the ALF Queensland's 
central Industrial body had be^i thrust aside by the amalgamationists 
4 
only a few short years before. Speakers at the dinner evinced great 
interest in the linking up of the various labour bodies not cmly in the 
4, Daily Standard^ 2 March 1917. 
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metropolitan area but throughout the state. As a parting gesture, 
Hinchcliffe once more appealed to all concerned to spare no effort in 
5 
achieving this amalgamation. At the subsequent Brisbane Industrial 
Council raeeting, discussion of the enthusiasm for amalgamating the 
labour bodies throughout Queensland produced the resolution that the 
Council Executive should draft a scheme for the proposed amalgamation 
6 
for consideration by the council. While newspaper reports of the 
7 
decision hailed it as the advent of the OBU, it was obvious from the 
discussion that the tmion delegates confused as they were themselves 
by the OBU propaganda, were groping for the kind of organisation best 
represQited by the Melbourne Trades Hall "where the whole of the ac-
tivities, political and industrial ... were efficiently carried on under 
8 
a system of close organisation". 
As 1917 progressed, worsening economic conditions and fears of 
that peace "when it arrives with its scores of thousands of unemployed, 
9 
will bring about a cataclysm ..." increased the realisation of the need 
for a central industrial body to fulfil the functions previously carried 
out by the ALF. On the recommendation of the executive of the Industrial 
10 
Council, a conference was convened of the Trades Hall Board (the 
management committee for the Trades Hall), the Eight Hours' Union 
(the committee which organised the yearly Eight Hours' Day procession), 
5. loc cit 
6. loc cit 
7. loc cit 
8. loc cit 
9. ibid, 30 July 1917. 
10. ibid. 11 April 1918. 
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the Metropolitan Labor Council ( a body repressiting the WPOs of the 
Brisbane area) and the Brisbane Industrial Council, in order to 
discuss the amalgamation of these metropolitan Labor organisations to 
forra a basis for a body with wider state control and affiliations. 
Out of the conference came an amalgamation committee consisting of 
representatives of the Industrial Council, the Trades Hall Board 
and the Eight Hours' Union. Its chairman was Alec Skirving (Hair-
11 
dressers Union) and R.J. Mulvey (Moulders Union) was its secretary. 
The rivalry between the officials of the separate bodies made 
progress slow and threatened to destroy the scheme. Suspicion that 
the Trades Hall Board, in sending delegates to a conference to con-
12 
sider the teaching of trades to disabled soldiers, was attempting 
to usurp the Industrial Council's authority seemed likely to halt 
negotiations completely until the Trades Hall Board ceased its activity 
in the contentious area. The withdrawal of the Metropolitan Labor 
Council from the scheme reduced the participating bodies to the three 
industrial organisations, the BIC, the Trades Hall Board and the Eight 
13 
Hours' Union. From the negotiations of these three bodies, there was 
drafted a scheme to establish one central authority to control indus-
trial matters in the metropolitan area. 
This body, the Trades Hall Council was divided into four sections -
the Industrial Committee; the Eight Hour Anniversary Committee; the 
11. ibid. 30 July 1917. 
12. ibid. 18 January 1918. 
13. loc cit 
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14 
Trades Hall Management Committee and the Parliamentary Committee. 
Each committee was to be controlled by separate rules and have 
management powers over their section of industrial matters. Unions 
were to affiliate directly with the Trades Hall Council. 
As efforts to achieve unity at the executive level for metro-
politan unions progressed promisingly, some unionists perceived the 
wider implications of this scheme and pressed for the establishment 
of a state executive body which could unite the industrial movement 
and give it the strength and unity to overcome the stresses that 
peace promised to inflict on the industrial community. In response 
15 
to the call of the Queensland Railway Union, the Brisbane Industrial 
Council initiated moves for a Trades Union Congress. The main object-
ives of the congress were to determine - (a) the need for anntial 
state Industrial Conferences (b) the necessity or otherwise of a 
permanent industrial executive body acting for the whole state (c) 
the formation of a scheme for more complete and effective industrial 
organisation (d) the formal declaration of working class aims upon 
16' 
(1) the war (2) peace (3) repatriation and other war troubles. 
Over a third of the resolutions for the conferaice agenda paper 
17 
referred to the pressing question of closer industrial organisation. 
By the time the congress met in August 1918, the alleged "scientific 
organisation" of the OBU scheme and its implications of control of 
14. ibid. 12 April 1918, 
15. ibid. 11 ^ ril 1918. 
16. ibid. 24 May 1918. 
17. ibid. 17 July 1918, 
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the labotir movement by a centrally united industrial wing had grabbed 
the imagination of the closer unity advocates. Discussion of the 
schemes already approved by the New South Wales Congress dominated 
the Queensland assembly of unions. 
The unanimity of the congress in adopting the WIUA as the basis 
for Queensland union organisation obscured the fundamental divisions 
18 
existing in the industrial movement. The bitter struggle that 
developed over the OBU scheme widened the cracks in the union edifice 
until they became a chasm splitting the union movement asunder. 
In provincial towns, the industrial movement was controlled mainly 
by unions who were coimnitted to the maintenance of craft autonomy and 
who favoured the Labotir Cotmcil form of organisation. OBU ideas 
failed to capture their interest or convince them to experiment in the 
same way as the metropolitan tmions. Some like Toowoomba, Ipswich, 
Gympie, Rockhampton and Townsville followed the Brisbane example of 
establishing Industrial Councils but generally took even less part in 
the movement to establish the OBU than did the metropolitan unions ex-
cept for Townsville. The northern centre long-known for its militant 
spirit formed an OBU committee which energetically promoted the OBU 
by holding large public meetings each week and publishing a paper 
advocating OBU ideals. Its secretary, E, Thomson, expressed great 
faith in northern support for the OBU when he wrote: 
18. ibid. 20 August 1918. 
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... the principles of the OBU have met with 
tmbotmded enthusiasm and is acknov/1 edged as the 
means by which the workers can win their em-
ancipation,!^ 
However, nothing more was reported of its activities in the OBU or 
in the Brisbane labour newspapers and its enthusiasm for the OBU seems 
to have died just as that of Brisbane's unionists had. In contrast, 
the Gympie Industrial Council, after debating the joining of the OBU 
movement, was divided equally for and against. No move therefore was 
made to follow Brisbane in forming a committee to educate unions to 
20 
join the WIUA. 
One of the largest rural unions,the AMIEU,held aloof from the 
movement seemingly convinced that its foim of worker control within the 
meat industry was a superior form of organisation to that of the OBU, 
Nevertheless, it suffered the same internal conflicts that the other 
great rural union, the AWU, experienced as OBU ideas created some grass-
i^ 3ots irritation with executives reluctant to commit their tinions to the 
revolutionary ideas of the OBU movement. 
In Brisbane, the divisions and new alignments came to the surface 
in a struggle for control of the Trades Hall Council which threatened 
to destroy any hopes of establishing a central industrial authority 
for Brisbane or for Queensland, 
21 
Out of the struggle came new criteria for defining militancy. Up 
19, OBU. 1 September 1919, 
20, Daily Standard. 11 March 1919, 
21, See ch 1 pp 15-18 for a discussion on militancy. 
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to 1915 and almost to the end of the war there was a unity in the 
Queensland labour movement that papered over the ideological differ-
ences. Though industrial unionist had differed with craft unionist 
and amalgamationist virith federationist, a basic unity had been main-
tained by the need to fight the conservatism of the non-Labor govern-
ments, first in Queensland and later in the federal sphere and the 
hostility of employers which remained a constant factor. By the close 
of the v/ar, the federal problan was still existent, but a common stand 
on the major issues of conscription and censorship was no longer a 
source of unity. They were replaced by serious economic and industrial 
problems, Queensland, free of major industrial conflicts since 1912, 
was rent by two major strikes in 1917 and 1918-19, 
In the latter there seemed, to the militants, little difference 
between the behaviour of the Queensland Labor government and that of the 
much despised National Party governments both state and federal, Im-
prisonment of '*Red Flag" demonstrators and government action during the 
1919 Merivale Street riot v/ere further proof to many unionists whose faith 
in the Labor government was being shaken by its handling of economic 
issues such as unemployment and in 1921 cuts in the basic wage, that the 
Queensland Labor Party was no longer purstiing a radical policy or in-
troducing economic reforms at a suitable rate. Challenges to the govern-
ment *s policies and its suitability to lead the Queensland labour move-
22 
ment were issued first by the QRU and then by a growing number of other 
22, Daily Standard. 5 April 1920. See also The Militant for ex-
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tmions and unionists many of whcra had been affiliates of the BIC and 
were now affiliated with the Trades Hall Council, These mostly became 
advocates of workshop control and the supremacy of industrial control 
of the labotir movement. 
Inspiration and example was given to them by the Bolshevik re-
23 
volution, the soviet systan of administration and the internation-
alism of the new world-wide socialist organisations. Out of their 
ranks came the nucleus of the Queensland division of the Australian 
Communist Party to be formed in the 1920s. This in itself produced 
a further division in the ranks of the new left-wing that further con-
fused and weakened it and the industrial movement. These critics of 
the capitalist society, the arbitration system, the Labor Party and the 
unions that supported it whether through approval of its policies and 
what it had done in the past or from fear that while the Labor govern-
ment might be bad, a non-Labor government would be worse, called them-
selves the •'militants" of the labour movement. All others were scabs 
24 
or "moderates'* or both. To some extent the criteria of this new 
militancy were the same as those of the pre-war period. It opposed a 
22, (cont) pressions of this opposition to the Queensland Labor 
Party. George Rymer in his taped interviews with the author ex-
pressed strongly his and his union*s opposition to the Labor 
Party*s policies especially those concerning railway workers, 
23, Daily Standard. 18 August 1918, On the first day of the Third 
Trade Union Congress the Russian Constil General, Mr. Simonoff 
addressed the assembled unionists who pledged their support for 
the newly formed Bolshevik republic in its battle against re-
volutionary government. 
24, ibid. 3 May 1920. 
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government not reforming or changing society at a satisfactory rate 
and confronted employers reluctant to provide suitable industrial 
conditioi^. At its extreme edge were those who desired a fundamental 
and ideological re-structuring of society. Not all militants were 
agreed on the extent of the chai^ ;es needed or the method of its achieve-
ment. Much of its militancy was inspired by dissatisfacticaa with ec-
onomic policies of government and management. But now, the militants 
25 
were prepared to be critical of PLP policies. 
It was the perception of the Queensland union movement that 
opposition to the PLP became one of the criteria of militancy in this 
period whereas support for the political party had been an indication 
of a union* s militancy a few years previously. Militancy had moved 
further to the left in the political and ideological spectrum leaving 
behind unions formerly **militant" and bringing a new polarization of 
power in the industrial movement centred on the urban unions and the 
rural unions. A swing of the axis had occurred so that the first now 
contained the "militants" and the foimerly militant mral unions were 
the "moderates". However, many Brisbane unions and unionists were also 
classified as moderates by the self-styled militants. 
Before 1915, the AWU, both as a separate organisation and in con-
junction with the AWA of Queensland after their amalgamation in 1913, 
had been a leading militant union but after the Labor win in 1915, its 
25, For a further discussion of Queensland union militancy in this 
period see A.A, Morrison '•Militant Labour in Queensland 1912-
1927", OP cit. 
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power within the Labor Party and its ability to obtain good Arbitration 
Court awards, had achieved most of its basic objectives and reuoved much 
of its need for extreme militancy. It is not claimed that in actual 
fact the ASVU did not exhibit some aspects of militancy, but rather that 
in the perception of those who "deemed themselves the militants" such 
tmions as the M U had lost their claim to be designated as militant. 
The urban tmions principally situated in Brisbane and Townsville and 
centred on the QRU, the meat workers and the building trades unions 
worst hit by the declining economic conditions and especially with the 
QRU and the building trade unions being affected directly by govern-
ment departments and their decisions, desired greater control over 
the Labor Party and the government. However they fotmd the Labor 
Party under the more autocratic control of Theodore, beginning to act 
more independently of the wishes of the industrial wing. 
It is simplistic to represent the '*militaniJ* v **moderate" dicho-
tomy purely in terms of a power stiniggle for control of the Labor Party 
but this conflict was a basic cause of the divisions in the Queensland 
labour movement and underlay many of the ideological and economic con-
troversies that split the movesa&at during these years. While divergent 
policies were major causes of the differences, the personalities of 
the leaders of the factions cannot be discounted as important contrib-
utory causes. 
When Ryan was the leader of the political party, he was careftil to 
consider the needs of the industrial wing. He endorsed giving to the 
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tmions a part to play in the decision-making processes that produced 
the Labor Party*s policies and supported altering the representation 
on the CPE and at the Labour-in-Politics Conventions and reforming 
laws relating to the tmions. 
Theodore was more impatient of union demands and more inclined 
to independent authoritarian actions. It is true that he was beset 
by more economic problems than Ryan had experienced. The Treasury 
depleted by severe drought conditions was faced by the refusal of 
British banks to provide loan money. In addition, Theodore was 
faced by strong radical opposition from the BIC and later the Trades 
Hall Council. The ferment in the labour movement forced from the 
Queensland Central Executive the Solidarity or Disruption manifesto 
ostensibly aimed at the I W but really a warning to other disruptive 
2t 
radical elenents in the union movement. Theodore*s failure and that 
of some of his ministers such as Jack Fihelly, Minister for Railways 
to be sensitive to the needs of the industrial mov®nent and to treat 
the wishes of militant union leaders with respect created great hos-
tility to the Labor government amongst these unions. 
It would also be simplistic to represait the divisions in the labour 
movement only in terms of union versus union. Conflict between mili-
tants and moderates split the monbership of many unions. The rift was 
evident in the opposing attitudes to the OBU as displayed by Pierce 
26. Solidarity or Disruption QCE Official Manifesto, 11 Eflarch 1919; 
also P.C. Conroy Political Action (Brisbane, 1919), 
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Carney and J.T, Gilday both Queensland del^ates to the federal 
27 
conference of AMIEU in 1919, Carney presented the more radical 
view of the northern Queaisland sections of the AMIEU when he secon-
ded the motion for the AMIHJ to adopt the OBU preamble as the union* s 
own. Gilday, president of the Queensland branch, opposed the motion 
and suggested the union should conc^itrate cm strength«iing its pos-
ition in the meat industry by concentrating on achieving one hundred 
per cent enrolment of workers in their own union by amalgamating with 
the Sigine Drivers and Ei^neers Unions both with members in the industry. 
This conflict betwe^i southern moderat^iess and northern militancy 
was evident in the lack of support givsEi to the northern meatworkers by 
southern Queensland sections of the AMIEU in the 1918-1919 meat strike. 
In s(»ne instances, large sums of money collected for financing the strike 
28 
were never forwarded on to the northern section. The strength of the 
left-wing group was reflected in the election of at least two or three 
militants amongst the eight or nine Queensland delegates to the AWU*s 
29 
annual conference before and during the early 1920s, One could probably 
trace the fluctuating support for their ideas in the votii^ patteri]^ 
over the years for militants, such as Ernie Lane, who were elected reg-
ularly to the Queensland delegation to the annual AWU conv^ition. 
Similarly, it is a simplification to depict the power struggle 
27, Worker. 13 November 1910. 
28, Cutler op cit. p 100, 
29, Official Reports of the AWU Annual Delegate Ccmferoaces 
Queensland Branch. 1918-1923, 
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purely as a rural versus urban conflict. The ASVU while it was the 
largest rural tmion in the state had important urban sections. In 
1919 the Milling, Baking and Confectionary Union became the Food-
stuffs Section of the AWU. Other small urban craft unions had amal-
gamated at various times with the A¥/U and the large tinion had in its 
ranks a considerable number of municipal workers, railway workers and 
meatworkers in metropolitan and provincial towns. However, it was 
classed as a rural union because the great majority of its mesnhers 
were in rural occupations. The result was a complex division in the 
industrial movement on the basic issues of satisfaction or otherwise 
with the performance of the Labor Party and just how and to what purpose 
the instiTiments of power controlled by the labour movement should be 
used , 
In the metropolitan area, this conflict was reflected in the 
struggle to control the Trades Hall Council which had the potential 
to be the most powerful organisation in the Queensland industrial 
movement, A struggle developed between the militant controlled Bris-
bane Industrial Council which became the Trades Hall Council (IHC) 
by the withdrawal from the Amalgamation Committee of the two other 
metropolitan industrial bodies, the Eight Hour Committee (later the 
Labor Day Celebration Committee) and the Trades Hall Board, both con-
trolled by moderates. 
Initially, at a mass conference in 1919 of delegates of forty-
three unions, the constitution of the three metropolitan industrial 
245 
organisations which arose frcmi the January 1918 agreea^it was adopted 
30 
with only slight modifications. The only dispute was over payment 
of dues to the new Trades Hall Council, This solved, the rules were 
refexred back to the unions for further consideration. Nevertheless, 
the amalgamation proposal was launched. By mid-February 1919, twenty-
three unions had signified their approval of the scheme and the date 
31 
of the inaugtural meeting was set for the folloxTing July, The 
apparent metropolitan success in achieving a centralized industrial 
32 33 
authority encouraged Ipswich and Gympie to establish industrial 
councils for the same purpose. 
The amalgamation of the three metropolitan industrial organis-
ations px>eceeded well up to the time of electing the executive 
34 
officers of the Trades Hall Council, At this point, because of a 
rule which banned politicians from holding office oo. the Council's 
executive, the Brisbane Industrial Council's delegates were able to 
35 
gain control of the key positions. When the moderates realised this, 
both the Eight Hour Union and the Trades Hall Board by withdrawii^ frcmi 
the amalgamation left the new body in ccaitrol of the militants, claim-
ing later that attempts had been made to make them sub-committees of 
the Trades Hall Council instead of semi-autonomous bodies that the 
36 
rules of the constitution provided for. The Brisbane Industrial 
30, Daily Standard. 25 September 1918, 
31, ibid. 18 February 1919, 
32, ibid, 23 April 1919, 
33, ibid. 11 March 1920, 
34, Trades Hall Council Minutes, 10 December 1919, 
35, ibid, 21 January 1920; also Daily Standard. 3 May 1920, 
36, Daily Standard. 6 August 1920, 
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Council carried out the agreement by dissolving itself and passing over 
its powers and assets to the Trades Hall Council. The two other bodies 
continued in existence until 1922 as separate independent organisations. 
The ensuJ.ng period was marked by a bitter confrontation betweoi 
the two groups with each predictably blaming the failure of the amal-
gamation scheme on its opponent. For a time, the Sight Hour Union 
attempted to usurp the functions of the Council, After changing the 
terms of its reference and its name to the Labour Day Celebrations 
Committee (LDCC), the committee declared its intention to inaugurate 
periodical meetings of its members to which parliamentarians and others 
were to be invited to give addressee on political and industrial sub-
37 
jects. While it continued to deny charges by the Trades Hall Council 
that it was attempting to rival the Council, the LDCC extended its 
activities by making representations to the federal Treasurer opposing 
the imposition of an amusement tax, tackled the Lord Mayor over the lack 
of lavatory facilities in the city, involved themselves with the quest-
ions of unfair treatment of a worker and the practice by the government 
of leasing contracts outside the state. 
The Trades Hall Cotmcil resented the actions of the Labour Day 
Celebrations Committee. In retaliation, it established in 1920 the 
IntexTiatlonal May Day Celebrations Committee for the purpose of organ-
38 
ising a rival celebration on Labour Day. 
37. Trades Hall Council Minutes, 22 August 1919, 
38, ibid, 4 February 1920, 
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A number of unions showed their displeasure with the Labour Day 
39 
Committee by withdrawing their support from its planned celebrations. 
The Painters Union decided to destroy its banner and after rejecting 
a suggestion to cut it up to make fancy waistcoats for its members, 
resolved that the unions, on the first public occasion when the banners 
were out, should take them to the Domain and publicly bum them as 
40 
relics of "obsolete antiquity". The painters regarded their banner 
as a symbol of the "bad old craft days". Inspired by similar senti-
ments, the AMIELJ proposed to give its banner to the museum "as a relic 
of the barbarous past". Both unions were motivated by their fervour 
for industrial unity and their hatred of craft unionism which they 
claimed the monbers of the Trades Hall Board and the Labour Day 
41 
Celebrations Committee desired to perpetuate. 
Labour Days in 1920 and 1921 were marked by two simultaneotis cele-
brations each symbolic of the difference between the warring factions. 
In 1920, the Labour Day CelebrationsCcaimiittee held the traditional 
procession led by prominent members of the labour movement from the 
political and industrial wings. At the evening celebrations in the 
Trades Hall, speeches by both politicians and unionists criticised the 
faction •*which deemed itself the 'militant' section" and its action in 
42 
grabbing control of the Trades Hall Council. 
The Trades Hall Council's celebrations were marked by a gathering 
39, Daily Standard. 9 April 1920, 
40. ibid. 5 June 1920, 
41, ibid, 8 May 1920. 
42. ibid. 3 May 1920, 
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in the Domain which was entertained by the singing of the Children's 
Peace Army while *'Workers Arise" (Henry Lawson's "Australian Marsei-
llaise") was sung by the Labor Girls Club. Its evening festivities 
included speeches by Gordon Brown, Jack Roche and the international 
socialist Scott Bennett. A speaker from the Russian Workers' Assoc-
iation called for protests against Brttish intervention in the affairs 
of the young Soviet State and the evening closed v/ith the singing of 
43 
the "Red Flag", 
Later that same month, hostilities betweai the two groups 
flared into open confrontation over the sacking of the Trades Hall 
44 
caretaker and the Trades Hall Board's use of members of the ABIEU 
after the Building Trades Group of the Trades Hall Council had de-
clared the job black. The Trades Hall Board was bitterly criticised 
for its use of police to protect ABIEU members from harassment and to 
guard matertals and work on the construction site. 
A series of mass meetings called to discuss the troubles at the 
Trades Hall work site were attended by large numbers of meti^opolitan 
45 
unionists, the last in June 1920 attracting between 300 and 400 workers. 
Decisions at the meetings showed clearly the rank and file desired the 
amalgamation to take place. Encouraged by their support, the Trades 
Hall Council once again attempted to initiate an amalgamation confer-
ence but the refusal of the Labour Day Celebrations Committee to accept 
43. loc cit 
44. Trades Hall Council Minutes, 12 May 1920. 
45. Trades Hall Council Minutes, 21 June 1920. 
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46 
the invitation wrecked its hopes of a reconciliation. 
Further attempts to achieve the amalgamation foundered on the 
continued reftisal of the Labour Day Committee to compromise. Labour 
Day in 1921 was again marked by separate celebrations but the Labour 
Day Ccsmnittee celebrations had many fewer participants than in pre-
vious years whilst the opposition group's festivities were well att-
47 
ended. The decline of its support must have concerned the Labotir 
Day Committee but so determined was its decreasing band of adherents 
to maintain their stand that it is probable they would have resisted 
the overtures of the Trades Hall Council for an indefinite period. 
However, the worsening economic and political situation created 
a crisis situation in which a closing of the unions' ranks was needed 
to strengthen the labour movement and protect the industrial wing from 
a political party that refused to heed its demands or consider its needs 
as more important than those of other sectors of the population. Worse-
ning relations betweoi the industrial and parliamentary wing of the 
party has been reflected in the much reduced vote for the PLP at the 
1920 elections. The Labor government was returned by the narrowest 
of margins. 
The widening division in radical attitudes in the labour movement 
was evident in the split in the Queensland delegation at the 1921 
48 
Interstate Labour Conference over the socialisation objectives. Two 
46. Daily Standard. 29 October 1920. 
47. ibid. 3 May 1921, 
48. Morrison op cit, p 2l8, 
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Queensland unionists in the delegation, David Weir, QRU and Bill 
Riordan, AWU, voted for its adoption while three out of the fotir 
representatives of the Queensland branch of the ALP, Theodore, 
McCormack and Lewis McDonald, secretary of the QCE, opposed it. In 
an economic and political environment where the Labor government had 
not only Introduced an economic campaign involving reductions in the 
work-force and the services of the Railway Department and hinted at 
reductions in wages but also rejected a recommendation by the Queens-
land Central Executive adopted in February 1922 "that the Arbitration 
Act be am^ided to provide for raising the standard of living and that 
any reductions in the basic wage of £4/5/- be prevented by such amend-
49 
ment", the need for industrial tmity was intensified, 
50 
In November 1921, the persistence of the Trades Hall Council was 
rewarded when the other two organisations suddenly agreed to attend a 
new amalgamation conference on 30 November 1921. This time no member 
51 
of the executives was allowed to be present. The conference was to 
be composed only of rank and file manbers of the three organisations. 
Thirty unions endorsed the new move and twenty-five were represented 
52 
at the conference. Later, others attended the discussions which led 
in January 1922 to the adoption of a new more ambitious amalgamation 
53 
scheme, 
49. ibid, pp 219-220, 
50. Daily Standard^ 11 November 1921, 
51. loc cit 
52. ibid. 3 December 1921, 
53. ibid, 17 January 1922. 
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The plan was to establish the Trades and Labour Council of 
Queensland which would be the central industrial authority for the 
whole state. In the constitution, the name and the objectives of 
the new body showed clearly the far-reaching intentions of the 
founders of the new council: 
Najne: Trades and Labour Council of Queensland 
Constitution: The Trades and Labour Council of Queensland 
shall consist of members of the working class banded 
together in unions for their mutual protection and advantage 
in industry, and for the carrying into effect the objects 
of the cotmcil hereafter laid down. 
Objects: (a) To secure closer unity in industry, with a 
view to organise into one big union the whole of the 
workers of the State, (b) To wrest from the capitalist 
class the economic powers which it as a class possesses, 
and to use them in the interests of the workers, (c) To 
settle by the best means possible all industrial disputes 
or inter-union disputes, (d) To collect funds wherever 
possible for the purpose of placing the new Trades Hall on 
a sound financial footing, (e) To organise on Labour Day 
a celebration worthy of the Labor movement, and, or, at such 
other time as the council may from time to time direct, (f) 
To scrutinise carefully all bills submitted to Parliament which 
bear in any way upon the industrtal standing of the workers, 
and to take such action as may seem most suited to secure 
alterations in accordance with the views of the cotmcil, (g) 
To secure a Labor press which shall be controlled from, or, 
by, council, (h) To act generally in the best interests of 
5 4 the workers. 
Follov/ing the recommendation of the mass meeting to the three 
industrial bodies to amalgamate as quickly as possible, a number of 
55 
unions announced to the Labour Day Celebrations Committee that they 
were withdrawing from their membership of that body until it came to 
a decision concerning the amalgamation tha,t would be satisfactory to 
54, loc cit 
55. ibid. 19 January 1922, 
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the majority of the rank and file. However the LDCC did not move to 
satisfy the rank and file until union representatives called upon the 
LDCC to forget its differences with the Trades Hall Council so that a 
united front could be presented to employers who were bringing pressure 
to bear on unions and on the goveimment to agree to wage reductions to 
56 
overcome the economic difficulties plaguing the country. As an in-
dication of its willingness to co-operate, the Labour Day Celebrations 
Committee invited the Trades Hall Council to attend its meeting to 
plan a unified celebration of Labour Day. The gathering developed into 
a conference of the ninety delegates from the Trades Hall Council, the 
57 
Labotu* Day Celebrations Committee and the Amalgamation Coimnittee. An 
agreement was reached to transfer all funds and assets negotiable or 
otherwise and all liabilities of the three organisations to the ftmd 
under the name of the new body, the Queensland Trades and Labor Council. 
This time differences were submerged in the common desire to unite 
the industrial movement and give it the framework on which a strong move-
ment could be built. At the inaugural meeting of the Trades and Labor 
58 
Council in April 1922, forty-six metropolitan unions were represented. 
G. Hamer was elected president, R.J. Mulvey as secretary, George Lawson 
MLC as vice-president, and Jock Miles as treasurer. These results made 
the executive representative of all groups but placed it firmly in the 
hands of the "moderates", 
56. ibid. 16 Febrtiary 1922, 
57. ibid, 16 February 1922. 
58. Brisbane Trades and Labour Council Minutes, 12 April 1922. 
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Initially, the new body had little power or influence beyond 
that which affiliated unions felt morally bound to render it. However, 
by forcing public servants attanpting to resist proposed reductions 
in their wages to plead their case in the State Arbitration Cotirt, the 
Labor government gave the Trades and Labotir Council an issue which 
allowed it to rally the unions behind it. Those whose positions were 
not covered by court awards suffered a five per cent salary reduction 
59 
by government regulation. 
In the conflict that followed, the Trades and Labour Council was 
an important means of organising opposition and formulating ideas for 
the whole state in cotmteracting government actions. Frcan this ti^ ne, 
the TLC in Brisbane became accepted by an increasing number of unions as 
the central voice and organising agency for the Queensland industrial 
movement. However, while the TLC was able to play an increasingly 
dominant role in Queensland industrial affairs, the ideal of its found-
ers to have it function as the central organisation of the state was not 
achieved, structurally, until 1947 when the Trades and La.bour Council 
of Queensland was formed as the central agency of closer unity with 
which all other Labour Councils in Queensland affiliated. 
The resurrection of the Labour Council movement spelt doom for 
those unions which had OBU aspirations. Though at times the AWU had 
sought affiliation it had generally held aloof from linking up with 
the Brisbane and later the state body. The polarization of industrial 
59. ibid, 19 April 1922, 
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and political forces into Elizabeth Street and Upper Edward Street 
60 
factions became more marked as the years progressed. 
Attempts by the AWU and the QRU to re-kindle the OBU movement 
in Queensland failed dismally in subsequent years. In its 1922-1923 
efforts, the AWU could attract support tram only one local union, 
61 
the Queensland branch of the Federated Colliery Employees Union. 
The QRU's efforts to extend its control over the craft unions existing 
in the railway industry foundered on the twin rocks of its own ab-
rasive attitude to the craft tmions which resisted its offers of 
amalgamation and the ability of these smaller unions to achieve their 
own objectives through the arbitration cotirts and the support of the 
Trades and Labour Cotmcil, 
Labour Day 1922 was celebrated in Brisbane under the auspices of 
the Trades and Labour Council, Unionists speaking at the traditional 
dinner universally condemned the government for its actions in the 
62 
reduction of wages issue, W,J. Riordan of the AWU replying on 
behalf of the Cotmcil to a toast in its honour struck a note from the 
past when he claimed the Cotmcil should legislate itself out of 
existence by industrial grouping its affiliates and evaitually forming 
63 
the One Big Union. There was little chance that hif advice would be 
60. The "Edward Street" reference is due to the situation of the offices 
of the Trades and Labour Council and the AWU offices beii^ at the 
upper and lower ends of that street in Bxlsbane. The AWU offices 
were really a few doors from the corner of Edward and Elizabeth 
Streets, 
61. AWU Executive Minutes, 5 May 1922. Reel 3 M50 ANU, 
62. Daily Standard^ 3 May 1922, 
63. loc cit 
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heeded 
A satisfactory balance between the independent pursuit of 
objectives peculiar to a particular union and unified action for 
achieving the common objectives of the whole union movenent had 
been achieved, llie basic pattern was set and the future course 
of developments in closer unity was laid out clearly for the Queens-
land industrial movement. 
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CCMCLUSION. 
The hiatus created by the demise of the ALF had been filled 
not by the amalgamation and One Big Union ideas that defeated it 
but by a similar, loosely organised body which eventually became 
a part of the nationwide federation the Australian Cotmcil of Trade 
Unions, The Trades and Labour Council's continued existence until 
today and its growth in power and stature emphasise it was the 
logical conclusion of the closer unity movement of this era. To 
accommodate the wide range of union structures and the divergent 
ideologies of the industrial movement, a flexible, resilient kind 
of organisation, allowing for a maximum of autonomy for its affil-
iates and a minimum of central control, was needed. The Trades and 
Labour Council structure HM been shown by its long existence in 
Australia to be the most successful structure in resisting the 
pressures peculiar to the local industrial movement. 
That Queensland had delayed for so long in establishing this 
almost traditional structure was due to the long existence of the AI^ 
and its influence. Based on the fundamental belief of tmionists in 
the "unity is strength" ideal, the doctrines of the ALF philosophy 
of "Strength United is Stronger" prepared the way for the more 
centralist industrial unionism, the "big union" pretensions of the 
AWU and its extension the OBU ideology so that it seemed a natural 
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step for many advocates of closer unity to seek the closer ties 
of one large amalgamated union. The ghost of complete organisation 
of all v/orkers into one tmion raised by Robert Owen haunted the 
idealists of the period. Pragmatic unionists accepting the in-
numerable obstacles to the achievonent of the "impossible dream" 
of trade unionism compromised to achieve a degree of closer unity 
that had given Queensland unionism a parliamentary form of central 
.organisation that best suited our British and Australian traditions. 
The Labour Councils had become and would continue to be the 
focus for closer tmity in Brisbane and in the main provincial towns. 
Later, this pattern would be institutionalized by the creation, 
finally, of an acknowledged central Labour Council with affiliates 
from all regions of the state. Within the onbrace of this looser 
type of vertical closer tmity, much closer bonds of horizontal 
unity were welded by the spread of amalgamations and federations 
so that almost all large unions, at least, were affiliated v/ith state-
wide or nation-wide bodies. This trend has continued since. It is 
probable that by the end of the century there will be fewer unions 
which do not have inter-state links. 
Craft tmionism still existed strongly but small local tmions 
based on craft lines were less prevalent. Most craft unions were 
organised much more on 'new model' lines. Within the state they 
were usually administered by more centralized hierarchies tmder the 
control of a small group of professional officials. The executive 
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officer maintained close control over the affairs of the large 
tmions but allowed regional branches autonomy mainly over localized 
activities except where they impinged upon the interests of the 
national or state-wide bodies. 
The promise of greater unity through a general espousal of 
industrial unionism was not achieved. Though industrial unionism 
and its extreme manifestation, the OBU, were influential in moulding 
the eventual shape of the major trends of the period, the industrial 
union movement failed to replace craft unionism. Those unions, 
mainly the AMIEU and the ARU, which came closest to achieving the 
industrial union ideal organisationally continued to act in much 
the same way as craft unions by placing their own sectional interests 
above those of the total union movement. However, the ideals of in-
dustrial unionism persisted long after the end of the twenties en-
couraging ftirther amalgamations of unions within some industries and 
the continuance of the industrial grouping system within the frame-
work of the Labour Cotmcil structure. 
Nevertheless, at the inter-union level, the main response to 
the crises of the first two decades of the twentieth century was the 
establishment of the Labour Cotmcil system. It was not achieved 
qtiickly or easily but evolved out of the searching experimentation 
in union structure that marks this period as one of the most sig-
nificant in Queensland union history. While the quest which had 
begun in 1889 had not reached its final stage by 1922, it is certain 
259 
that the pattern that future developments in closer unity would take 
had been set with the establishment of the Trades and Labour Council 
in Brisbane in that year. 
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APPENDIX C 
The following is a list of unions represented at the Special 
Meeting called by the Brisbane Industrial Council on 25 November 
1914 for the purpose of discussing 
1 
in Brisbane. 
the amalgamation of all tmions 
Ship Painters and Dockers 
Musicians 
QTA 
Painters and Ship Painters 
Amalgamated £hgineers 
Hairdressers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Boot Trade Employees 
Shop Assistants 
Masters and Engineers 
Signwriters 
Iron Workers Assistants 
Conf ecti oners 
AWU 
(Ship Painters and Dockers Union) 
(Musicians Union) 
(Queensland Typographical Association) 
(Federated House Painters, Ship 
Painters, Paperhangers and Decorators 
Employees Association of Australasia) 
(Amalgamated Society of Engineers) 
(Queaisland Operative Hairdressers 
Union) 
(Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union 
of Australasia) 
(Australian Boot Trade Employees Union) 
(Shop Assistants and Warehouse 
Hnployees Union) 
(Masters and Engineers Association) 
(Signwriters Union of Queensland) 
(Federated Iron Workers Assistants 
Association of Queensland) 
(Queensland Journ637man Confectioners 
Union) 
(Australian Workers Union) 
1• Daily Standard. 28 November 1914, 
2, This column shows the titles of the unions as listed in the Daily 
Standard. 
3, These are the full titles of the unions. 
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Life Assurance Agents (Queoisland Life Assurance Agents 
Union) 
Shipwrights (Port Brisbane Shipwrights Union) 
Builders Labourers (Australian Builders Labourers 
Federation) 
Plumbers (Australian Plumbers and Gasfitters 
Employees Union) 
Progressive Carpenters (Australian Society of Progressive 
Carpenters and Joiners) 
Coopers (Federated Coopers Union of Australia) 
Engine Drivers and Firemen (Federated Engine Drivers and 
Firemen's Association of Australasia) 
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